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MEMORANDA RECORDED fqq 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaints 
VS. 









PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 28th day of March 2007, Lee Fisher, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, who, being first duly sworn, 
complains and says: JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County 
of Elrnore, State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there commit the crime of RAPE, a 
felony, said crime being committed as follows, to-wit: 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. Q 18-6101(3), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of S.T., a &male person, with 
his penis, and where S.T. resisted but her resistance was overcome by force or violence in that the 
Defendant held S.T. down by her wrists, all in violation of I.C. 1 8-6 101 (3). 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 1 
p ~7 q[a ~n 8 ' 7 
004 d M U  WYU b d  r J  
All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and 
provided against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Said Complainant therefore prays that the Defendant, JUSTIN W. WODGION, be brought 
before the Court to be dealt with according to law. 
DATED This 28th day of March 2007. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
TY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN T 8th day of March 2007. 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 2 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
In The Matter Of the Arrest 1 Citation No. 
of 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE 
Defendant. CAUSE FOR ARREST 
Justin Wayne Goodgion DOB
SSN:
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ELMORE, ) 
Detective Catherine Wolfe, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
That I am an authorized peace officer, and on the 27th of March 2007, at approximately 
10: 10 p.m. o'clock (10 10 hours), I had probable cause to believe that Justin Wayne Goodgion, 
the defendant herein, committed the following crime(s): 
Rape, Idaho Code 1 8-6 1 0 1 (3) 
AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE - Page 2 
The probable cause for defendant's mest was as follows: 
On June 22,2006, at approximately 2 100 hours, a juvenile female (S. T.) came to the Sheriffs 
Ofice with her mother to report a rape. S. T. reported that a male subject that she knew as Justin 
Goodgion came to her residence at 5556 Tenant Avenue, Mountain Home, Elmore County, 
Idaho, at approximately 2000 hours, and raped her. S. T. told me that Mr. Goodgion held her 
down on her living room floor by her wrists and placed his penis in her vagina after she told him 
"no" and also "I don't want to do this." 
On March 27,2007, at approximately 1010 hours, I was speaking to Justin Goodgion in the 
interview room of the Elmore County Sheriffs Office, as he was a suspect in a rape that was 
reported to the Sheriffs Office in June 2006. I read Mr. Goodgion his Miranda warnings via the 
Miranda rights form, which he stated that he understood and initialed each line after each right. 
He also signed the form and also signed that he would speak to me next to "I wish to speak to 
Detective Wolfe." Mr. Goodgion admitted to me that he had sexual intercourse with S. T. and 
that he knew that she was fourteen or fifteen-years-old and he had turned nineteen, two months 
prior. Mr. Goodgion told me that the sexual intercourse was consensual and denied forcing 
himself on S. T. 
DATED This 27th day of March, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND ,2001 .  
~bkinis ter  Oath 
.-u , . .-..- c 1  , 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT- OF . . ) 
, . 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF E + f ? q F E 1 2 ~  ~ ; 1  4: 02 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
0 Defendant. U 
,... .  '  
Case No. , . .... . , L I 
THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE That David C Epis, Magistrate, who has 
identified himself to me as a duly appointed, qualified, and 
acting Magistrate of the District Court in and for Elmore County, 
Idaho, has advised me of the following facts: 
1. That I have an absolute right to remain silent and do not 
have to make any statement. 
2. That in the event I did decide to make a statement, 
anything I say can and will be used against me in a Court of law. 
3. That I have an absolute right to have a lawyer advise and 
represent me at all stages of the proceedings. 
4. That I have the right to a lawyer even if I cannot afford 
one, and if I cannot afford one, I may use the services of the 
Public Defender at any time and at public expense. 
5. That I have the right to have a preliminary examination. 
I understand the above and have a full awareness of each of said 
rights as explained to me by the above named Magistrate. 
Witness 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE " ' @ - . I \  ' - . 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
n n - 7  I - 7 r 
$o~d IJYL .. ..\ L 3 F;t 4: 0 1 Case No. CR- 
NO CONTACT ORDER ;- : 
(Criminal) 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court, and good caus ppearing, /3" 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shal 
communicate with or knowingly remain within one hundred (100) fe 
"Contact" means, but is not limited to contact in person, through third p 
other electronic means, or knowingly remaining within the distance limit 
Exceptions - the Defendant may have contact for the following 
4 
CbQ None. 
[ ] to contact by telephone between , .m. and , .m on J 
for the following purpose: , 
[ ] to participate in counseling or mediation; 
[ ] to meet with or through attorneys and 1 or during legal proceedings; 
[ ] to respond to emergencies involving the natural or adopted children of both parties; 
[ ] Other: 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall not go within three hundred (300) yards of the 
above-named person's residence or workplace as follows: 
Workplace Address 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order can be modified will remain in effect until fUrther 
order of the Court or upon dismissal of this case at 1159 p.m. on , whichever occurs first. 
NOTICES 
1. A violation of this order is a separate crime under Idaho Code 4 18-920, for which no bail will be set until an appearance 
before a Judge, and is punishable by a fine of up to $l,OOO.OOJ or by imprisonment up to one ( I )  year, or both. Any such 
violation may also result in the modification of the above terms or the increase or revocation of the bond set on the 
underlying charge in this matter. 
2. When more than one domestic violence protection order is in place ntrol any conflicting 
terms of any other civil or criminal protection order. 
3. This Order controls and supercedes any previous No Contact Order entered 
4. This Order may subject you to federal prosecution under the United States if you possess, receive 
or transport a fir 
Dated t h i s m d a y  of ,m [h , h 
NO CONTACT ORDER - 1 
nna 




1003 2nd Street N. 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
0 
rth Judicial District Court, State of 
a 
In and For the County of Elmore who 
150 South 4th East, Suite #5 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647-3095 
j Case No: CR-2007-0001156 
) 





The Court being fully advised as to the application of Justin Goodgion, and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Elmore County Public Defender 
290 South 2nd East 
Mountain Home ID 83647 
Public Defender for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Justin Goodgion, in all proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that helshe may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
DATED This 28th day of March, 2007. 
Prosecutor p Deputy Clerk 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
IN THE D I S T R I ~ T O U R T  OF THE FOURTH J U D I C I ~ I S T R I C T  OF THE 
STATE O ~ A H O ,  IN AND FOR THE C O U N T ~ F  ELMORE 
1 
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1 Case No. w-07 -I 1% 
WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATION 
Defendant. 1 
Being aware of the fact that a preliminary examination is a 
Court hearing to determine if a crime has been committed and 
whether there is probable cause to believe that I committed such 
crime, and being fully aware of my right to have such a 
ng criminal charge of 
, a felony, now lodged 
hereby waive my right to 
such preliminary examination. No promises or threats have been 
made to me nor is any pressure of any kind been used against me to 
encourage the signing of this Waiver. 
Dated this day of 3:3a 
Magistrate 
015 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mouatain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
C a ~ e  NO. CR-2007-000 1 1 56 
Plaint% ) 
) 
VS. 1 ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT 
1 TO ANSWER 




ON THE 6th day of April 2007, at the hour of 1 :45 P.M., the D e w  appeared befbre the 
undersigned Magistrate with Terry S. RatW Attorney at Law, his attorney of record, tbis being the 
time and place set for the preliminary examination herein. The State of Idaho was represented by Lee 
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elrnore, State of Idaho. The Defendant 
waived the reading of the Complaint on file herein. The Defkndant was advised of the right to a 
prebinary examination, the nature of which was explained to the Defendant. The Defendant 
thereupon waived his preliminary examination. 
The Court, being M y  advised in the premises, finds that the crime oE RAPE, a fklony, as 
set forth in the Infbrmation on file herein, have been committed in EImore County, State of Idaho, 
and that there is suflEicient cause to believe that the Defendant committed said crime. 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 1 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED That the Dekndant be and hereby is held to answer to the 
charges as set forth in the Information on file berein, before a District Judge in the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Tbat Defendant' 
DATED This &ay of A@ 2007. 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 2 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
1,S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2007-000 1 1 56 
Plaint 8, 1 
1 
VS. 1 I N F O R M A T I O N  
1 




Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attomy in d for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, 
who, in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person, 
comes now before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is 
accused by this Infbrmafion of the Mime of  RAPE, a felony, upon which charge the said Defendant, 
having duly appeared before a Magistrate on the 6th day of April 2007, and then and there having 
waived his prelimimy examhation upon said charge, was, by said Magistrate, thereupon held to 
answer befbre the District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the 
County of Elmore, to said charge, which crime was committed as fbllows: 
INFORMATION - Page 1 
- - .  ORIGINAL 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. 8 18-6101(1), 1&6104,1&112A, 18-8304 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of S.T., a female person, with 
his penis, and where S.T. resisted but her resistance was overcome by fi,rce or violence in tbat the 
Defendant held S.T. down by her wrists, all in violation of I.C. 8 18-61 01 (3). 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This 6th day of April 2007. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I 
eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
INFORMATION - Page 2 
n r s  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL APRIL 16, 2007 
COURT MINUTES 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
) 
vs . 1 RAPE 
1 







Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
Tape No. A132-07 1325 to 2307 
10:ll a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for INITIAL ARRAIGNMENT, defendant present, in 
custody, bond set at $$lo, 000.00. 
Information and papers filed. 
The Court informed the defendant of the charge(s1 filed against 
him being a felony and of the possible penalties which could be 
imposed. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
The Court has received an Amended.Information. 
No objection by Mr. Ratliff. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 16, 2007 
Page - 1 
The Court advised the defendant of, his right to counsel at public 
expense in all the proceedings in this Court. 
The Court advised the defendant of his right to appeal from any 
Judgment entered, to be represented by counsel in said appeal and 
payment of costs incurred in said appeal at public expense and of 
the appeal time being forty-two (42) days. 
True copy of the Information furnished to the defendant and 
counsel. 
True name of defendant, JUSTIN GOODGION. 
Formal reading of the Information waived by defendant. 
The Court advised the defendant of the different pleas he could 
enter to the charge(s) set forth in the I'nformation and of the 
statutory time, not less than one (1) day, he would be entitled to 
before entering his plea. 
Defendant advised that he understood his rights, the charge(s) and 
the possible penalties that could be imposed. 
Statement by Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court the defendant will plea "Guilty" to 
the charge of Aggravated Battery in the Amended Information. The 
Staters recommendations are: the defendant will receive a 
Psychosexual evaluation and a PSI. If defendant is not a high 
risk then the fines and fees will be $1,000.00 with $750.00 
suspended with public defender and court costs reimbursed. No less 
than 2 years and no more than 10 years of jail. The defendant 
will be placed on felony probation for 5 years. The defendant 
will have no contact with anyone under the age of 18 unless they 
are a family member. The defendant will complete all 
recommendations on the psychosexual evaluation. 120 days of jail 
with work release if qualifies. Restitution will be aid if need 
be determined. State will request retained jurisdiction if 
defendant does not do recommendations. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the full fee will be suspended if 
completes his recommendations. The defendant will have no contact 
with the victim. 
Mr. Ratliff states that he has had adequate time with the 
defendant. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 16, 2007 
Page - 2 
The Court advised the defendant that by pleading GUILTY, he would 
be giving up his constitutional right to a trial by jury and the 
right to confront witnesses and accusers and the privilege against 
self incrimination. Further advised that the Court is not bound 
by the negotiations of counsel at sentencing. 
Defendant sworn and examined as a witness in own behalf and for 
information of the Court. 
In answer to the Court, defendant entered a plea of "GUILTYu. 
The Court found that the defendant understood the rights he would 
be giving up by his plea of guilty and that he understands that 
the Court is not bound by the negotiations of counsel at the time 
of sentencing in this matter. 
The Court accepted the defendant's plea of "GUILTY"; and directed 
the clerk to enter said plea. 
Mr. Ratliff requests bond reduction or release. 
No objection by Mr. Fisher. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
The Court will reduce bond to $5,000.00. The defendant was 
advised absolutely no contact with the victim or any children 
under the age of 18 accept for family members. 
The Court ordered a presentence report and continued this matter 
to June 18, 2007, at 1:30 o'clock p.m. for SENTENCING. 
Defendant remanded to the custody of the Elmore County Sheriff. 
10:34 a.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
eput Clerk BYY 
Reporter: K. Redlich 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 16, 2007 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
vs . 1 Case No. a-2-7 -\\% 
1 
1 
DOB: 1 ORDER REDUCING BOND 
SSN 1 
Defendant. 
TO: The Sheriff of  Elmore County, State of  Idaho. 
You are hereby notified that the bond in the above 
entitled matter has been reduced to the amount stated below. 
CHARGE w- Y 
REDUCED BOND AMOUNT 
CONDITIONS: No law violations, maintain contact with attorney, 
make all scheduled court appearances, \% . ~ L - T  
\ '.- 
Dated this \b%ay of 
ORDER REDUCING BOND 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 





JUSTIN W. GOODGION, ) 
SSN: 
DOB 1 
e f h t .  1 
Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attomey in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, 
who, in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person, 
comes now before b District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
the County of Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is 
accused by this Amended Idormation of the crime oE AGGRAVATED BATTERY, a felony, which 
crime was committed as follows: 
AGGRAVATED BATTERY 
Felony, LC. b) 1&907(a), 18-903 
That the Defendant, Justin W. Goodgion, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County 
of Elmore, State of Idaho, did wilfully and unlawfully use force upon the person of S.T., causing 
AMENDED MFORMATION - Page 1 
great bodily harm permanent disfigurement, and/or permanent disability, to-wit: by having sexual 
relations with S.T., all in violation of I.C. $8 18-907(a) and 18-903. 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against 
the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This 16th day of April 2007. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
1 
BY: 
Lee %her, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
AMENDED INFORMATION - Page 2 
TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No. 3598 
RATLIFE' LAW OFFICES, CETD. 
290 South Second East 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
2007 APR 30 AH 9: 43 
t.i,:i;i3A GfiitilYETT 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Attorneys for Defendant 1 
IN THE DISTRICI' COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAFIO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) Case No. CR-2007-0001156 
Plaintiff, 
) 
VS. ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL 
1 EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 
1 
Defendant. 
THE COURT having considered the stipulation of the parties herein, to wit, that the 
Defendant have a psychosexual evaluation for the court to consider at sentencing herein, and 
good cause appearing therefrom, and the Defendant being still in custody, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Dr. John Morgan will conduct' a Psychosexual 
Evaluation of the Defendant and will have access to the Defendant at the Elrnore County Jail to 
conduct said evaluation. Payment for the purpose of conducting said evaluation of the Defendant 
shall be at County Expense in that the Defendant is both indigent and in need of said evaluation. 
ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE 1 
Dated this Sy of April, 2007 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on t h i s a w d a y  of April 2007, served a copy of the 
within and foregoing ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY 
EXPENSE to: 
Marsa Grimmett BY: - /hand delivery 
C/O Elmore County Courthouse Federal Express 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 Certified Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile - 
Kristina M. Schindele By: HandDelivery 
Elrnore County Federal Express 
Prosecuting Attorney Certified Mail 
190 South 4' East U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 607 Facsimile Transmission 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Fax No. (208) 587-2 147 
Terry S. Ratliff By: / Hand Delivery 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. Federal Express 
290 South 2nd East Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
Fax No. (208) 587-6940 Facsimile Transmission 
ORDER FOR PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION AT COUNTY EXPENSE 2 
027 
Dr. John Morgan 
704 Main Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605-3744 
Fax No. (208) 455-3495 
By: Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
J U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JUNE 18, 2007 
COURT MINUTES 







1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
1 









Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
Tape No. A216-07 0132 to 0180 
4:48 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant not present for 
proceedings, in custody, bond set at $$10,000.00. 
The Court advises that they psychosexual evaluation has not been 
received. 
The Court set this for SENTENCING on August 6, 2007 at 1:30 
o'clock p.m. 
4:45 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
e uty Clerk -Y 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - JUNE 18, 2007 
Page - 1 
>UL I u  L u u I  \ I U L t  l u - u U  L a w  u 1 1 l L C 5 ,  C I I L u .  I ~ ~ A , Q = o I  O Y U U  
I 
. ' 
TERRY S. R A W  
RATLIFP LAW OIFJFICES, CBTD. 
290 South Second East Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Tclqbne: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
TSB: 3598 
bi 53.4 c;iiinHiTT 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Attorney for the Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TBE F0T.TR'l.X JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR l"HE COUNTY OF ]ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
-VS- 1 MOTION TO SEAL 
1 ]PSY~OsExuAL 




COMES NOW The Defendant and his attorncy of =cord, TERRY S= RATLIFF, of Ratliff 
Law Offices, CM., and hereby moves this Court to Seal, , b r n  both the Court and the State, the 
Psychosexual Evaluation conducted with the Defendant, until such time as the Defendnnt and 
Counsel review the m e ,  first, and determiae whcthcr or not such evaluation comports with the 
dictates of thc Dcf&tt's rights pursuant to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment to the U.S. 
. , Constitution, 'md such similar rights pursuant to the Constitution of the ~tate'of~daho. Said Motion 
is baxd on Estrad' v. State, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). 
MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION - Page 1 
J U L - I U - C U U I { I U C I  1 4 - U O  
L 
Law u I I I L C . ~ ,  L I I C U .  
The Sixth Amendment gurvantew a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all 
"criticaI stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. Unitcd States v. Wade, 388 
U.S. 218, 224, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967); Sme v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 
637 P.2d 415 (1981). A defenbi's right to effective assistance [**9] of counsel 
"extends to all critical a g e s  of the prosecution where his substantial rights may bc 
afZected, and stntmcing is one such m e . "  Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796, 874 
P.2d 603,607 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,134,88 S. Ct. 254, 
256, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967)). In determining whether a particular stage is  "criticd," it is 
necessary "to analyze whether potential substanti J prejudice to defendant's rights inheres 
in the particular conftontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prcjudicc." 
Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S. Ct. at 1932. "mf the stage is not criticat, thcre can be no 
constitutional violation, no mattcr how dcficicnt counsel's performance." United Stotes v. 
Benlian, 63 F.3d 824,827 (gm Cir. 1995). 
It makes no sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or 
entry of a guilty plea, and would also be entitled to representation at sentencing, yet 
would not be entitled to the advicc of counscl in thc inkdm period regarding a 
psychoscxual cvduation. Thc analysis in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct, 1866, 
68 L. Ed. 359 (1981), [**I01 is instructive. In Estelle, the United States Suprcmo Court 
ruled that the capital deftndant's prc-trial psychiatric evaluation was a critical stage of the 
proceedings. Id at 470, 101 S. Ct. at 1877. Thc Court stated the m47de~mdant had a 
Sixth Amcndmcnt right to the assistance of counsel befoe submitting to the interview, 
observing that it "is centnil to [the Sixth Amendment] principle that in addition to 
counsel's presence at trial, the accused is  guaranteed that he need not stand alone against 
the State at my stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where 
counsel's absence might derogate fiom the accused's right to a fair Id. at 470-71, 
10 1 S. Ct. at 1876-77 (quotation omitted). 
A psychosexual exam concerned with the future dafigmusness of a defendant is 
distinguishable fiam a "mutine" Wsentencc investigation. Specifically, HNwdaho Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 32 does not require a defendant's participation in a presentonce 
investigation report, whereas I.C. 8 18-83 16 states, "lf ordcrcd by thc court, an oEender 
, . , shall submit to [a psychosexualJ twaluation.. ,." The presmtence [**I11 report relics 
greatly on infiirmation already available in public records, such as educational 
background, residence history and employment information. See LC.R 32(b). In contrasf 
a psychoscxual cvaluation liko thc one Estrrda faced is more in-depth and personal, and 
includes an inquiry into the defmdantls sexual history, with verification by polygraph 
being highly recommended. Because of the nature of the information sought, a defendant 
is more liktiy to make incriminating statements during a psychosexual cvduation than 
during a routine prcscntcncc investigation. As the district court in this casc concluded, 
"the psychosexual cvaluation contained information concerning Esh.adavr > w e  
dangerowness."' 
Importantly, the Estelle Court recognized b t  the defendant was not seeking a right to 
have counsc1 actually present during the exam. Id. at 471, a14, 101 S. Ct, at 1877, n.14. 
MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL 1EVAI;UA~ON- Page 2 
This clarification reflects a diffmcc betwcen the "limited fight to the appointment and 
presence of counsel rccopized as a F i f i  Amendment safeguard in M r h "  and a 
defendants Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. See id; scc also State v. 
Tinkham, 74 Wn. App. 102,871 P.2d 1127,1131 (Wd~CtApp.  1994) [[**I21 (ruling a 
court-ordered psychological cxam to determine a defmdant's future dangerousness for 
sentencing purposes is a critical stage requiring the aPis&nce of counsel, but cki@ing 
"wc arc not holdin that counseI has a right to be present, only that the dcfcndmt has the 
right to advice"). '%is Court's hding that a Sixth Ammdment right to assiscnnce of 
counsel in the critical stage of a psychosexual evaluation inquiring to a defendant's firturt 
dangerousness, does not necessarily require the presence of counsel during the exam. 
Because Estrada does not argue his attorney should h v c  bccn present duting the 
evaluation, this ruling is limited to the finding that a defendant has a [*838] Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel regarding only the decision of whether to submit to a 
psychoscxual exam. 
Oral argument is requcstcd. 
3 4  
DATED This // 'day of ~ u l y  2007. 
MOTION TO SW PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION - Page 3 
032 
OF SERVICE 
/- I IlEREBY CERTW That I haw on this // day of July 2007, sewed a copy of thc 
within and foregoing MOTION TO SEAL PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION to: 
Kristina Schindelc b Hand Delivery 
Elmore County Prosecutor Federal Express 
190 south 4' East Certified Mail 
Mountah Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
% Facsimile Transmission 
Fax NO. (208) 587-2 147 
MOTION TO SEAL PSYCEOSIEXUAL EVALUATION - Page 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Plaintiff, 
) Case No. CR-2007-1156 
VS. 
) 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 
) ORDERRE: 
) MOTION TO SEAL 
) PSYCHOSEXUAL EVALUATION 
Defendant. 
The defendant, through counsel, has filed a motion to seal psychosexual 
evaluation. In his motion, the defendant "moves this Court to Seal, from both the Court 
and the State, the Psychosexual Evaluation conducted with the Defendant, until such time 
as the Defendant and Counsel review the same, first, and determine whether or not such 
evaluation comports with the dictates of the Defendant's rights . . . Said Motion is based 
on Estrada v. State, 149 P.3d 833 (2006)." 
The defendant pled guilty in this case. Pursuant to his guilty plea and in open 
court, the defendant was advised that in entering his guilty plea he waived any right to 
object to participating in a psychosexual evaluation to assist the court in sentencing. 
Consequently, Estrada is not applicable here. 
If the defendant's position is that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently enter his guilty plea, the court would entertain a motion to withdraw the plea 
and go to trial. The defendant may not have it both ways, however, by entering a guilty 
plea and then asserting a right he was specifically advised he was waiving at the time he 
entered his guilty plea. 
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing, the defendant's motion is hereby denied. 
+ 
SO ORDERED AND DATED this day of July 2007. 
D' rict Judge /" 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following: 
Lee Fisher 





Dated this 12th of July, 2007. 
" I  
MARSA G~IMME'~ ' ,  
Clerk of the biitrict Court 
, I 
. -  I 
Depu By h e  erk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL AUGUST 6 ,  2007 
COURT MINUTES 







1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
CD NO. D02-07 10:49 to 10:51 
10:49 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody, 
bond set at $$10,000.00. 
The Court advises that there has been a letter received that the 
PSI has not been completed. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
The Court continued this matter for SENTENCING on September 17, 
2007 at 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
Defendant remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
10:51 a.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
he District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - AUGUST 6, 2007 
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Deputy Prosecutinq Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
3:37 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody, 
bond set at $$10,000.00. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the corrections to the PSI 
and he will stipulate to the defendant going on a rider. 
All parties have received and had adequate time to review the 
report. 
Mr. Fisher states corrections. 
Mr. Ratliff states corrections. 
The defendant had no corrections. 
No testimony. 
COURT MINUTES - SEPTEMBER 17, 2007 
Page - 1 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Fisher's recommendations: 
Both parties stipulate to a rider. He advises that there is no 
restitution that the State knows of. The entire fine be suspended 
but the court costs and public defender reimbursement shall 
remain. The defendant pay reimbursement for the psychosexual 
evaluation. And the defendant is to register for Selective 
Service. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations: 
The defendant to go on a rider. 
No statement by the defendant. 
No legal cause shown. 
The Court sentenced the defendant to 15 years incarceration with 5 
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate and the Court will retain 
jurisdiction. The defendant will have credit for 174 days against 
the fixed portion of the sentence. The defendant will pay a fine 
of $1,000.00 with $700.00 suspended plus standard court costs and 
$250.00 reimbursement to the public defender . No order for 
restitution at this time. The defendant will have no additional 
jail time. The defendant is to have no contact with the victim or 
any member of the family. No fine will be imposed. The defendant 
is to receive relationship and anger programs, substance abuse 
programs, cognitive based programs, obtain his GED, and any other 
such programs deemed appropriate by rider personnel.. 
The Court advised the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
No legal cause shown. 
The defendant remanded to the custody of the sheriff's office. 
3:51 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
' C  
B y y  D pu y Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - SEPTEMBER 17, 2007 
Page - 2 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, U 
Plaintiff, 
vs . ) Case No. CR-2007-1156 
JUST  
DOB: ) JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
SSN:  ) RETAINED JURISDICTION 
Defendant. ) 
On the 17th day of September, 2007, before the Honorable 
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee 
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, 
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry 
Ratliff, this being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in 
this matter. 
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the 
Information filed against him for the crime of RAPE, Felony, I.C. 
5 18-6101(1); of his arraignment thereon on April 16, 2007; plea 
of "Guiltyn thereto on April, 2007 to the crime of AGGRAVATED 
BATTERY as charged in the Amended Information; and of the receipt 
and review of a presentence investigation report. 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
The Court asked whether the defendant had any objections 
or corrections to be made to the presentence report to which 
minor correction were made. 
The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or 
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment; 
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement. 
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he 
replied that he had none. 
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the 
Court why judgment should not be rendered; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense 
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed 
on or about the 22nd day of June, 2006. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the 
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by 
said Board in a suitable place for a period of fifteen (15) years 
with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate; with 
credit for 174 days served; with the court retaining jurisdiction 
for 180 days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4). 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
31-3201A(b) the defendant shall pay Court costs in the amount of 
$17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of 
$10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-4602; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the 
amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-3201B; ISTARS technology 
fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. 5 31-3201(5); 
$50.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to I.C. 5 72- 
1025; $250.00 for reimbursement of public defender fees pursuant 
to I.C. 5 19-854(c), $10.00 drug hotline fee; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-5304 the defendant shall pay restitution to be 
reserved until completion of the rider; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and 
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District 
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by 
the Department of Probation and Parole; 
Defendant shall obtain his GED, receive cognitive based 
programs, relationship and anger programs, substance abuse 
programs, and such other programs deemed appropriate by rider 
personnel. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the 
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery 
FORTHWITH and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other 
JUDGMENT - Page 3 
facility within the State designated by the State Board of 
Correction. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified 
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which 
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
6 
Dated this 17 day of September, 2007. 
D'strict Judge / 
JUDGMENT - Page 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this \" ) - day of September, 
2007, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument to: 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail 




Department of Correction 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Elmore County Jail 
Interdepartmental Mail 
\ , ' ,  
 MARS^ G R I ~ E ~ T  
Clerk of thql ~ihtrkct Court 
JUDGMENT - Page 5 
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1 ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 3rd day of 
March, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on 
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction. 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1 
Dated this day of February, 
D' kkict Judge t .. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 20th day of 
February, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or 
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Carolee Kelly 
Records Administrator 
Dept. of Corrections 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 




Public Defender I 
MARSA GRIMMETT ' 
Clerk of the District Court 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 2 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
2C3C FEB 28 PH 2: 57 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2007-0001156 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF FILING OF MATERIALS 
1 FOR RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, ) HEARING 
1 
Defendant. 1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT AND TO HIS ATTORNEY, 
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, WILL PLEASE TAKEN NOTICE That the State has filed the 
attached materials for consideration of the Court at the retained jurisdiction review hearing scheduled 
before the above-entitled Court at the Elrnore County Courthouse on March 3,2008, at the hour of 1 1 :00 
DATED This 28th day of February 2008. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 




Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
NOTICE OF FILING OF MATERIALS FOR RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW HEARING 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 28th day o f F e b ~ 2 0 0 8 ,  I caused a copy of the foregoing 
document, together with the attachments thereto, to be served upon the Defendant's attorney of record by 
facsimile andlor hand delivery/interoffice mail. 
Terry Ratliff 
290 South 2nd East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
KRZSTINA M. SCHINDELE 
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DATE 
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WARRANT# 
CASE #: 07-2749 EVENT #: 0712180013.A15 
CODE SECTION 0 sup.~anm~m MOUNTAIN HOME POLICE D E P A ~ E N T  CASE 8 
SUBJECT: RAPE 
1103 
GOODGION, JUSTIN W.; TAYLOR, AMANDA RUTH; CORCORAN, KELSEY 
MAY; UNKNOWN, JOHN (aka SQUISHY) ; UNKNOWN, SIERRA; TAYLOR, 
ELIZABETH; UNKNOWN, GAVIN 
Approximately sometime in January of 2007, I received a telephone 
call from ELIZABETH TAYLOR. Ms. Taylor said she used to reside in 
Mountain Home, but is now located in Montley, Minnesota. She 
informed me she wanted a report done because her daughter, AMANDA 
TAYLOR, was raped while they resided in Mountain Home, Idaho. Ms. 
Taylor stated the suspect was JUSTIN GOODGION. She went on to say 
Amanda was currently having psychological problems as she is trying 
to deal with what happened to her. 
L O C A M  OF INCIDENT 
MOUNTAIN HOME, MOUNTAIN HOME 
NARRATIVE 
I spoke to Ms. Taylor in regards to this case and informed her I 
needed Amanda to complete a written statement and send it to me at 
the Mountain Home Police Department. Ms. Taylor stated she would 
email the statement to me. I provided Ms. Taylor with my email 
address; however, I did not receive a statement. 
07002749 
Later in the year I spoke with Ms. Taylor again and informed her I 
never did receive the email of the statement I requested. Ms. Taylor 
advised me once again she would send the statement via email. 
The last time I spoke with Ms. Taylor was approximately October of 
2007, at which time I again told her I had not received anything from 
her in regards to the rape. Ms. Taylor stated she would attempt to 
mail the statement, through the U.S. Postal Service, at that time. 
I finally received letters from the Taylor's, one written by Ms. 
Taylor - dated November 7, 2007, and the other a two (2) page letter 
from Amanda. In Amanda's letter she describes the incident that 
occurred between Justin and her, and stated the first incident 
occurred June 21, 2006. Amanda said Justin walked up to one of her 
friends, KELSEY CORCORAN, and told Kelsey they decided to go to a 
subject's, JOHN (NFI), house, as Kelsey wanted to engage in 
sexual acts with Justin. 
Amanda stated Justin and Kelsey went inside a camper, outside of 
"Squishy's" house, and shortly thereafter Amanda heard Justin calling 
her name. Amanda stated she then went into the camper and, as she 
did, Justin grabbed her by the back of the hair and threw her on the 
bed next to Kelsey. Amanda asked Justin what he was doing to which 
CaOlEmION SUPPLEMENT 
a 
MOUNTAIN HOME POLICE DEPA CASE 
1103 NARRATIVE 07002749 
I I 
L O U M  OF INUOPCT 
MOUNTAlN HOME, MOUNTAIN HOME 
he t o l d  he r  t o  "shut up". She s a i d  J u s t i n  then took o f f  he r  s h i r t  
and b ra  and began ca ress ing  and l i c k i n g  he r  b r e a s t .  She s a i d  she  
t o l d  him t o  s t o p  and t h a t  he d i d  no t  have t o  do t h a t .  Amanda s a i d  
J u s t i n  again t o l d  he r  t o  be q u i e t  and took her  pan t s  and underwear 
o f f .  He then began t o  i n s e r t  h i s  f i n g e r s  i n t o  h e r  vagina. 
Amanda a l s o  s t a t e d  she was a  v i r g i n  so,  a s  J u s t i n  had h i s  f i n g e r s  
i n s i d e  he r  vagina it was very uncomfortable. She s t a t e d  she t o l d  
J u s t i n  t o  s t o p  and began t r y i n g  t o  f i g h t  him o f f ,  and again he would 
no t  s top .  She s t a t e d  Kelsey was l y i n g  t h e r e  with h e r  back turned  t o  
them, not  watching what was going on. Amanda s t a t e d  she asked Kelsey 
t o ,  "Do something", but  Kelsey ignored her .  Amanda s a i d  t h a t  i s  when 
J u s t i n  took her ,  Amanda's, pan t s  o f f .  She t r i e d  t o  s i t  up t o  run, 
b u t  h i t  he r  head on t h e  s h o r t  c e i l i n g  of t h e  camper. She s a i d  t h a t  
h i t t i n g  her  head h u r t  her  a  l o t  and, the re fo re ,  it took a  second f o r  
h e r  t o  g e t  her  " w i t s w  back. 
Amanda s t a t e d  a t  t h a t  time J u s t i n  had h i s  pants  and boxer ' s  o f f  and 
grabbed a  condom, pu t  it on h i s  pen i s  and began p e n e t r a t i n g  h e r  
vagina with h i s  penis .  She s t a t e d  she  begged him t o  s t o p  but  he 
refused.  A t  t h a t  t ime Kelsey was s t i l l  ly ing  with h e r  back tu rned  t o  
them. Amanda s t a t e d  J u s t i n  had an orgasm and, while  doing so,  
grabbed h e r  by t h e  back of t h e  head and 'forced h e r  t o  conduct o r a l  
sex  on him. She s a i d  a t  t h a t  time he f i n a l l y  l e t  h e r  go. She s a i d  
she  was cry ing  while  g e t t i n g  dressed  and J u s t i n  t o l d  her  i f  she t o l d  
anyone about t h e  inc iden t  he would k i l l  he r  and h e r  family. Amanda 
s a i d  he t o l d  he r  no one would b e l i e v e  h e r  because Kelsey would n o t  
t e l l ,  and he would j u s t  t e l l  everyone she, Amanda, wanted i t .  Amanda 
s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e  condom broke dur ing  t h e  rape and he threw it o u t s i d e  
t h e  camper. 
The second inc iden t  Amanda descr ibed  i n  h e r  l e t t e r  was da ted  J u l y  1 4 ,  
2006. She s t a t e d  t h a t  a f t e r  t h e  f i r s t  rape, she went "down-hill" 
f a s t  because she began dr inking  a lcohol  and smoking marijuana. She 
s a i d  she a l s o  began sneaking ou t  of h e r  house and even ran  away once 
a f t e r  being grounded by her  mother f o r  a  very long time. She s a i d  
she snuck out of he r  window on J u l y  1 4 ,  2006 and went t o  a  f r i e n d s ' ,  
HOLLY (NFI) house. According t o  Amanda's l e t t e r ,  Ho l ly ' s  mother 
would not  l e t  Amanda s t a y  a t  t h e i r  residence,  s o  Amanda c a l l e d  a  
f r i e n d  of t h e i r s ,  TOM (NFI), t o  p ick  h e r  up. Amanda s t a t e d  she went 
t o  Tom's mother's house, a t  which time Tom and h i s  mom decided t o  go 
t o  Boise, Idaho; therefore ,  Amanda ended up on t h e  s t r e e t s  walking 
around. Amanda s a i d  she was near  t h e  movie t h e a t e r  and J u s t i n  was 
walking toward Tom's house. She s a i d  when J u s t i n  saw her ,  he grabbed 
he r  by wrapping h i s  arms around h e r  very t i g h t  - l i k e  i n  a  bear  hug, 
and took he r  t o  Tom's house. Amanda s t a t e d  she t r i e d  t o  f i g h t  him a s  
b e s t  she could, but  J u s t i n  i s  6  f e e t  t a l l  and s t r o n g e r  than a  5 '4  
female. 
OFFICER'S NAME ( ID NUMBER 1 DATE I SUPERVlSOR RMEW 1 ID NUMBER 1 DATE I I 
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Amanda stated Justin forced her through Tom's door and into the 
living room, where he began removing her clothing. She stated that 
around that time she gave up hope and had nothing left to fight with. 
Justin inserted his fingers into her vagina and also penetrated her 
with his penis without a condom. Amanda said when he was finished 
raping her, she was crying while getting dressed, and he made the 
same threats he had the first time he raped her. Amanda stated she 
ran out of the house and went to her friend, GAVIN's (NFI), house. 
Amanda stated her mother discovered her missing and found her at 
Gavin's house. She said Gavin's mother made her leave and at that 
time she was "high" and would not get into her mother's vehicle. Ms. 
Taylor called the Police and reported Amanda as a runaway and the 
Police came and arrested Amanda, Case# 06-1400. Ms. Taylor stated at 
that time Amanda was taken to Intermountain Hospital in Boise, Idaho. 
Amanda stated Ms. Taylor was never aware of her being raped, and she 
did not tell her mother until September as she, Amanda, was placed in 
a mental facility in Texas. Amanda said they moved because Ms. 
Taylor wanted to get her out of the environment she was in while in 
Mountain Home. Amanda stated phe did not choose to press charges at 
that time as she says she was not mentally stable to do so. Amanda 
stated she "broke downn in January, and then informed a school 
counselor in Minnesota. The counselor then contacted law 
enforcement, who then contacted the Mountain Home Police Department. 
Amanda stated she emailed the report at that time; however, she 
understood we did not get it. She apologized for taking so long to 
send another report, but went on to say she is in counseling and was 
not ready to relive the two rapes again. Amanda stated she has 
nightmares and just wanted her life back. She stated she was not 
ready to relive the rapes one more time so she decided to email the 
statements. The name at the bottom of the statement is Amanda R. 
Taylor, 64 Harrison, Montley Minnesota. 
I was able to find out through my investigation that Justin was sent 
to the Department of Correction's due to a charge of statutory rape 
with another female. He is currently in the Idaho Department of 
Correction, Cottonwood. 
I contacted the Department of Corrections to see if they would 
interview Justin for me, and was told they do not do things like 
that. They advised I contact the Idaho County Sheriff's Office. 
I then contacted the Idaho County Sheriff's Department and spoke with 
Detective MIKE QUINTAL. I asked him if he could conduct an interview 
for me and he stated he would. I then faxed Detective Quintal 
a m c W S  NAME I ID NUMER 1 DATE I SUPERVISOR RNW 1 ID NUMBER 1 DATE I I 
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everything I had in regards to this case so he could conduct the 
interview. I sent him a fax on November 27, 2007 at approximately 
1030 hours. 
I received a telephone call on November 29, 2007 from Detective 
Quintal stating he did not receive the fax. I faxed the paperwork 
again on November 29, 2007 at approximately 1230 hours. I also sent 
Detective Quintal a PDF file of the information via email. He called 
me back again and stated he had not received the fax, but did receive 
the PDF file via email. Detective Quintal stated he would interview 
Justin in a couple days. 
I received a telephone call from Detective Quintal stating that he 
interviewed Justin in the Department of Corrections. Detective 
Quintal later emailed the recorded interview he had with Justin. I 
received a telephone call from Detective Quintal and he stated he 
would send me the report as soon as he had it finished. He stated 
Justin admitted to having sex with Amanda Taylor and Kelsey Corcoran. 
I am currently awaiting Detective Quintal's report so I can attach it 
to this report. 
After learning some information of the interview from Detective 
Quintal, I was able to find out that Kelsey still resides in Mountain 
Home, 463 NW Sandpiper Avenue. I was able to contact THERESA 
AGUIRRE, Kelseyfs mother, at her place of employment, 366-2614, on 
December 13, 2007. I attempted to try Theresa's home telephone with 
negative results. When I spoke to Theresa I informed her of the 
information that I had received and that I needed to speak with her 
daughter as soon as possible. Theresa stated that was okay but she, 
Theresa, wanted to be present. Theresa stated she would not be able 
to do that until December 17, 2007 at 1800 hours': 
On December 17, 2007 I received a telephone call from Theresa asking 
if I still wanted to meet with them and I advised that I did. 
Theresa and Kelsey arrived at the Mountain Home Police Department on 
December 17, 2007 at 1800 hours. I spoke to Kelsey and she confirmed 
she did have sex with Justin on one occasion. When I asked Kelsey 
about the rape Amanda is reporting and the allegations that she, 
Kelsey, was present at the time, Kelsey stated that a rape never 
happened. Kelsey said Amanda and Justin did have sex, but Amanda 
went into the trailer knowing what was going to happen, and she 
wanted to have sex with Justin. When I asked Kelsey when she thought 
thiq incident occurred, she stated it was the summer of 2004. 
I had been informed earlier by someone that Justin had sex with three 
(3) girls in one evening. Kelsey stated that allegation was not true 
and that she did have sex with Justin but it was before he had sex 
[OFFICERS NAME I ONUMBER (DATE ( SUPERVISOR R M E W  1 ID NUMBER 1 DATE I 1 
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with Amanda. Kelsey identified the third female as SIERRA (NFI), and 
said Justin and Sierra had sex on a different evening. I asked 
Kelsey how she knew Amanda and Justin had sex and she stated that she 
was sitting in the truck of the camper and that she "just knew they 
were having sex". 
MOUNTAIN HOME POLICE DEP 
1103 NARRATIVE 
I informed Kelsey and Theresa of the possibility of a court trial, 
and told them they might be receiving a telephone call from the 
Elmore County Prosecutor in regards to this case. 
CASES 
As of the date of this report, I have not received Deputy Quintal's 
report; however, as soon as it arrives I will attach it to this 
report and send it to the Elmore County Prosecutorls Office. 
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Mtn. Home Police Department 
CC: County Prosecutor 
Officer Melanie Rhodes 
oF!=M23SNAME I IDNUMBER 1 DATE ~ ~ U P E R V ~ ~ ~ R R N ~ E W  1 I0 NUMBER 1 DATE I 1 
05 7 '  I 
MOUNTAIN H ba POLICE - -. . .. 
CRIME 1 INCIDENT 
REPORT 
2?75EUi(IhNorth 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
IM)200200 
- - . . - . 
MHPD 
CRIME 
Rape - Strongam 
L 
CUSSFICATION SUSPsJT INFORMATION 
1103 
I 
AREA OCCURRED DATE TIM MY 
1 ~ c N - I F -  1 12/18/07 109:05 1 TUE 
I 
NATURE OF INCIDENT 
0 computer useti 0 ~ a t e m l u  ~otlvated 0 ~ h l l d   bum 0 0 Adult Mlsslng 
0 Alcohol Related Omcer Assault Domestlc Vlolence a Felony 0 K-9 0 Drug Ralatcd Senlor ClUzen 0 Anon 0 Mlsdemunor a ln-atlon 
0 Gang Relam @ Juvenlle CJ BuQlar~ 0 Use of Force 
SYNOPwa 
- GOODGION, JUSTIN W. 
MOUNTAIN HOME, MOUNTAIN HOME 83647 
A(EM1.S NAME 
MOUNTIN HOME 
CC: COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
OFFICER MELANIE RHODES 
m K U J A L  VlOlATlON COOE SECTIONS 
TO 
rSE STATUS DEPARTMENf DISPOSITION 
12/18/07 
12/18/07 
I W A R R  








flCER'S NAME IDNUMBER DATE SUPERWSOCl RRllNV 
- .  - IDNUMBER DATE --..--- .- ..-. -.----- .- .. - .-- --- - -.-- .-- -.-- . 
TUE 
TUE 




C O O L m O N  MOUNTAIN HOME POLICE DEP 
1103 NARRATIVE 
CASE #: 07-2749B EVENT #:  0712180013.B15 
RE: ORIGINAL REPORT 07-2749; 0712180013.A15; DATED 01/??/07 
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SUBJECT : RAPE 
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UNKNOWN, GAVIN 
On December 20, 2007, I received an emailed copy of Detective MIKE 
QUINTAL'S, of the Idaho County Sheriff's Department, report. It is 
now attached to this report and will be sent to the prosecutor's 
office. 
As of this time there is nothing further. 
Detective Humberto Fuentes 
Mtn. Home Police Department 
CC: County Prosecutor 
Officer Melanie Rhodes 
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hfuentes 
From: Mike Quintal [mquintal@idahowunty.org] 
Sent: Thursday, December 20,2007 253 PM 
To: hfuentes 
Subject: Goodgien interview 
Attachments: GoodgienJustin.wav; Goodgien reportdoc 
Attached is a brief narrative and the audio from the interview. Let me know i f  you need anything else. 
Mike Quintal 
INCIDENT REPORT 
OFFENSE: Agency Assist (Courtesy Interview) 
SUSPECT: Justin W. Goodgien 6-18-87 
LOCATION : North Idaho Correctional Institute 
D A T m  ME: 12-4-07/19:00 
I received a request by Detective Sgt. Fuentes, with Mountain Home Police Department; to 
conduct a courtesy Interview with Goodgien in regards to a rape investigation. 
On the above listed date and time I made contact with Goodgien for the purpose of conducting 
an interview. When I made contact with Goodgien I identified myself and informed him why I was there 
to talk with him. I also advised Goodgien that he didn't have to speak with me and he could leave at any 
time. Goodgien indicated that he would speak with me. I advised Goodgien of his Miranda rights prior 
to questioning him. 
Goodgien informed me of the following during the interview: 
See audio recording for full detail. 
I asked Goodgien if he knew the victim and other persons listed in the case report. Initially Goodgien 
denied knowing any of the parties from the case. Goodgien stated to me that he knows twenty-three 
Amanda's from Mountain Home. I asked Goodgien about whether he was in Mountain Home during the 
alleged incident. He told me that he was in Nampa staying with Gary Hubbard, who happened to also 
be an inmate at North ldaho Correctional Institute. Goodgien said that he was in Mountain Home until 
around June 26m. He then went to Nampa, where he worked intermittently and stayed at different 
places. 
I asked Goodgien if he ever had intercourse with a girl named Kelsey from Mountain Home. He told me 
that he had not. I asked if he ever had sex with a girl named Amanda from Mountain Home. He told me 
that he had sex with Amanda Wilson over two years ago. 
Goodgien then told me that he knew a Kelsie, unknown last name; I asked Goodgien if he ever had 
intercourse with a girl named Kelsey from Mountain Home. He told me that he had not. I asked if he 
ever had sex with a girl named Amanda from Mountain Home. He told me that he had sex with Amanda 
Wllson over two years ago. 
I explained to Goodgien that it would be very easy for investigators to prove that he wasn't being honest 
with me about knowing the people involved in the case. I told him that if he lied about knowing the 
people involved it might seem that he was lying about committing the offense. 
Goodgien told me that he did have sex with a girl named Kelsie while in a camper at Josh Moyef s house. 
After having sex with Kelsie a girl he knew as Amanda Able came by the camper and Kelsie yelled for her 
to come in. Amanda came in the camper and she (Amanda) asked for him to take her virginity. 
Goodgien said that he didn't know Amanda's age at the time and he had drunk a bottle of Jack Daniels 
about three hours prior. He had just had sex with Kelsie and didn't have any pants on at the time. He 
stated that he knew what he was doing was wrong, but he did it anyway. Goodgien told me that he had 
sex with Amanda while wearing the same condom that he had used while having sex with Kelsie. I asked 
if Amanda made any statements or indicated that she didn't want to have sex with him. He said that 
she didn't. 
Goodgien told me that after having sex with Kelsie and then Amanda that they left Moyer's camper and 
went to a girl's house named Sierra. Goodgien said that while there he had sex with Sierra, which he 
said he was subsequently charged for. He and Amanda later left Sierra's house and he walked her close 
to her house and then gave her a hug and a kiss before saying goodbye. 
Goodgien told me that the above inadent is the only sexual encounter he had with Amanda. He denies 
meeting her on the street and having sex with her at Tom's house. Goodgien also told me that Amanda 
had e-mailed him messages on his "myspace" account saying that she wanted to get back together with 
him. I asked i f  he still had his account on "Myspace". He gave me an account name of "sexyymanbeast" 
with a password of "mikalal" and an e-mail address of sexwdaddv4u@vahoo.com with a password of 
"augustus3". 
I spoke with Goodgien about whether he would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination to 
confirm his honesty about what he had told me. Goodgien indicated that he would be willing to take an 
examination. 
Detective Mike Quintal 
Idaho County Sheriff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL MARCH 3, 2008 
COURT MINUTES 







) Case No. CR-2007-1156 
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Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
11:39 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in 
custody, bond set at $$10,000.00. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that he has gone over the rider review but 
needs to discuss some new information to the State. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that he will be filing a 19-2524. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Response by the Court. The Court advises that it will exercise 
its discretion and continue this matter for an additional 30 past 
the 180 days. 
COURT MINUTES - MARCH 3, 2008 
Page - 1 
The Court set this matter for HEARING on March 17, 2008 at 11:OO 
o'clock a.m. and SENTENCING on April 7, 2008 at 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in custody of the sheriff. 
11:43 a.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - MARCH 3, 2008 
Page - 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHEREU MARCH 17, 2008 
COURT MINUTES 




1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
1 
) AGGRAVATED BATTERY 
1 







Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Counsel for State 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender Counsel for Defendant 
CD NO. D9-08 11:51 to 12:07 
11:51 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for HEARING, defendant present, in custody. 
The reviews the rider review. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defense didn't order an evaluation 
pursuant to 19-2524. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the time limit for the 
evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff requesting the Court to take this 
under advisement. 
The Court advises that it cal issue a written opinion as rapidly 
as it can. 
COURT MINUTES - MARCH 17, 2008 
Page - 1 
The Court addresses counsel regarding 19-2524. 
The Court advises that time has past for that evaluation and that 
evaluation must be requested before the original sentence was 
imposed. 
The Court further advises that the request for the evaluation is 
not timely and is not appropriate to order when a rider is 
relinquished. 
The Court will not have a 19-2524 evaluation performed where 
relinquished jurisdiction is recommended. 
The Court advises that this is set for SENTENCING on April 7, 2008 
at 1:30 o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
12:07 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
COURT MINUTES - MARCH 17, 2008 
Page - 2 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk : K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E .  WETHERELL APRIL 7 ,  2008 
COURT MINUTES 


















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
5:58 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the defendant will be pleading guilty to 
CR-2008-932 Count I. The updated PSI will be waived and will use 
the rider review. The fine amount will be left in the Courtf s 
discretion and the defendant will pay reimbursement to the public 
defender's office and standard court costs. The defendant would 
be incarcerated for a period of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 
years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156. The 
restitution is to be determined and the restitution report would 
be pending until the defendant returns from a 2nd rider. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his arraignment 
of the new case. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
Page - 1 
The Court addresses the deft of his arraignment rights. 
The defendant requested that the he would like to have the 
arraignment rights read to him again. 
The Court advised the defendant of his arraignment rights on case 
CR-2008-932. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant has dyslexia. 
The Court read the Information to the defendant. 
The Court advises that the defendant will be entering a guilty 
plea on CR-2008-932 to Count I. 
Mr. Ratliff has had adequate time with the defendant. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
The defendant advises that he understands that his counsel can 
file a Motion to Suppress but waives the right of the Motion to 
Suppress regarding his admissions. 
Mr. Ratliff consents to the guilty plea. 
The defendant agrees with his representations. 
The defendant sworn and examined on his own behalf. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his updated PSI. 
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court about the medical issues that the 
defendant has. 
The Court accepts the guilty plea and directs that they be 
entered. 
The Court advises that it will move directly to sentencing. 
The Court advises counsel about the 19-2524 evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the State has no objection 
to the defendant remaining in custody for the evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
Page - 2 
Counsel is ready to proceed to sentencing on both cases. 
The Court advises that on CR-2007-1156 the Court will place the 
defendant on probation for a period of 15 years with 377 days 
credit . That sentence is being imposed for the purpose for 
allowing the defendant in CR-2007-1156 to obtain a 19-2524 
evaluation pursuant to Idaho law. The Court advises that the 
underlying sentencing is incarceration for a period of 15 years 
with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The Court further 
advises that the only condition of probation is that the defendant 
will remain in custody of the Elmore County Jail pending 
completion of the evaluation and then be brought back in front of 
the Court for sentencing. The Court reserves the right to send 
the defendant on a 2nd rider upon completion of the evaluation 
without violation of probation. The Court will order a 19-2524 
evaluation in case CR-2008-932. The 2 matters will be brought 
back in front of the Court for sentencing. The Court will impose 
a joint rider on both cases as agreed by both parties with 
reviewing the evaluation at that sentencing. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
The Court order a 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be down. 
Mr. Fisher requests that restitution be left open. 
Response by the Court regarding the restitution. 
Mr. Fisher gave the Court victim statements. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on June 2, 2008 at 1:30 
o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
6:40 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
Page - 3 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
-; . , . - ' \5  1; 8:45 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE: COUNTY 0 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 






i ~ M E N T ,  SUSPENDED 
SENTENCg, ORDER OF 




On the 7th day of April, 2 0 0 6 ,  before the Honorable Michael 
E. Watharell, District ~udge ,  pereonally appeared Lee Fisher, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of 
Idaho, and the defendant with hie  attorney Terry Ratliff, this 
being the tima fixed f o r  pronouncing judgment in this matter. 
The defendant w a s  informed by the Court of the nature of  the 
Information filed against h i m  for the crime of RAPE, Fmlany, I.C. 
i§ 1 8 - 6 z O l ( l ) ;  of  hia arraignment thsreorl on April 16, 2 0 0 7 ;  plea 
of ' ' G u i l t y 1  thereto on April 1 6 ,  2007 of the crime of AGGRAVATED 
aATTERY as charged in the Amcnded Infm-mation; and of the receipt 
and review of a presentence investigation report. 
The Court aaksd whether the defendant had any objections 
or corrcctione to be made to the presentence report, which the 
defendant stated he had none. 
04/14/2008 HON 13:46 CTI/RX NO 90311 
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The Couxt asked whether the defendant had witnesses or 
evidence to preetent on a hearing in mitigation of punishment; 
heard statementsl Prom counael; and gave defendant an ~pportunity 
to make a statement. 
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment ahould not be pronounced against him, to which ha 
replied that he had none. 
And no sufficient cauae being shown or appearing to the 
Court why judgment ehould not be rendered; 
IT IS THIGREFORE ORDEmD, ADJIJbGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted~ that the offense 
for which the defendant; is adjudged guilty herein w a s  connnitted 
on or about the 22nd day of June, 2 0 0 6 .  
IT IS F U R ~ R  ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced 
pursuant to Idaho Coda Seetion 19-a513 to the custody of the 
Idaho Sta te  Board of Correction, to bm held and incarcerated by 
eaid Board in a suitable place for a period fifteen (15) years 
with f ive (5)  years fixed and ten (10) yeara indeterminate; 
That pursuant to Idaho Code Section 18 -309 ,  the defendant 
shall be .given credit for the t i m e  already served upon the charge 
specified herein of 377 daya. 
Execution of such judgment is euspended and defendant, 
JUSTIN W. O O D Q T O N ,  ia placed on probation fo r  a period of 
fifteen (15) years, under the following conditions, to w i t :  
S U S P W E D  GENTENCB AND ORDER OF PRORATION - 2 
A. That the probation is granted subject to the below 
listed special condition and with the understanding and agreement 
of the parties that the Court may at any time, cause the 
probationer to be returned to the Court for the imposition of 
sentence as prescribed by law or any other punishment as the 
Court may see fit to hand down, after the completion of the 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. Section 19-2524 in his other pending 
criminal case CR-2008-932 which is currently before the Court. 
The 19-2524 evaluation was requested by the defense and the 
defendant has specifically agreed in open Court to placement on 
probation temporarily in this case to allow the evaluation to be 
done prior to sentencing on the other charges. 
B. Special conditions, to-wit: 
1.Defendant will remain in the custody of the Elmore 
County Jail pending completion of the 19-2524 
evaluation and upon completion of said evaluation the 
defendant will be brought back before the Court to be 
sentenced to a 2nd rider to run concurrent with CR- 
2008-932 if deemed appropriate by the Court following 
review of the evaluation. Defendant will be given 
credit for all time sewed against the fixed portion 
of his sentence in his case for the time spent in 
obtaining the evaluation in case CR-2008-932. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified 
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which 
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
The probation agreement is to be hereto attached and by 
reference made a part hereof. 
SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND ORDER OF PROBATION - 3 
Dated this day of April, 1 0 0 8 .  
SUSPENDED SENTENCE AND ORDER OF PROBATION - 4 
This is to certify that I have read or had read co me and 
fully understand and accept a l l  the conditions, regulations and 
restriction8 under which 1 am being granted probation. I will 
abide by and conform to them strictly and fully understand that 
my failure to do ea may reault in the sevocacion of my probation 
and commitment to the Board of Correction to serve the sencence 
originally imposed, 
Probatianer's Signature 
Date o? acceptance 
WITNESSED : 
Probation and Parole Ofricer 
State of Idaha 
SUSPENDED SEWIZNCE AND ORDER OF PROEATION - 5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING -* I hereby certify that on thie 1- - day of  A p r i l ,  2008. I 
mailed (served) a true and correct copy a£ the within 
ingtrumnt to: 
Elmore  County Proeecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Elmore  County Sheriff 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Elmore C o u t y  Public Defender 
fnterdepartmntal Mail 




MARSA GRIMMETT , '  1 
Clerk of the Disvqict Court 
1 8  
SUSPE3fDQ) SEN'I'ENCE AND ORDER OF PROBATION - 6 
04/14/2008 KON 13:40 tTX/R.X NO 90311 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JUNE 2 ,  2008 
COURT MINUTES 

















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
2:26 p.m. Call of case. 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
The Court will sign the order as of today's date for the mental 
health access. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be 
withdrawn. 
Mr. Ratliff had no objection to the 2nd evaluation being 
withdrawn. 
COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008 
Page - 1 
The Court advises that there will not be an additional 
psychosexual evaluation done. 
Mr. Ratliff will stipulate to use the first evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Response by the Court. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on July 7, 2008 at 1:30 
o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in custody. 
2:31 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
By ha$- 
DR ty Clerk 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008 
Page - 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JULY 7 ,  2008 
COURT MINUTES 


















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
5:34  p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the defendant being 
evaluated for Mental Health Court. 
The Court advises that it does not believe that the defendant 
would qualify for Mental Health Court. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the agreement was that the defendant 
would be sent on a second rider on CR-2007-1156. 
Response by the Court regarding the Mental Health Court. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the State is not willing to agree to the 
Mental Health Court. 
The Court addresses counsel. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 1 
Response by Mr. Fisher. 
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the 
materials. 
Mr. Fisher had no corrections. 
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections. 
The defendant had no corrections. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Fisher's recommendations: 
CR-2007-1156 - the Court revoke his probation and send the 
defendant, on a second rider. CR-2008-932 that the defendant 
register as a sex offender. The fines, fees, court costs, and 
public defender reimbursement are in the Court's discretion. That 
the underlying sentence would be 15 years incarceration with 5 
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. That the rider is ran 
concurrent for both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. Restitution 
would be left open for the victim A.T. in CR-2008-932 and in CR- 
2007-1156would request to reserve restitution in that case. 
The Court advises that it will order a restitution report in CR- 
2008-932. 
Objection made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Response by Mr. Fisher. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement continued by Mr. Fisher. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff requesting the evaluation be 
attached to the PSI. 
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations: 
The defendant would be sent on a 2nd rider. That the Court hold 
off sex offender determination until after the rider review. That 
the defendant be evaluated for mental health medication while on a 
rider. That on CR-2008-932 that the defendant would have an 
underlying sentence of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years 
indeterminate to run concurrent with his other case and would 
request that the Court not go beyond that amount and run them 
concurrent. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 2 
Statement made by the defendant. 
The Court advises that it will add in capitals and underlined the 
following: the copy of the Idaho Code Section 19-2524 mental 
evaluation of the defendant is attached hereto assist in the 
defendant's treatment and programming while on the rider. And the 
evaluations will be attached to both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. 
No legal cause shown. 
The Court sentenced the defendant on CR-2007-1156 to incarceration 
for 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with 
credit for 468 days against the fixed portion. The Court will 
retain jurisdiction for the 2nd time. While the defendant is on a 
rider he will receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse 
treatment, obtain his GED, and any other programs deemed 
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in 
sex offender group. The Court will reserve restitution upon 
completion of the rider. On CR-2008-932 the Court sentenced the 
defendant to 25 years with 10 years fixed and 15 year 
indeterminate with credit for 468 days served with the Court 
retaining jurisdiction and sending the defendant on a rider to run 
concurrent with CR-2007-1156. While the defendant is on a rider 
the defendant will receive cognitive based programs, substance 
abuse treatment, obtain his GED and any other programs deemed 
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in 
sex offender group. The defendant will pay a fine in the amount 
of $2,500.00 with standard court costs and fees. The defendant 
will pay reimbursement to the public defender in the amount of 
$500.00. Restitution will be reserved pending completion of the 
rider. The defendant shall supply a DNA sample and thumbprint. 
The Court will reserve any determination of sex offender 
registration pending completion of the rider. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the credit for time served. 
The Court advises that on CR-2008-932 the defendant will receive 
credit for time served of 130 days against the fixed portion of 
the sentence. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 3 
6:00 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Dep ty Clerk 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 4 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk : K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF EL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 1 ! case No. C&- m-@13a 
1 
I )  
1 ORDER FOR 
SSN ) RESTITUTION REPORT 
1 
Defendant. 1 
In order that the Court may have at its disposal, an 
accurate view of the Restitution involved in the above-entitled 
case, it is ordered that the restitution be investigated by the 
Elmore County Restitution Officer and an amount be presented in 
a written restitution report filed with the Court prior to 
sentencing. 
MICHAEL E. WETHERELL 
*A report is needed prior t 
Defense Attorney: 
ORDER FOR RESTITUTION REPORT - Page 1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL - -- -r 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OQ,WmE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs . ) Case No. CR-2007-1156 
) 
JUSTIN GOODGION, 
DOB: ) JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
SSN: ) RETAINED JURISDICTION FOR 
) THE SECOND TIME 
Defendant. ) 
On the 7th day of July, 2008, before the Honorable Michael 
E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee Fisher, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of 
Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry Ratliff, this 
being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter. 
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the 
Information filed against him for the crime of RAPE, Felony, I.C. 
5 18-6101(1); of his arraignment thereon on April 16, 2007; plea 
of "Guiltyn thereto on April 16, 2007 to the crime of AGGRAVATED 
BATTERY as charged in the Amended Information; and of the receipt 
and review of a presentence investigation report. 
The Court asked whether the defendant had any objections 
or corrections to be made to the presentence report to which 
 correction were made. 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
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The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or 
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment; 
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement. 
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he 
replied that he had none. 
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the 
Court why judgment should not be rendered; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense 
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed 
on or about the 22nd day of June, 2006. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the 
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by 
said Board in a suitable place for a period of fifteen (15) years 
with five (5) years fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate to run 
concurrent with CR-2008-932; with credit for 468 days served; 
with the court retaining jurisdiction for the second time for 180 
days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4). The Court recommends the 
defendant receive cognitive based programs, substsnce abuse 
treatment and to receive any other programs,including obtaining 
his GED,deemed approriate by rider personnel, and participate in 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
the sex offender group. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-5304 the defendant shall pay restitution to the 
victims reserved until completion of the rider. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and 
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District 
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by 
the Department of Probation and Parole; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the 
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery 
FORTHWITH and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other 
facility within the State designated by the State Board of 
Correction. 
A COPY OF THE IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2524 MENTAL EVALUATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT IS ATTACHED HERETO TO ASSIST IN DEFENDANT'S 
TREATMENT AND PROGRAMMING WHILE ON THE RIDER. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified 
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which 
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
Dated this 7* day of July, 2008. 
D strict Judge C 
JUDGMENT - Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this qb day of July, 2008, I 
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument to: 
Lee Fisher 






Department of Correction 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Elmore County Jail 
Interdepartmental Mail 
;, ', I 
' 1 
MARSA GRIMMETT' I 
, 
Clerk of the ~idtkict: Court 
By : 
e p u t '  Court ' Clerk 
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It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 5th day of 
January, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on 
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction. 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1 
Dated this 30th day of December, 
Dist Yct Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 30th day of 
December, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or 
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Carolee Kelly 
Records Administrator 
Dept. of Corrections 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 
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MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JANUARY 5 ,  2009 
COURT MINUTES 


















Prosecuting Attorney Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
11:lO a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in 
custody. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding getting an updated 
polygraph and requests a 30 day extension. 
The Court addresses counsel regarding disclosure. 
Response by Mr. Ratliff. 
Discussion between the Court and counsel regarding disclosure. 
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an additional 30 days and 
sets this matter for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW on January 20, 2009 at 
11:OO o'clock a.m. 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009 
Page - 1 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
11:14 a.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 4 pages 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHEFLL JANUARY 20, 2009 
COURT MINUTES 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
1 CR-2008-932 
VS . 1 
1 







Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
11:49 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in 
custody. 
The Court advises that the Notice of Authority was just received 
today . 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the late filing. 
The Court advises that it will give the State time to respond. 
Mr. Fisher advises that if the Court is ready to proceed then the 
State is also. 
The Court advises that it will set it over on the calendar until 
3:30 o'clock p . m .  
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009 
Page - 1 
11:52 a.m. End. 
3:38 p.m. Recall of case. 
The Court advises that it has received additional case law and 
will continue this one more time. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on February 2, 2009 at 
11:OO o'clock a.m. 
The Court advises that the State may respond to the citation of 
case law by January 28, 2009 and Mr. Ratliff can file a reply by 
January 30, 2009. 
The Court further advises that this will not get delayed again 
after February 2, 2009. 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
3:40 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009 
Page - 2 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 5 pages 
. 1  r a  . 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY ,;y 28 pn12:53 
190 South 4th East zgi3 W,,I 
Post Office Box 607 , ., e l  t - l  , .  
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 c;L (,(, V-j -\i!b: :~L i<- f  
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-21 47 
OEp ~ i @  
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-00000932 & 
Plaintiff, ) CR-2007-000 1 156 
) 
vs. ) RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW FOR 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW 
1 HEARING 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby responds to the Defendant's submission of case law as follows. 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery reduced from rape in case number CR- 
2007-1 156 and was sent on a rider. During the rider, he was interviewed by law enforcement regarding 
two other potential victims. Based on that interview, this matterwas filed with two counts ofrape. The 
Defendant retuned h m  his lint rider witha recommendation to relinquish jurisdiction. The Defendant was 
placed on probation in case number CR-2007-1156 pending the resolution of this matter. The Defendant 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW 
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entered a guilty plea to one count ofrape in this matter and was sent on a rider in both cases with the Court 
reserving the issue of sex offender registration in this case and restitution in both cases. During his second 
rider, the Defendant completed a sexual history as part ofhis treatment. He submitted to apolygraph to 
determine the truthllness ofhis sexual history. The polygraph indicated that he had not beentruthfbl and 
he subsequently admitted that he had left another victim out ofhis history. The Defendant did not invoke 
his Fifth Amendment rights at any time during this process. 
LAW 
The case ofstate v. Crowq governs this matter. In Crowe, the Defendant was placed on probation 
and required him, as conditions ofhis probation, to complete a specialized sex offender therapy program 
through SANE and have no unsupervised contact with minors following a conviction for sexual abuse of 
a minor. State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 1 09,110- 1 1 (1 998). The Defendant failed a polygraph examination 
as part of his SANE treatment. "When confkonted about this," the Defendant admitted that he had 
unsupervised contact with his ten-year-old niece and had inappropriately touched her buttocks. u. at 1 1 1. 
The Defendant, at the SANE counselor's request, "made verbal and written admissions to his probation 
officer about the incidents."u. The statements to the counselor and probation officer, including the written 
statement, were admitted at the probation violation hearing. The Defendant was found to have violated his 
probation, and his sentence was imposed. See id. 
On appeal, Crowe argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admission ofthe 
statement to his counselor at the probation violation hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that 
argument. The Court first noted that 'Tilt is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by 
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the person claiming the privilege or the privilege is deemed lost."u. at 1 12 (citations omitted). Crowe did 
not assert his Fifth Amendment right. Id. The Court then reviewed the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Minnesota v. Mumhy. The Crowe court noted that Murpb held the "Fifth Amendment applies, 
even if not invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat 
to impose apenalty ifthe privilege is invoked."U. Thecourt in Murph~thenlimited its own holding," 'a 
State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its 
probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal 
proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.' "u. (quoting Minnesota v. Mmhy, 465 U.S. 
420,436 n. 7, 104 S. Ct. 1 136, 1146 n. 7 (1 984) (citation omitted)). 
The Crowe court held that a probation violation proceeding is not a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. ,-a. Therefore, the admission ofthe statements to the counselor did not violate Crowe's 
Fifth Amendment rights. & &J. A copy of the Crowe decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
The case ofMadison v. Cravw is a civil rights violation case involving Mr. Madison, "a prison 
inmate," who sued the Executive Director ofthe Commission ofpardons and Parole and two therapists 
at the Idaho Department ofcorrection. Madisonv. Crava, 144 Idaho 696,698,169 P.3d 284,286 (Ct. 
App. 2007). Madison's claims included that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was forced 
to tell a counselor that he was "sexually attracted to his daughter who was the victim ofhis crime." 144 
Idaho at 699, 700, 169 P.3d at 288. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that there was no Fifth 
Amendment violation for two reasons, the admissions did not incriminate Madison and were never used 
against him in a criminal pr0ceeding.a. at 700,169 P.3d at 288. The Madison court went on to quote 
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a t e  v. Crowg in support of this holding, noting that there was no violation in crows because the 
statements had not been used in a criminal trial. & u., 144 Idaho at 701, 169 P.3d at 289. 
Madim also notes that if a Defendant does not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege and answers 
voluntarily, the privilege is lost, i.e. the answers are not considered to be compelled within the meaning of 
1 the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 700,169 P.3d at 288 (citing M i ~ e s o t a  v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427- 
28 (1984)). A copy of Madison is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The case ofstate v. Radford, submitted by the Defendant, also supports the State's position. In 
Radford, the Defendant was r e q W  to participate in counseling through SANE. As part of the counseling, 
he completed a sexual history and was given a polygraph on that history. State y&dfor& 1 34 Idaho 187, 
1 89 (2000). ")uring the polygraph, Radford revealed" that he had committed a separate offense in 1 991. 
u. Radford had signed an agreement with SANE that SANE would disclose "information regarding his 
treatment to law personnel" and the contract specifically stated that "previous1y committed crimes must also 
be reported, and maybe prosecuted . . . ."Id. at 1 88. After the disclosure to the counselor, Radford met 
with his probation officer and made the same statement to the probation officer. At a later date, Radford 
met with his probation officer and two detectives. At that meeting, Radford wasMirandized, told he was 
not in custody, and signed a "Miran& waiver."u. at 1 89. Radford then made admissions regarding the 
same prior crime. See id. 
Radford was charged with new crimes basedon his statements and filed amotion to suppress the 
statements as being obtained inviolation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. At first the district court judge 
denied the motion to suppiess. a d .  AAer the Crowq case discussed above was decided, Radford filed 
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a motion to reconsider, which the district court granted and suppressed all ofthe statements. The 
State then appealed only the suppression of the statement made to the detectives. at 189,190 
(notingthat the State did not appeal the suppression of the statements in the new case that were required 
by the polygraph as part o f i s  probation). The Radford court then held that the statements to the detectives 
should not have been suppressed because they were voluntary and were not the fruits of the polygraph 
statements. See id. at 191-93. 
ARGUMENT 
Based on the foregoing cases and the facts in this matter, the Def-t 'S Fifth Amendment rights 
have not been violated. First, the Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right. He omitted avictim 
fiom his sexual history and failed the polygraph examination because ofhis omission. As the cases above 
note, the failure of the Defendant to invoke his Fifth Amendment right waives the right. 
Second, even ifthe Court were to find no waiver, there was no Fifi  Amendment violation because 
the law in Idaho is clearly settled that statements made to a SANE counselor aspart ofprobation cannot 
be the basis for a new criminal prosecution. -we specifically held that such statements can be used for 
a probation violation hearing but not in anew trial. State v. Crowg, 13 1 Idaho 109,112 (1 998); see also 
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,193 (2000) (noting the Crowe decision stands for the premise that 
disclosures required by probation were admissible in a probation violation proceeding but not in a 
"subsequent criminal trial"). This is a retained jurisdiction hearing. The Defendant has even fewer 
constitutional rights on a rider than he would have on probation. This proceeding is not anew or subsequent 
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criminal trial but is more akin to a probation violation hearing. Since the Defendant's omission is not being 
used in a new prosecution, there is no violation of the Defendant's F i f i  Amendment right. 
. . Third, as noted above, the law is clearly settled in Idaho that the State cannot use the in-g 
statements of a person in a new case when such statements are made pursuant to a requirement of 
probation. Here, the Defendant made the false statements pursuant to the requirements ofhis treatment on 
the retained jurisdiction program, which should be considered to be akin to the probation situation The 
State has long recognized that it cannot use these statements for anew prosecution. The State cannot use 
the Defendant's admission that he has another victim as evidence in a new case. The most the Defendant 
faces fiom his admissions or failures to admit are the imposition of sentence in this matter, which clearly 
does not implicate the Fifth Amendment under the binding Idaho authority discussed above. Therefore, the 
State's use of the Defendant's lies on his sexual history in this matter does not violate the Fifth Amendment 
Since the Defendant was not at risk for a new criminal proceeding ifhe had revealed his other 
victim, the persuasive case ofunited States v. Antelous does not indicate a different result. The Antelo-w 
court's holding provides that ifthere was immunity from prosecution for the answers to the sex offender 
treatment counselor's questions, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. See. e. p . Antelopq, 395 
F.3d 1 128,114 1 (9th Cir. 2005). T h e m  court also affirmed that for the Fifth Amendment to be 
implicated "the government has [to seek] to 'impose substantial penalties becausea witness elects to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give in cnminating ' testimony a m  himself' " Antelooe. at 1 135 
(quoting Lekowitz v. Cunninehaq, 43 1 U.S. 801,805 (1 977)). The Defendant's other case is similarly 
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unavailing of any additional relevant standard in light of the binding, directlyrelevant decisions of the Idaho 
courts in  crow^, Madison, and bdford.  
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant cannot prove a violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. The State is fiee to argue 
his failure to disclose another victim on his sexual history and the subsequent failed polygraph together with 
any other arguments arising therefiom as reasons to impose his sentence. 
k 
DATED This L8 day of January 2009. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following 
parties by the following means: 
Terry S. Ratliff Hand Delivered (Interoffice Mail) 
ATTORNEY AT LAW - U.S. Mail 
290 South 2nd East - Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 - Next Day Delivery 
Facsimile 
The Honorable Michael E. Wetherell Facsimile (208) 487-7529 
Bench Copy 
DATED this a % a y  of lanuary 2009. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
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131 Idaho 109; State v. Crowe; 952 P.2d 1 245 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John David CROWE, Defendant-Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 1 091 
No. 23325. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 1997 Term. 
February 27, 1998. 
Following conviction on defendant's plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Ada County, Joel D. Horton, J. revoked defendant's probation, and defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Silak, J., held that admission of defendant's statements to sex offender counselor 
that he had fondled his niece's buttocks, in violation of probation agreement, did not 
Page 110 
violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Affirmed. 
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, David J. Smethers, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for 
appellant. David J. Smethers argued. 
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Kenneth M. Robins argued. 
SILAK, Justice. 
This is an appeal from an order revoking probation. At the probation revocation hearing, 
incriminating statements made by the probationer to his counselor and probation officer were admitted. 
The appellant claims that admission of the statements at the hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. We affirm the decision of the district court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant John David Crowe (Crowe) was indicted on charges of lewd and lascivious conduct on 
September 25, 1990. He subsequently pled guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor on 
October 2, 1990. Crowe was placed on probation. 
The relevant terms of the probation included Crowe's completing a specialized sex offender therapy 
program through the Sexual Abuse Now Ended (SANE) program, Crowe's abiding by all laws of the 
State and Crowe's not "associat[ing] with any juveniles unless accompanied by [a] responsible adult as 
104 
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approved by the probation officer and 
therapist." The terms of the probation also included Crowe submitting to polygraph examinations upon 
request of a probation officer. As a condition of the treatment at SANE, therefore a condition of the 
probation, Crowe was required to report any contact with minor children and to submit to polygraph 
examinations upon request. 
At the SANE facility, Crowe signed a treatment contract which allowed counselors during treatment 
to disseminate information to Crowe's probation officer. During a SANE treatment session around May 
15, 1996, Crowe underwent a polygraph exhnat ion as part of his SANE treatment. Crowe failed the 
examination. When confronted about this, Crowe related to D.F., his SANE counselor, that he had failed 
the examination because he had been alone with his ten-year old niece, and had improperly touched her 
by placing his hand on her buttocks. At the counselor's request, Crowe made verbal and written 
admissions to his probation officer about the incidents. Crowe was arrested for violating his probation. 
On May 28, 1996, a motion and order for a Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed. After a 
violation hearing, at which the statement to D.F., the statement to the probation officer and Crowe's 
written statement were admitted, the district court found that Crowe violated his probation by having 
unsupervised contact with a minor and committing the crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The district 
court ordered Crowe's probation revoked and ordered the execution of the previously suspended 
sentence, a unified sentence of ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at his probation 
revocation hearing by the admission of statements Crowe made to a counselor during a sex offender 
counseling session required by his probation agreement. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard Of Review. 
[I, 2) This Court exercises fiee review in determining whether "constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied in light of the facts" found by the trial court. State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449,452,776 P.2d 
458,461 (1989) (quoting State v. Heinen, 1 14 Idaho 656,658, 759 P.2d 947,949 (Ct.App. 1988)). 
Deference will be given to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
B. Additional Issues Raised For The First Time On Appeal At Oral Argument Are Not 
Properly Before This Court. 
(3,4] Preliminarily, we note that counsel for Crowe tried to raise at oral argument the issues of 
whether an extra-judicial confession was sufficient to convict Crowe absent more corroborating 
evidence and whether Crowe's right to confiont witnesses at the probation violation hearing had been 
violated. These issues were not presented by Crowe's counsel in the statement of issues or argued in the 
1 0 s  
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briefs. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) requires that a list of issues be presented on appeal. This Court has 
acknowledged that this rule will be relaxed when the issues are supported by argument in the briefs. 
State v. Prestwich, 116 Idaho 959,961,783 P.2d 298,300 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Gwman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992). Counsel for Crowe did not argue these additional issues 
in his brief. Therefore, these additional issues are not properly before this Court and will not be 
addressed on appeal. 
(5) Additionally, Crowe's counsel argued at oral argument that the Idaho Constitution provides 
greater protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellant's brief did 
not argue for a different interpretation of the Idaho Constitution nor was there any authority cited for a 
different interpretation. Therefore, this issue also was not properly raised on appeal. The only issue 
properly before this 
Page 112 
Court is the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the present facts. 
C. The District Court Was Correct In Holding That The Admission Of Statements Made By 
Crowe To His Court Ordered Counselor Did Not Violate The Appellant's Fifth Amendment Right 
Against Self-incrimination. 
(6) It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by the person claiming the 
privilege or the privilege is deemed lost. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427-28,104 S.Ct 1 136, 
1 142,79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Gamer v. US., 424 U.S. 648,654,96 S.Ct 1 178, 1 182,47 L.Ed.2d 370 
(1976). It is undisputed that Crowe did not assert his Fifth Amendment right. 
17) Crowe relies on Minnesota v. Murphy in arguing that his statements to his counselor should be 
suppressed because the questions posed to him forced him to answer or to be punished as a probation 
violation for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination; thus, he argues he was forced into the 
"classic penalty" situation. The Court in Murphy held that the Fifth Amendment applies, even if not 
invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat to 
impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434,104 S.Ct at 1 146. The Court in 
Murphy limited this exception to situations in which the statement obtained was to be used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding. The Court in Murphy stated: 
[A] State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence 
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers 
may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. 
Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled 
testimony would not be at stake," and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a 
State from revoking probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of 
probation. 
Id. at 436 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1146 n. 7 (quoting Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 
280,284,88 S.Ct 1917, 1920,20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968)). In this case, the statements were used against 
Crowe in a probation revocation hearing, not a subsequent criminal trial. A probation revocation 
proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. Id. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1 146 n. 7. See also, United 
States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1992) ("a person may not claim the self-incrimination 
privilege merely because his answer to a question might result in revocation of his probationary status. 
His answer, however, cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution."); United States v. 
Page 4 of 4 
Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) ("in general, a probationer is not entitled to invoke 
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about his probation status."). 
This case does not present a "classic penalty" situation. The statements were not used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding. We hold that the admission of the statements to the counselor at the 




The order of the district court revoking Crowe's probation and placing his previously suspended 
sentence into execution is affirmed. 
TROUT, C.J., and JOHNSON, SCHROEDER and WALTERS, JJ., concur. 
Idaho 
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MADISON v. CRAVEN 
169 P.3d 284 (ID 2007) 
Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents. 
No. 33710. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
August 6,2007. 
Review Denied October 15,2007 
Page 285 
This Page Contains Headnotes. 
Appeal fiom the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Daniel C. Hurlbutt, J. 
Page 286 
Carl Lewis Madison, Boise, pro se appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loomis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for 
respondent. 
LANSING, Judge. 
Carl Lewis Madison, a prison inmate, filed an action against the Executive Director of the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Commission") and two therapists at the Idaho Department of 
Correction, requesting that certain information be removed fiom his prison record and not considered in 
any future parole proceedings because the information was allegedly obtained through violations of his 
privilege against self-incrimination. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, 
and Madison appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1997, Madison was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 18- 1506, 
for which he received a sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate. During the course of his 
incarceration, Madison participated in a sexual offender therapy program. He contends that during that 
program, he was forced to falsely(fn1) admit a sexual attraction to the victim, his daughter, and was later 
terminated fiom the group when he accused the therapists and Department of Correction personnel of 
colluding to make him appear to be a serial pedophile. In May of 1999, he was denied parole. The 
minutes of that parole hearing contain a notation that Madison had molested fifteen victims. Madison 
108 
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later asserted that this statement in the minutes was false and that he had only one victim. 
On November 14,2003, Madison filed a prisoner civil rights complaint asserting that the therapists' 
acts and the allegedly false information in the parole hearing minutes violated his civil rights. The 
district court treated Madison's complaint as a habeas corpus petition and dismissed it when Madison did 
not pay the filing fee. He appealed, and in Madison v. Craven, 1.41- Idaho-45, lOSP._3d_7_Q5 
(Ct.App.2005), we reversed and remanded. After remand, Madison amended his complaint. 
The nature of the claims that Madison intends to be presenting in his pro se complaint and 
subsequent filings is difficult to discern or characterize. His general claim seems to be that various post- 
trial admissions he made, including those contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI), and 
statements made at the parole hearing and during sexual offender treatment, were obtained in violation 
of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record 
and not considered in any future therapy or parole proceedings. He also contends that he has been 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and raises several other related claims. 
The district court initially characterized the amended complaint as a habeas corpus petition before 
deciding to handle it as an action for violation of civil rights. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the 
action on the respondents' summary judgment motion. Madison appeals, asserting that the district court 
misinterpreted one of his claims, did not address several others, and misapplied the law. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'' Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See 
also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 33 1,333 (1 995); Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. 
City of Coeur dylene, 126 Idaho 740, 742,890 P.2d 326,328 (1995). On review, this Court liberally 
construes the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, Id&o 270,272, _86P 
P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). If the evidence reveals no material disputed factual issues, however, only a 
question of law remains over which this Court exercises fiee review. Roell v. Boise City, 130-Idaho 199, 
200-01,938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (1997). 
In this case, there are no disputed issues of fact; the respondents' summary judgment motion did not 
challenge Madison's allegations that the minutes of the parole hearing erroneously state that he had 
fifteen victims or that Madison's therapist required him to make statements regarding his sexual 
attraction toward the victim. Therefore, the issue presented is whether these alleged events violated 
certain of Madison's constitutional rights. Because we exercise de novo review over this legal issue, 
Madison's assertions that the district court misinterpreted his arguments or erred in its legal analysis 
need not be specifically addressed. 
B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-incrimination 
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Madison's primary argument on appeal is that information elicited after his conviction-including the 
statement in his parole hearing that he had fifteen victims, statements made during therapy regarding his 
sexual attraction to his daughter, and information in the PSI report-was obtained in violation of his F i f i  
Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record. The thrust of 
his argument is that these statements were elicited to make him appear to be a serial pedophile, which he 
contends has undermined his ability to trust his therapists and participate in therapy. He notes that this 
will make it difficult for him to be paroled, and speculates that if this characterization of his criminal 
nature remains in his record, it could be used against him in future matters. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to 
testitjl against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges him not to 
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where 
the answers might incriminate him in fbture criminal proceedings." Lejkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,77, 
94 S.Ct 316,322,38 L.Ed.2d 274,281 (1973). 
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See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,426,104 S.Ct 1 136,1141,79 L.Ed.2d 409,418 (1 984). 
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does not turn upon the 
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission 
and the exposure which it invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,49, 87 S.Ct 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
558 (1967). A witness protected by the privilege may rightfblly refuse to answer unless and until the 
witness is granted immunity from the use of the compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in 
which the witness is a defendant. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct at 1 14 1,79 L.Ed.2d at 41 8. If he 
or she is nevertheless compelled to answer without immunity, the answers are inadmissible against the 
witness in a later criminal prosecution. Id. An individual does not lose this protection by reason of 
conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a person is imprisoned at the time he or she makes 
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent 
criminal trial of that person. Id.; State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1193, 1198 
(Ct.App.2002). 
1. Statement that Madison had fifteen victims 
To the extent that Madison contends that the inclusion of the statement at the parole hearing that he 
had fifteen victims violated his right against self-incrimination, this argument is undermined by 
Madison's own assertions. He does not suggest that he was unlawfully compelled by the parole board to 
admit this fact, but claims that he did not say it. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination is not implicated here. 
2. Statements contained in the PSI 
Madison also argues that any statements he made to the presentence investigator should be purged 
from his record. A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the 
sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,563, 149 P.3d 833, 
838 (2006); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-19,868 P.2d 1331, 1233-35 (1994); State v. Lanuord, 
1 16 Idaho 860,871,781 P.2d 197,208 (1989). However, if a defendant desires the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment, he generally must claim it or it will be lost. That is, if one who is being questioned 
does not assert the privilege and instead voluntarily responds without protest, the responses are not 
considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
110 
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427-28, 104 S.Ct. at 1142-43,79 L.Ed.2d at 419-20; Curless, 137 Idaho at 143,44 P.3d at 1198 (holding 
that the defendant's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a psychosexual evaluation precluded 
him from asserting the privilege on appeal). In this case, Madison has presented no evidence suggesting 
that during the preparation of the PSI, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless 
compelled to answer, nor that compulsion prevented him from asserting the privilege. Because Madison 
never asserted the privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the presentence 
investigation interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege therefore fails. 
3. Statements made during therapy 
We next examine whether Madison's Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by the allegedly 
compelled admission, during treatment by a Department of Correction therapist, that he was sexually 
attracted to his daughter who was the victim of his crime. We hold that this claim is without merit for at 
least two reasons. First, there has been no Fifth Amendment violation because Madison's statements 
were not used against him in a criminal proceeding and, second, the statements were not incriminating. 
In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,123 S.Ct 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for damages for violation of the Fifth 
Amendment where his allegedly compelled statements were never used against him in a criminal 
prosecution. In that case, Martinez brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 on the theory that his right 
against self-incrimination was violated 
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by an officer who interrogated him while he was in an emergency room receiving treatment for several 
gunshot wounds. Martinez was not charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against him 
in any criminal case. A four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court was of the view that when statements 
have been compelled by police interrogations, "it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." Id. at 767, 123 S.Ct. at 2001, 155 L.Ed.2d at 993. The mere 
use of compulsory questioning, without more, the plurality said, does not violate the Constitution. Id. 
Two additional justices who did not join in the plurality opinion nevertheless also rejected Martinez's 
argument that the questioning alone was a completed violation of the Fifth Amendment subject to 
redress by an action for damages under § 1983. Id. at 777-79, 123 S.Ct at 2006-08, 155 L.Ed.2d at 
1000-01 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Idaho Supreme Court earlier reached the same conclusion in State v. Crowe, 1.3 1 Idaho 109,952 
P.2d 1.245 (1998), where the defendant had been required to participate in sex offender therapy as a 
condition of his probation. During therapy, he admitted that he had fondled a minor while on probation, 
and this statement was used against him in a subsequent probation revocation hearing. The defendant 
argued that his right against self-incrimination had been violated. The Idaho Supreme Court held that no 
violation had occurred because the statements were used in a probation revocation hearing, not in a 
criminal trial. Thus, we conclude that because Madison does not assert that any of his allegedly 
compelled statements were used against him in a criminal prosecution, he has not alleged a cognizable 
civil claim for violation of the Fifih Amendment. 
Madison's claims also fail for the additional reason that he has not shown that the allegedly 
compelled admissions were incriminating. The Fifih Amendment provides a privilege against answering 
official questions "where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Murphy, 
465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct. at 1141,79 L.Ed.2d at 418 (quoting Lefiowitz, 414 U.S. at 77,94 S.Ct. at 
322, 38 L.Ed.2d at 281). That is, the privilege applies only if there is some rational basis for believing 
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that the answer to a question will incriminate the individual and no assurance has been given that neither 
the statement nor its h i t s  will be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
429, 104 S.Ct. at 1143,79 L.Ed.2d at 420; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,599-600,16 S.Ct. 644,647- 
48,40 L.Ed 8 19,821-22 (1896). In dicta. the Murphy Court observed that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not available when a defendant is being questioned about violations of conditions of 
probation that do not constitute new criminal acts because the answers could not be used to incriminate 
the probationer in another crime. While the answer to the questions might result in termination of 
probation, the Court said, a probation revocation proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. at 1 146 n. 7,79 L.Ed.2d at 425 n. 7. Thus, information is not 
incriminating if disclosure poses no realistic threat of criminal prosecution. 
In this case, Madison's admission that he had been sexually attracted to his daughter could not be 
used against him in a criminal prosecution, for he had already been convicted and sentenced for 
molestation of his daughter before he made the statement. Double jeopardy protections insure that he 
cannot be reprosecuted for this offense.(=) Madison speculates that his statement could negatively 
impact potential future parole eligibility proceedings, sex offender classification proceedings, eligibility 
for prison therapy programs, or civil cases. None of these, however, are criminal proceedings. See Folk 
v. Pennsylvania, 425 F.Supp.2d 663,667-68 (W.D.Pa.2006) (no violation of defendant's 
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right against self-incrimination when parole board declined to grant parole after defendant refused to 
admit guilt to sexual crimes during therapy, for parole eligibility proceedings do not constitute a 
criminal cases); In re Mark, 292 Wis.2d 1,718 N.W.2d 90, 100 (2006) (statements regarding the crime 
of which defendant was convicted, or confession to activities that are not criminal but violate conditions 
of parole, are not incriminating for Fifth Amendment purposes); Bankes v. Simmons, 265 Kan. 341,963 
P.2d 41 2,419 (1998) (statements compelled during prison sexual abuse treatment program may be used 
against inmate in a civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator). Because the 
proceedings in which Madison alleges that his statements could be used against him are not criminal 
proceedings and the statement does not implicate him in a separate crime, he has no Fifth Amendment 
claim.(fh3) 
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Madison also alleges that forcing him to falsely admit a sexual attraction to his daughter, in 
combination with the allegedly incorrect statement that he had fifteen victims, constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. He contends that he is being stigmatized by family, friends, inmates, and prison 
officials as a serial pedophile, that he is no longer able to trust his therapists and prison officials, and that 
he experiences mental anguish at being forced to say that he perceived his daughter in a sexual light. 
The Eighth Amendment, which restrains the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes. 
The Supreme Court has explained its application as follows: 
[Tlhe Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, 
use excessive physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also imposes duties on 
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must 
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 
"take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." 
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[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. 
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious"; a prison official's 
act or omission must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's 
necessities." 
The second requirement follows from the principle that "only the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." To violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." In 
prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to inmate 
health or safety. 
Farmer v. Brennan, 51 1 U.S. 825,832,834,114 S.Ct. 1970, 1976,1977,128 L.Ed.2d 8 1 1,822,823 
(1 994) (internal citations omitted). When considered against this articulation of what constitutes "cruel 
and unusual punishment," it is readily apparent the unpleasant emotional and social conditions of which 
Madison complains are not sufficiently serious to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. 
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D. Other Issues 
Madison's pro se appeal brief also mentions several other claims that he contends were alleged in his 
civil rights complaint, but were not addressed by the district court. As to these additional claims, we 
have either considered them and find them to be without merit or have been presented with no coherent 
legal argument that we are able to identify and address. 
CONCLUSION 
Madison's factual allegations and evidence, even when accepted as true and liberally construed in his 
favor, show no right to relief in this civil rights action on any of the theories he has advanced. Therefore, 
the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the action. Summary judgment for the 
respondents is affirmed. 
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ concur. 
Footnotes: 
FN 1. He advances the theory that he should not be branded as a pedophile because he imagined his 
victim as an adult when he molested her. 
FN2. The time for appeal of Madison's conviction has long since passed, as has the statute of 
limitation for any post-conviction action challenging the conviction. Madison does not contend that 
there exist any pending post-conviction actions challenging the validity of his conviction or any other 
proceeding that could lead to a new trial on the charge for which he was convicted, such that the 
admission of sexual attraction to his daughter could be used against him in a new trial. 
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FN3. A W e r  word concerning the scope of Fifth Amendment protections is appropriate to ensure 
that our holding in this case will not be misunderstood nor applied too expansively. We have addressed 
today only whether an individual who did not invoke the self-incrimination privilege and who made 
statements allegedly under compulsion may obtain the remedy of removal of the statements from his 
prison records. We do not address the quite different issue of whether the government may penalize a 
person who, not having been offered immunity, legitimately invokes the privilege and refuses to provide 
potentially incriminating information. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chavez did not 
overturn decades of precedent allowing the self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in contexts other 
than criminal cases and granting relief where the govenunent has penalized persons for their refusal to 
waive the privilege. To the contrary, the Chavez plurality expressly recognized the continuing authority 
of those decisions and characterized them as establishing "prophylactic rules" that are necessary to 
protect the "core constitutional right." Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n. 2,770-72, 123 S.Ct. at 2001 n. 2, 
2002-04, 155 L.Ed.2d at 994 n. 2,995-97. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL FEBRUARY 2,  2009 
COURT MINUTES 














Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
11:35 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
The Court reviews the file. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding CR-2007-1156. 
Response by the Court. 
The Court continues to review the file. 
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the 
materials. 
Mr. Fisher had no corrections. 
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections. 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
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The defendant had no corrections. 
No testimony or statements. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Fisher's recommendations: 
That the Court relinquish jurisdiction and asks that the Court 
reserve the restitution. And if it is needed the State will 
notice it for a hearing. That the defendant register as a sex 
offender . 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations: 
That the defendant be placed on probation. 
No statement made by the defendant. 
No legal cause shown. 
The Court imposes the underlying sentences in both cases. The 
defendant will receive sex offender treatment. In case CR-2007- 
1156 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 
15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with credit 
for 688 days against the fixed portion of the sentence. This 
sentence is to run concurrent with CR-2008-932. In case CR-2008- 
932 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 25 
years with 10 years fixed and 15 years indeterminate with credit 
for 340 days against the fixed portion to run concurrent with CR- 
2007-1156. The Court using its discretion under Rule 35 reduces 
the sentence in CR-2008-932 to 29 years with 6 years fixed and 19 
years indeterminate. While the defendant is incarcerated the 
Court recommends that he receive cognitive based programs, sex 
offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such other 
programs deemed appropriate by prison personnel. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
Copies of the materials returned. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding custody. 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
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The Court advises that the defendant will be required to register 
as a sex offender for the remainder of his life in case CR-2008- 
932. The Court will reserved restitution for a period of 90 days. 
The Court set this matter for RESTITUTION HEARING on May 4, 2009 
at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
12:ll p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 36 pages 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIfjTwFr - 0 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 
vs . ) Case No. CR-2007-1156 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, ) 
DOB: ) ORDER RELINQUISHING 
SSN:  JURISDICTION 
Defendant. 
TO: STATE OF IDAHO BOARD OF CORRECTIONS: 
On the 2nd day of February, 2009, before the Honorable 
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee 
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, 
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry 
Ratliff, this being the time for jurisdictional review in this 
matter. 
At which time the Court relinquished jurisdiction and the 
defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction for execution of the original sentence that 
being for a period of fifteen (15) years with five (5) years 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 1 
I f8  
fixed and ten (10) years indeterminate. The defendant is to 
receive cognitive based programs, sex offender treatment, 
relationship and parenting programs, anger management 
treatment, and such other programs as are deemed appropriate by 
prison personnel; 
That pursuant to Idaho code Section 18-309, the defendant 
shall be given credit for the time served in the Elmore County 
Jail upon this time of 688 days, including the retained 
jurisdiction time. 
All of the defendant's fines, fees, and costs are forgiven 
due to indigency resulting from the incarceration. 
The defendant is to have no contact with the victim of his 
offense while incarcerated or on parole should parole be 
granted. 
The Clerk shall deliver a certified copy of this Order to 
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the 
defendant. 
Dated this 2*Lday of February, 2009. 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
--en 
I hereby certify that on this 5  day of February, 
2009, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
Lee Fisher 
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Terry Ratliff 
Elmore County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Central Records 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Elmore County Jail 
Interdepartmental Mail 
MARSA GRIMMETT\ {
Clerk of the District Court 
I 
' 1 1  
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TERRY S. RATLIFF 
R A W  LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South Second East Street 
Mountain Home, LD 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
I.S. B. No. 3598 
. . 
2009 HAR I 7  Ptl 4: 39 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF . THE . 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 Case No. CR-2007- 1 1 56 
Respondent, 1 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 
1 
Appellant. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS AlTORNEYS, 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE; LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
STATEHOUSE, BOISE, IDAHO 83720; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GrVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the February 3, 2009, Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, by the Honorable Michael E. 
Wetherell, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Decision 
described in paragraph 1 above is applicable for an Appeal order under and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (c)(l) 
and or (9), I.A.R. and Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1 (a)(2). 
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3. Issues on Appeal: 
(a) Whether the District Court abused its discretion, when it revoked probation of 
Justin, due to the allegation that "on 12/05/08 he was DECEPTIVE during a polygraph 
examination conducted while he was on a second rider, in Elrnore County Case CR-2008- 
0932? 
(b) Whether the District Court denied Justin due process of law pursuant to the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, by revoking probation of him, when he was 
required to participate in a polygraph examination, as set forth above, without allowing him 
access to his court appointed attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, nor advising him of 
his F i f i  Amendment right against self-incrimination, prior to and during the polygraph 
examination. 
4. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report is routinely sealed by the Court, and is 
requested herein. 
5. (a) Is reporter's standard transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript as defined in Rule 25(b), I.A.R.: 
(1) Hearing held on 9/17/07 
(2) Hearing held on 4/07/08 
(3) Hearing held on 7/07/08 
(4) Sentencing hearing held on 2/02/09 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under' Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. All memorandums or briefi filed herein. 
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b. Addendum to the Pre-Sentence Investigation and Cover Letter dated 
12/08/08, by Darla Maqueda, in Elmore County Case CR-2008-0932. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) (1)-That either the reporter of the clerk of the district court or 
administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript. 
(2 )XTha t  the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee 
because this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent. 
(c) (1)-That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record 
has been paid. 
(2)-That the appellant is exempt fiom paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because this is a criminal appeal. The Defendant is also indigent. 
(d) (1)-That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
(2 )LTha t  appellant is exempt fiom paying the appellate filing fee because 
this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. (And the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.) 
P DATED this / 7 day of March 2009. 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CIFII). 
Attorney for ~ ~ p e l l ~  
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'P I HEREBY CERTIFY That I have on this 1 7 day of March 2009, served a copy of the 
within and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
Kristina Schi'ndele 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 607 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Lawrence Wasden 
Attorney General 
Attention: Criminal Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
BY: Hand Delivery 
Federal' Express 
Certified Mail 
y U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
BY: - Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
)C U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Molly J. Huskey BY: - Hand Delivery 
State Appellate Public Defender Federal Express 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane Certified Mail 
Boise, ID 83703 )r U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Nicole Omsberg BY: - Hand Delivery 
Court Reporter Federal Express 
Elmore County Courthouse Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 ,& U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Steve Kenyon 
Idaho Supreme Court 
45 1 State St. 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-01 01 
BY: - Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
Certified Mail 
& U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
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TERRY S. RATLIFF 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South 2nd East Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 . .  
Idaho State Bar No.: 3598 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
1 Case No.: CR-2007-1156 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
) OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 




COMES NOW the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, by and through his attorney, 
Terry S. Ratliff of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and hereby moves this Court for its Order pursuant 
to Idaho Code 9 19-867, et seq, and Rule 13 '(b), (12) and (1 9) appointing the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office to represent the above-named Defendant-Appellant in all further 
appellate proceedings and allowing trial counsel for Defendant to withdraw as counsel of record. 
This motion is brought on the ground and for the reason that the Defendant-Appellant is 
currently being represented by this Counsel and Office, as Public Defender in and for the County 
of Elmore, and the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the 
Defendant-Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings. 
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Further, it is in the interest of justice for that Office to represent the Defendant-Appellant 
in this case since the Defendant-Appellant is indigent, and any fiuther proceedings in this case 
will be at the appellate level. 
DATED this 18 day of March, 2009. 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this / g day of March, 2009, served a copy of the 
within and foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER to: 
Molly J. Huskey By: Hand Delivery 
State Appellate Public Defender Federal Express 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane Certified Mail 
Boise, ID 83703 _$L U.S.Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Kristina Schindele 
Elmore County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 607 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
By: Hand Delivery 
Federd Express , '  U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Legal Assistant 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 2 
TERRY S. RATLIFF 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South 2"d East Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
Bar Number: 3598 
Attorney for DefendantlAppellant 
, , . ..- -.- . . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) Case No.: CR-2007-1156 
Plaintiff, 
) 
VS. ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 DEFENDER 
1 
Defendant. ) 
The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of State Appellate 
Public Defender and Defendant-Appellant being indigent, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Molly J. Huskey of the State's Appellate Public 
Defender's Office is hereby appointed as Counsel for the Defendant and Terry S. Ratliff, of Ratliff 
Law Offices, Chtd. is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record. 
DATED this &+day of + / ,2009. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - I 
amr 
IZI jKI [ - i r  ./ I r rAL 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this day of h a  ,2009, 
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to: \ 
Kristina Schindele By: dand Delivery 
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney - Federal Express 
190 South Fourth East - Certified Mail 
P.O. Box 607 - U.S. Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 - Facsimile Transmission 
Terry S. Ratliff - / H a n d  Delivery 
Ratliff Law Ofice, Chtd. - Federal Express 
290 South Second East - Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 - U.S. Mail 
- Facsimile Transmission 
Molly J. Huskey 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3627 Lake Harbor Ln. 
Boise, ID 83703 
Hand Deliverv - 
- Federal E X ~ ~ S S  
- Certified Mail 
~ u . s .  Mail - 
- Facsimile Transmission 
.&Pp F THE COURT 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2 
arnr 
1.28 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
' ! 1  C - 
A I _- . - +  
In the Supreme Court of the Stata,q&J&&poo 4" 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
- 
) ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS 
1 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36364-2009 
) (36365-2009) 
) Elrnore County Docket No. 2007- 1 156 
) (2008-932) 
1 
It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of 
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36364 and 36365 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36364, but all documents filed shall bear 
both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S 
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with 
a copy of this Order. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare a 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the transcripts requested in the Notices of 
Appeal. 
DATED this 1 0 ~  day of April 2009. 
Fo*e Supreme Court 
-,,- 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
129 
ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket No. 36364-2009 
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- - I :  - ; I  ! Z . ,  
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE r, ' .. . -  I 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 2008 FEB 29 Pn 3: 54 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-21 44 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
I , ,* , , \" ,  .4r\i1 gilL 1 i 
CLEHH OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY \( *-5, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) Case No. CR-2008- 9 3 4 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
1 COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL 




PERSONALLY APPEARED Before me this 29th day of February 2008, Lee Fisher, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, who, being first duly swom, 
complains and says: JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the County 
of Elrnore, State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there commit the crimes of RAPE, I1 counts, 
felonies, said crimes being committed as follows, to-wit: 
COUNT I 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. 8 18-6101 (I), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 1 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of A.T., a female person, with his 
penis, and where A.T. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: of the age of 14 years, all in violation 
of I.C. 8 18-6101(1). 
COUNT U 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. $j 1&6101(1), 1&6104,1&112A, 18-8304 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening ofK.C., a female person, with his 
penis, and where K.C. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: of the age of 13 years, all in violation 
of I.C. § 18-6101(1). 
All ofwhich is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided 
against the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Said complainant therefore prays that the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, be brought 
before the Court to be dealt with according to law. 
DATED This 29th day of February 2008. 
KFUSTINA M. SCHINDELE 




Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 29th day o$February 2008. 
COMPLAINT - CRIMINAL - Page 2 
- - q  
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Counsel for 
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Counsel for Defendant Counsel for 
Index ) 
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Phase of Case 
I 
1 1 3 1 .Case Called. Advised 
I 
1 4.Understand equest P.D. ( )Will Hire Own ( )Request Continuance ( )Waives Attorney 
I 
I Enters Plea Of ( )Not Guilty ( )Guilty 
I 
Obiection to P.D ( )Objects to P.D. I &  11. 
Subiect to Reimbursment ( )P.D. Denied ( )Acce~ts Plea ( )Cannot Accept Plea 
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THIS IS TO ACKNOWLEDGE That David C. Epis, Magistrate, who has identified himself 
to me as a duly appointed, qualified, and acting Magistrate of the District Court in and for Elmore 
County, Idaho, has advised me of the following facts: 
1. That I have an absolute right to remain silent and do not have to make any statement. 
2. That in the event I did decide to make a statement, anything I say can and will be 
used against me in a court of law. 
3. That I have an absolute right to have a lawyer advise and represent me at all stages of 
the proceeding. 
4. That I have the right to a lawyer even if I cannot afford one, and if I cannot afford 
one, I may use the services of the Public Defender at any time and at public expense. 
5 .  That I have the right to have a preliminary examination. 
I understand the above and have a full awareness of each of said rights as explained to me by 
the above named Magistrate. 
/ 
DATED This < o'clock 
- 




1003 2nd Street N. 
Nampa, ID 83687 
Defendant. 
DL: 
h Judicial District Court, State 61 In and For the County of Elmor ~ ---. .
150 South 4th  as< Suite #5 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647-3095 - - ! \  , . c - r ;  




) Case No: CR-2008-000 
) 
) ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC D-NDER 
1 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of Justin Goodgion, and it appearing to be a proper case, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that an attorney be appointed through the: 
Public Defender's Office 
Elmore County Public Defender 
290 South 2nd East 
Mountain Home ID 83647 
Public Defender for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is 
hereby appointed to represent said Defendant, Justin Goodgion, in all proceedings in the above entitled case. 
The Defendant is further advised that helshe may be required to reimburse the Court for all or part of the cost 
of court appointed counsel. 
DATED This 3rd day of March, 2008. 
Copies to: 
% Public Defender 
Prosecutor 
IN THE DISTRI URT OF THE FOURTH OF THE 
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I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORB 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
plaintiff , 1 1 Casa No. 
1 . i 





1, > ~ t ~ n  ( ; ~ c I  ~nn , hereby waive my right 
to a speedy preliminary haaring. I understand that I am antitled 
to a preliminary hearing within 14 days if incarcerated or 21 days 
if not incarcerated. By signing this document I am not waiving my 
right to a preliminary hearing or any other rights that I am 
entitled to under the united States Constitution or the Idaho 
constitution. lnfi~ch DATED This 5 day of , of 20 &8 
o'clock & .H. 
WAIVER OF SPEEDY PRELIMINARY HEARING 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
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) Case No: 
i 
1 WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY 
) EXAM1 NATION 
) 
Being aware of the fad that a preliminary examination is a Court hearing to determine if a crime 
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that I committed such crime, and 
being fully aware of my right to have such a preliminary examination upon the pending criminal charge of 
Rape-Female Under the acre of 18 (Statutorv Rape) Rape-Female Under the aqe of 18 (Statutory 
Rape) , a felony, now lodged against me, it is my desire to and I do hereby waive my right to such 
preliminary examination. No promises or threats have been made to me nor is any pressure of any kind 
been used against me to encourage the signing of this Waiver. 
Dated this 4th day of April, 2008, 
Magistrate 
WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No 6090 
, , .  i ' . . 9  ,' . . . .  . CLEEi,; ;jF Tt!r i I. .  ;;;';{T 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR-2008-00000932 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 
VS. ) ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT 
) TO ANSWER 




ON THE 4th day of April 2008, at the hour of 1 : 15 p.m., the Defendant appeared before the 
undersigned Magistrate with Terry S. Ratliff, Attorney at Law, his attorney of record, this being the time 
and place set for the preliminary examination herein. The State of Idaho was represented by Lee Fisher, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho. The Defendant waived the 
reading of the Complaint on file herein. The Defendant was advised of the right to a preliminary 
examination, the nature ofwhich was explained to the Defendant. The Defendant thereupon waived his 
right to a preliminary examination. 
The Court, being hlly advised in the premises, finds that the crimes of RAPE, a felony, II counts, 
as set forth in the Information on file herein, have been committed in Elmore County, State of Idaho, and 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 1 
ORIGINAL 
that there is sufficient cause to believe that the Defendant committed said crimes. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED That the Defendant be and hereby is held to answer to the 
charges as set forth in the Information on file herein, before a District Judge in the District Court ofthe 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That Defen&?emain as previously set. 
EPIS, Magistrate Judge 
ORDER HOLDING DEFENDANT TO ANSWER - Page 2 
1 4 1  
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 
Facsimile: (208) 587-2 147 
I.S.B. No. 6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-00000932 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. ) I N F O R M A T I O N  
) 




Lee Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, who, 
in the name of and by the authority of said State, prosecutes in its behalf, in proper person, comes now 
before the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Elmore, and gives the Court to understand and be informed that the Defendant is accused by this 
Information ofthe crimes o t  RAPE, a felony, I1 counts, upon which charges the said Defendant, having 
duly appeared before a Magistrate on the 4th day of April 2008, and then and there having waived his 
preliminary examination upon said charges, was, by said Magistrate, thereupon held to answer before the 
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, to said 
INFORMATION - Page 1 
charges, which crimes were committed as follows: 
COUNT I 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. § 18-6101(1), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of A.T., a female person, with his 
penis, and where A.T. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: ofthe age of 14 years, all in violation 
of I.C. 5 18-6101(1). 
COUNT I1 
RAPE 
Felony, I.C. § 18-6101(1), 18-6104,18-112A, 18-8304 
That the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, on or about the 22nd day of June 2006, in the 
County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did penetrate the vaginal opening of K.C., a female person, with his 
penis, and where K.C. was under the age of eighteen years, to-wit: ofthe age of 13 years, all in violation 
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against 
the peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
DATED This 4th day of April 2008. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BYJ& 7- 
Le isher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
INFORMATION - Page 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL APRIL 7 ,  2008 
COURT MINUTES 














Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
5:58 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the defendant will be pleading guilty to 
CR-2008-932 Count I. The updated PSI will be waived and will use 
the rider review. The fine amount will be left in the Court's 
discretion and the defendant will pay reimbursement to the public 
defender's office and standard court costs. The defendant would 
be incarcerated for a period of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 
years indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156. The 
restitution is to be determined and the restitution report would 
be pending until the defendant returns from a 2nd rider. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his arraignment 
of the new case. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
Page - 1 
d 
The Court addresses the deft of his arraignment rights. 
The defendant requested that the he would like to have the 
arraignment rights read to him again. 
The Court advised the defendant of his arraignment rights on case 
CR-2008-932. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant has dyslexia. 
The Court read the Information to the defendant. 
The Court advises that the defendant will be entering a guilty 
plea on CR-2008-932 to Count I. 
Mr. Ratliff has had adequate time with the defendant. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
The defendant advises that he understands that his counsel can 
file a Motion to Suppress but waives the right of the Motion to 
Suppress regarding his admissions. 
Mr. Ratliff consents to the guilty plea. 
The defendant agrees with his representations. 
The defendant sworn and examined on his own behalf. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the defendant will waive his updated PSI. 
Mr. Ratliff advises the Court about the medical issues that the 
defendant has. 
The Court accepts the guilty plea and directs that they be 
entered. 
The Court advises that it will move directly to sentencing. 
The Court advises counsel about the 19-2524 .evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the State has no objection 
to the defendant remaining in custody for the evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
Page - 2 
Counsel is ready to proceed to sentencing on both cases. 
The Court advises that on CR-2007-1156 the Court will place the 
defendant on probation for a period of 15 years with 377 days 
credit. That sentence is being imposed for the purpose for 
allowing the defendant in CR-2007-1156 to obtain a 19-2524 
evaluation pursuant to Idaho law. The Court advises that the 
underlying sentencing is incarceration for a period of 15 years 
with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The Court further 
advises that the only condition of probation is that the defendant 
will remain in custody of the Elmore County Jail pending 
completion of the evaluation and then be brought back in front of 
the Court for sentencing. The Court reserves the right to send 
the defendant on a 2nd rider upon completion of the evaluation 
without violation of probation. The Court will order a 19-2524 
evaluation in case CR-2008-932. The 2 matters will be brought 
back in front of the Court for sentencing. The Court will impose 
a joint rider on both cases as agreed by both parties with 
reviewing the evaluation at that sentencing. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
The Court order a 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be down. 
Mr. Fisher requests that restitution be left open. 
Response by the Court regarding the restitution. 
Mr. Fisher gave the Court victim statements. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on June 2, 2008 at 1:30 
o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
6:40 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - APRIL 7, 2008 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JUNE 2,  2008 
COURT MINUTES 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) 
Plaintiff, 1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
1 CR-2008-932 
vs . ) 
1 







De~utv Prosecutina Attornev 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
2:26 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
The Court will sign the order as of today's date for the mental 
health access. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the 2nd psychosexual evaluation will be 
withdrawn. 
Mr. Ratliff had no objection to the 2nd evaluation being 
withdrawn. 
COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008 
Page - 1 
The Court advises that there will not be an additional 
psychosexual evaluation done. 
Mr. Ratliff will stipulate to use the first evaluation. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Response by the Court. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on July 7, 2008 at 1:30 
o'clock p.m. 
The defendant remained in custody. 
2:31 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
- 5  
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
COURT MINUTES - JUNE 2, 2008 
Page - 2 
TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No. 3598 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South Second East 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 
Defendant. 
) 
) CASE NO. CR 2008-0932 
) 
) ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH 





WHEREAS, on the 7' day of April, 2008, the above-named Defendant appeared before 
this Court with counsel TERRY S. RATLIFF and admitted to one count of RAPE in the above 
case, and the Defendant's mental health being at issue therein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that pursuant to Idaho 
Code tj 19-2524 the Defendant above-named shall undergo a mental health examination, at the 
direction of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare and shall report to the Court as 
specified herein. 
The report shall include the following: 
1) A description of the nature of the examination; 
2) A diagnosis, evaluation, or prognosis of the mental condition of the 
defendant; 
3) An analysis of the degree of the Defendant's illness or defect and level of 
functional impairment; 
ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS 
1 4 9  ORIGINAL 
4) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the Defendant's 
mental condition; 
5 )  An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or non- 
treatment; 
6) A consideration of the risk of danger which the Defendant may create for 
the public if at large, and; 
7) A plan of treatment if the mental health examination indicates that: 
a. The Defendant suffers from a severe and reliably diagnosable 
mental illness or defect; 
b. Without treatment, the immediate prognosis is for major distress 
resulting in serious mental or physical deterioration of the 
defendant; 
c. Treatment is available for such illness or defect, and; 
d. The relative risks and benefits of treatment or non-treatment are 
such that a reasonable person would consent to treatment. 
Said evaluation shall be performed at no cost to the Defendant, as the defendant is a 
"needy person." Idaho Code 4 19-85 l(c). All expenses incurred for the preparation of the 
evaluation shall be borne by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (I.C. $ 19-2524(6)). 
The Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy hereof upon the Department of Health and 
Welfare, the Elrnore County Detention Center, the Elrnore County Prosecutor, and attorney for 
. the Defendant, Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., forthwith. 
Upon completion, said evaluation shall be filed in triplicate with the Clerk of the District 
Court, or her deputy. The Clerk shall provide copies of the evaluation to the prosecutor and 
defense counsel. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Elmore County Detention Center shall allow the 
Department of Health & Welfare, or its designee, to complete the evaluation, entry into the 
Elmore County Detention Center for the purposes of conducting a mental health examination of 
the Defendant at any and all reasonable times. The Detention Center shall also provide a quiet, 
private area with a table and any and all other reasonable facilities and necessary equipment to 
the Department of Health & Welfare or its designee to complete the examination of the 
Defendant. 
ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS 2 ,  
l s n  , 
FURTHER, the Defendant may be subject to making restitution to or reimbursing the 
State of Idaho for monies used to pay for the evaluation. 
3M 
SO ORDERED AND DATED, this ~ t d  day o f L O 8 .  
ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS 
4 - -  
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to: 
qL day <T- , 2008, 
KRISTINA SCHINDELE By: /Hand Delivery 
Elmore County Federal Express 
Prosecuting Attorney Certified Mail 
1 90 South 4' East U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 607 Facsimile Transmission 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Fax No. (208)587-2 147 
Teny S. Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd. By: / Hand Delivery 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. Federal Express 
290 South 2nd East Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
Fax No. (208)587-6940 Facsimile Transmission 
Mary Jo Beig 
DAG, Human Services Div. 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0026 
Fax No. (208) 334-6738 
By: Hand Delivery 
Federal Express 
_J Certified Mail 
U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Elrnore County Detention Center By: / Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 665 Federal Express 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Deputy ~ i e+-  J 
ORDER FOR MENTAL HEALTH EVALUATION, ACCESS, & FUNDS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E . WETHERELL JULY 7, 2008 
COURT MINUTES 


















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
5:34 p.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the defendant being 
evaluated for Mental Health Court. 
The Court advises that it does not believe that the defendant 
would qualify for Mental Health Court. 
Mr. Ratliff advises that the agreement was that the defendant 
would be sent on a second rider on CR-2007-1156. 
Response by the Court regarding the Mental Health Court. 
Mr. Fisher advises that the State is not willing to agree to the 
Mental Health Court. 
The Court addresses counsel. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 1 
Response by Mr. Fisher. 
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the 
materials. 
Mr. Fisher had no corrections. 
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections. 
The defendant had no corrections. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Fisher's recommendations: 
CR-2007-1156 - the Court revoke his probation and send the 
defendant on a second rider. CR-2008-932 that the defendant 
register as a sex offender. The fines, fees, court costs, and 
public defender reimbursement are in the Court's discretion. That 
the underlying sentence would be 15 years incarceration with 5 
years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. That the rider is ran 
concurrent for both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. Restitution 
would be left open for the victim A.T. in CR-2008-932 and in CR- 
2007-1156would request to reserve restitution in that case. 
The Court advises that it will order a restitution report in CR- 
2008-932. 
Objection made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Response by the Court. 
Response by Mr. Fisher. 
Response by the Court. 
Statement continued by Mr. Fisher. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff requesting the evaluation be 
attached to the PSI. 
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations: 
The defendant would be sent on a 2nd rider. That the Court hold 
off sex offender determination until after the rider review. That 
the defendant be evaluated for mental health medication while on a 
rider. That on CR-2008-932 that the defendant would have an 
underlying sentence of 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years 
indeterminate to run concurrent with his other case and would 
request that the Court not go beyond that amount and run them 
concurrent. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 2 
Statement made by the defendant. 
The Court advises that it will add in capitals and underlined the 
following: the copy of the Idaho Code Section 19-2524 mental 
evaluation of the defendant is attached hereto assist in the 
defendant's treatment and programming while on the rider. And the 
evaluations will be attached to both CR-2007-1156 and CR-2008-932. 
No legal cause shown. 
The Court sentenced the defendant on CR-2007-1156 to incarceration 
for 15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with 
credit for 468 days against the fixed portion. The Court will 
retain jurisdiction for the 2nd time. While the defendant is on a 
rider he will receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse 
treatment, obtain his GED, and any other programs deemed 
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in 
sex offender group. The Court will reserve restitution upon 
completion of the rider. On CR-2008-932 the Court sentenced the 
defendant to 25 years with 10 years fixed and 15 year 
indeterminate with credit for 468 days served with the Court 
retaining jurisdiction and sending the defendant on a rider to run 
concurrent with CR-2007-1156. While the defendant is on a rider 
the defendant will receive cognitive based programs, substance 
abuse treatment, obtain his GED and any other programs deemed 
appropriate by rider personnel. The defendant will participate in 
sex offender group. The defendant will pay a fine in the amount 
of $2,500.00 with standard court costs and fees. The defendant 
will pay reimbursement to the public defender in the amount of 
$500.00. Restitution will be reserved pending completion of the 
rider. The defendant shall supply a DNA sample and thumbprint. 
The Court will reserve any determination of sex offender 
registration pending completion of the rider. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding the credit for time served. 
The Court advises that on CR-2008-932 the defendant will receive 
credit for time served of '130 days against the fixed portion of 
the sentence. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
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6:00 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
COURT MINUTES - JULY 7, 2008 
Page - 4 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. $ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Plaintiff, i 
vs . ) Case No. CR-2008-932 
JUST  
DOB: ) JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
SSN:  ) RETAINED JURISDICTION 
) 
Defendant. ) 
On the 7th day of July, 2008, before the Honorable Michael 
E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee Fisher, 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, State of 
Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry Ratliff, this 
being the time fixed for pronouncing judgment in this matter. 
The defendant was informed by the Court of the nature of the 
Information filed against him for the crimes of RAPE, Felonies, 
I.C. 5 18-6101(1); the defendant waiving his right for a formal 
thereon on April 7, 2008; plea of "Guiltyv thereto on April 7, 
2008 to the crime of RAPE as charged in the information, Count I1 
having been dismissed; and the defendant waiving his update 
presentence investigation report. 
JUDGMENT - Page 1 
The Court asked whether the defendant had witnesses or 
evidence to present on a hearing in mitigation of punishment; 
heard statements from counsel; and gave defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement. 
The defendant was asked if he had any legal cause to show 
why judgment should not be pronounced against him, to which he 
replied that he had none. 
And no sufficient cause being shown or appearing to the 
Court why judgment should not be rendered; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
defendant is guilty as charged and convicted; that the offense 
for which the defendant is adjudged guilty herein was committed 
on or about 22nd day of June, 2006. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is sentenced 
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-2513 to the custody of the 
Idaho State Board of Correction, to be held and incarcerated by 
said Board in a suitable place for a period of twenty-five (25) 
years with ten (10) years fixed and fifteen (15) years 
indeterminate to run concurrent with CR-2007-1156; with credit 
for 130 days served; with the court retaining jurisdiction for 
180 days pursuant to I.C. 5 19-2601(4). The Court recommends 
the defendant receive cognitive based programs, substance abuse 
treatment, obtain his GED, and to receive any other programs 
deemed appropriate by rider personnel including the sex offender 
JUDGMENT - Page 2 
assessment group. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be, and hereby is, 
assessed and Ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $2,500.00, 
with $0.00 suspended; 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
31-3201A(b) the defendant shall pay Court costs in the amount of 
$17.50; County Administrative Surcharge Fee in the amount of 
$10.00 pursuant to I.C. § 31-4602; P.O.S.T. Academy fees in the 
amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. § 31-3201B; ISTARS technology 
fee in the amount of $10.00 pursuant to I.C. § 31-3201(5); 
$50.00 to the Victims Compensation Fund pursuant to I.C. § 72- 
1025; $500.00 for reimbursement of public defender fees pursuant 
to I.C. § 19-854 (c) , 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 19-5304 the defendant shall reserve restitution to be 
reserved pending completion of the rider, to be paid through 
the Clerk of the District Court as arranged through the 
probation officer; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Fines, Court Costs and 
Restitution shall be paid through the Clerk of the District 
Court, upon the defendant's release from custody, as directed by 
the Department of Probation and Parole; 
JUDGMENT - Page 3 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be committed to the 
custody of the Sheriff of Elmore County, Idaho, for delivery 
FORTHWITH.and within 7 days, to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other 
facility within the State designated by the State Board of 
Correction. 
A COPY OF THE IDAHO CODE SECTION 19-2524 MENTAL EVALUATION 
OF THE DEFENDANT IS ATTACHED HERETO TO ASSIST IN DEFENDANT'S 
TREATMENT AND PROGRAMMING WHILE ON THE RIDER. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk deliver a certified 
copy of this Judgment and Commitment to the said Sheriff, which 
shall serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
Dated this * day of July, 2008. 
cstrict Judge 
JUDGMENT - Page 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this qm day of July. 2008, I 
mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the within 
instrument to : 
Lee Fisher 






Department of Correction 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Elmore County Jail 
Interdepartmental Mail 
MARSA GRIMMET+', 
Clerk of this' ~istrict Court 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 
Post Office Box 607 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503 
Fax: (208) 587-2147 
ISB #6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-00000932 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
VS. 1 MOTION TO DISMISS 
1 COUNT I1 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy 
Prosecutor, and hereby moves for dismissal ofcount I1 based upon the following factors: pursuant to plea 
negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to count I in exchange for dismissal of count 11. This Motion is made 
in the interests of justice and of the People of the State of Idaho. 
s" DATED This day of July 2008. 
I 
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I1 - Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following 
parties by the following means: 
Teny S. Ratliff 
Attorney at Law 
290 South 2nd East 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
First Class Mail 
X Hand Delivery 
- Certified Mail 
- Next Day Delivery 
- Facsimile 
P- DATED this - day of July 2008. 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Zfi 7;- 
Lee Fi er 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT I1 - Page 2 
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
190 South 4th East 2;0$ JUL -9 PH 3: 22 
Post Office Box 607 . L,\II  , / t i  \ 1 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 c i E i { K q @ { y  
Telephone: (208) 587-2 144 ext. 503 DEPUT - 
Fax: (208) 587-2 147 
ISB #6090 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Case No. CR-2008-00000932 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 1 ORDER TO DISMISS 
COUNT n 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
BASED UPON Motion by the State, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Count II is hereby DISMISSED. 
DATED ~ h i s e d a ~  of July 2008. 
ORDER TO DISMISS COUNT I1 - Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
9- I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the ?fay of July 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the - - 
foregoing document, to be served upon the following people by the following methods. 
Elmore County Prosecutor First Class Mail 
190 South 4th East / Hand Delivery 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 Facsimile 
Teny S. Ratliff 
Attorney at Law 
290 South 2nd East 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
First Class Mail 
A a n d  Delivery 
Certified Mail 
Next Day Delivery 




MARSA GRIMME'M', ~ l m h  of thc District Court 
h,,u/ , , . :  
D uty Clerk 
ORDER TO DISMISS COUNT I1 - Page 2 
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1 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
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It appearing that the above-named defendant is in the custody 
of the Idaho State Board of Correction, and that it is necessary 
that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Sheriff of Elmore County, 
State of Idaho, bring the defendant to the Court in Mountain Home, 
Idaho, County of Elmore, State of Idaho, on Monday the 5th day of 
January, 2008, at the hour of 11:OO o'clock a.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Idaho State Board of 
Correction release the said defendant to the Sheriff of Elmore 
County, State of Idaho, for the purpose of the aforementioned 
appearance and for the Sheriff of Elmore County, State of Idaho, 
to hold said defendant until such time as he is released on 
probation or ordered returned to the Board of Correction. 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- Page 1 
Dated this 30th day of December, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Marsa Grimmett, hereby certify that on this 30th day of 
December, 2008, a true and correct copy of the ORDER was served or 
mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows: 
Carolee Kelly 
Records Administrator 
Dept. of Corrections 
Central Records 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, ID 83706 





MARSA GRIMME~T , I 
Clerk of the\ nir~trict Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JANUARY 5 ,  2009 
COURT MINUTES 





















Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
11:lO a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in 
custody . 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding getting an updated 
polygraph and requests a 30 day extension. 
The Court addresses counsel regarding disclosure. 
Response by Mr. Ratliff. 
Discussion between the Court and counsel regarding disclosure. 
The Court will retain jurisdiction for an additional 30 days and 
sets this matter for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW on January 20, 2009 at 
11:OO o'clock a.m. 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009 
Page - 1 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
11:14 a.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 5, 2009 
Page - 2 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 4 pages 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL JANUARY 2 0 ,  2009 
COURT MINUTES 


















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Counsel for State 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender Counsel for Defendant 
11:49 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for JURISDICTIONAL REVIEW, defendant present, in 
custody. 
The Court advises that the Notice of Authority was. just received 
today . 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding the late filing. 
The Court advises that it will give the State time to respond. 
Mr. Fisher advises that if the Court is ready to proceed then the 
State is also. 
The Court advises that it will set it over on the calendar until 
3:30 o'clock p.m. 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009 
Page - 1 
11:52 a.m. End. 
3:38 p.m. Recall of case. 
The Court advises that it has received additional case law and 
will continue this one more time. 
The Court set this matter for SENTENCING on February 2, 2009 at 
11:OO o'clock a.m. 
The Court advises that the State may respond to the citation of 
case law by January 28, 2009 and Mr. Ratliff can file a reply by 
January 30, 2009. 
The Court further advises that this will not get delayed again 
after February 2, 2009. 
The defendant remained in the custody of the sheriff. 
3:40 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 5 pages 
COURT MINUTES - JANUARY 20, 2009 
Page - 2 
..--a A bur w I # A c F P ,  L I I C U .  
8 .  LrnA)wyuu Q 
TERRY S. RATLIFF 
R A W  LAW OFFICES, CETD. 
290 South Second -1 Smet . ,  . 
Mountain Homc, 1D 83647 , .:!;,t I S  v , ' -  k i C L E R ~  OF THE CGURT 
Telcphonc: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 DEPUTY 
ISB: 3598 . . . . . . . . +I 4-
Attorney for the D e f e n h ~  
M TAE DISTIUCX COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIsIrlRICT OF THE 
. , 
TkE STArllE OF lDAHO, 1 , .  
1 C='NO. CR-08-0932 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 







COMES NOW The Defendant, JUSTIN GOODGION, by and through his attorncy of 
rccord, TERRY S. RATLIFF of Ratliff Law Offices, Chld, and hereby subm'ts this authorily Cir 
che proposition that thc Dcfcndant should either be retuned to the Rider Program, without requid 
disclosue of olhm .sexual activity. unlcss hc is @vcn imrnupity for thc m e ,  or in thc altcrnativc, 
that thc Dchdant be given probation herein 
7 
DATED This ad &y of January, 2009. 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CEITt). 
By?-.. 
TERRY ~RATLIFF /, ' 
Attorney for Defendant 
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within and foregoing NOTICE OF AUTFIOWIY to: 
~l&bre County Prosecutor's Office 
190 South 4n' East 
, .. Y .O. BOX 607 
. . Mouptain . , ~ d m e , '  TD 83647 
NOTICE OF AUTHORITY - Page 2 
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STATE OF IDAHO, PlalnW-Appellant, v. ROBERT RADFORD, Defendant- 
Rapondent 
Docket.Na 24762,2000 Opinion No. 23 
SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO 
134 Idaho 187; 998 P2d 8% 211W Ida LJSB 23 
. . .  . , 
' . March 29,2000, ~ i l c d  . . 
. . 
, . SUBSEQUENT HISTORY; (.**I] RelgdCd f& .. . . F ~ ~ ~ ,  , AND PROCEDURAI, RACK- Publiation April 20,2000. ' . . , . GROUND 
PRIOR HI!iZORY: Appeal From thc Disbjct Court of On Scptcmbcr 1, 199 1. an unknown [***2] male 
the Fowh Judicial Dlstrict of tlie State of'ldaho, Ada entered the home of C. B. (md detained hcr with thc in- 
County. klon. George D. Carey, District Judge. . tmt to commit the of rape. C. B. promptly reported 
the incident to the Boisc poliec, but could not identify 
X,TSPO!SlTION: Reversed and remmded. her assailant. Evenmi~lly, because of a lack of Imds, the 
police put rhe crw on inactivc status somc timc in 1992. 
COUNSEL: Hon. Alan G. Lancc, Attomcy Genml, On June 22, 1995, ltodford entered into a Rule 11 
Doisc, for nppellsmt. Michael A. Henderson, Deputy At- .plea agrecmcnt in a completely unrelated case. The 
tomey Oeneml, argued. agreement d e d  for Radfod to plead guilty to a chargc of 5axual abwc of a minor in r a m  for the State ncom- 
mending a speeiflc sentence, most of which would bc WMbnp. McQb. Collins* BOim' for rmpmdmr suspended with Radford placed on probation. One of the Thomas McCabc nrgued. conditions of hdford's prthtion was comuldion of the 
JUDGES: TROUT, Chief Jusdce. Justices SILAK, SANE (Sexual Abwc  on ~ndcd) prog&. SANB is a 
privately operated treatment program fbr sex offikndm SC1moEDnt WALTERS ad a d  W r  fhmilior The corn accepted the plea agrecmc"~ 
OPMION BY; TROUT lyld Radford was givcn the scntence recommended by the State. 
OPlNION Prior to scntcmciny and in anticipation of the ex- 
[*I 88] [**81] TROUT, Chicf Justice 
This is an appwl from the onltr of lht distict judgc 
panting the defendants motion to suppress. The defen- 
&I., Robcri Radford (hdfod) wns indicted for first- 
degree burglary md fust-degree kidnapping. Prior to 
trial, Rdford filcd a motion lo suppms s~lcmmts mado 
to law enforcement ofncers. This motion was eventually 
.gnantcd by thc diutricl judgc and h c  Sktc of Idaho is 
now appenling that decision. The State argues the district 
judgc incorrectly dctcrmincd that our decision in State v.. 
Cruwe, 131 fduho 109,952 P.2d 1245 11998) mandated 
suppression of thc st;ltcmcnt% made by Radford. 
pemd sentence, Radford entered into a contract with 
SAW. This contract specifically authorized Itadford's 
thenpist to release information warding his tramrent to 
law mforcement persom~el. Additionrrlly, the conmct 
provided that Rndford ~ m h l o o d  hat [**9] "pi- 
ously committed &mes must also be reported, and may 
be prosecuted ...." This contract mast be signed by any- 
one seeking entrance into the SANE program. 
[*lay [**82] As part of his participation in the 
SANE program, hdford prepared a written sex~llrl his- 
tory and took a rcquincd polygmph examinatfon on Moy 
28, 19%. During the polygmph, Racfford rcv~nlnl that in 
1991 hc had cntcrcd a woman's home during the nidu 
and remined her. This is h e  incidcnt which is involved 
in tho instant appeal. 
- -  - - - - , . * - ,  W " .  " 4  I,V C I L O W  U I I I L C . 5 ,  L I ICU.  
, 
? t 'rHA~wyuU 0 
134 ldnho 1117, *; 998 Y2d 80, **; 
2000 Ida. I.EXlS 23, *** 
A summiuy of the polypph w;s provided to the 
SANE counselor. Thc ncxt day, thc counselor met with 
Radford's probntion officer, Dottie I~K~c, md disclosed 
the evidence to her. Hook p u c d  this informalion to De- 
tective Anderson who then accompanied Iiook on a visit 
to Mford's home that same day. During this visit, Hook 
had a conversation ,with Rndford in which he described 
the ,1991 incident. Radford stated that hc entercd a housc 
w&ng a ski mask and inlmdcd lo mpe a woman who 
lived there. I.Iowevcr, upon enterins the rcsidcncc. R d -  
ford discovmcd'only thc intended victim's sister. He then 
stated he handcuffed the sber, stayed for about an hour 
and a ,  hdf, and then rcmovcd tho hvndcuO's and leR. 
:[***4] lt,is imdisputcd that, diving the probation offi- 
cer's hoke' visit, Ridford was not placed in custody and 
no Mirundu wnrnings w ~ r t  given. I:ollowi~ig the home 
. visit, : betective Anderson reported, the information to 
petectivo Ayottc 'who had originally invcstignted the 
1991 .incident After henring the story, Ayone believed 
t h t  Radford might have committed thc crimc against C. 
B. 
Radford met with llook for an oRicc visit on June 4. 
1996. and both Delcctivm Ayottc nnd Smith attended the 
meeting. Prior to the interview, Detective Ayottc told 
Radford that he was not in custody and advised him of 
his Miranh rights. hdford then signed a written 
Mirmda waivur. At first Rndford rcrused lo talk about 
the 1991 incident, citing the advice of his attorney; how- 
ewr, he did i y e e  to talk to policc about other maucrs. 
During h e  course of the conversation, kidford repeat- 
edly brought up the 1991 incident, mntwlly apmd lo 
discuswthe incident, made admissions nbout it, ~d wrote 
a letter of apology to the victim. Rdfmd was not ar- 
rested at h c  conclusion of the intmicw; howew, fol- 
lowing a se;uch of Wford's storage unit lator that day. 
, Radfbrd was mMcd by Hook for violation [***a of 
the conditions of his probation. IaIls probation in that case 
was eventually revokcd and Radford is now serving his 
sentence. 
After a hearing involving testimony kom several 
witncsscs and brieling by the panics, the distria judge 
found tbe EdCts as stated above and dcnicd thc motion to 
suppms. Following his Corn's dtcision in State v. 
Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998). Radfbtd 
filcd a motion for rzconsidcration. After argument on 
that motion, the d i d c t  judge reversed his decision and 
granted tly motion LO r u p p m  the slntemenk? based on 
this Courts decision In Crowe. The State thm appealed. 
P. OOd/O 18 
Page 2 
court's factual findings unlms thcy arc clciuly crroncous. 
Slula v. Mddlcy, 127 frluho 182, 18.5, 898 P.2d IOY3, 
1096 (1995). Based upon the trial court's findings, this 
Court exercises free review over whether the constitu- 
tional requirements h m  been mot. Id 
In. 
Rdford has nrgue4 both below and on appcal, hat 
his statements should be suppressed under both the Fifih 
and Fourtennth [***6J Amcndm~nts to tlrc United Storm 
Conrlilrrtiorr, as well as Article I, Section 13 ofthe Idaho 
Constitution. Before .discussing Radford's 'Fifih wd 
Folincenth Amendment claims, we must first determine 
if the'Idaho Constitition.should be interpreted to provide 
grenur'pmtection had the U.S. Constitution in this erne. 
A. ,The 1daho.Constitution Doos Not Provide Greater 
katcction to Radfbra Undct tha Facti of this Clw. 
Radford argues that his right to due proccss undtr 
the Id,lho Constitution is violated in this case because he 
is compcllcd by the t m s  of his probation to givc honcst 
[*I901 [**m ;msw~s concerning his sexual history 
and is then p ~ i s h e d  for htse answets by bcing sub- 
. Jemd to M e r  prosecution. Radford argues it is h d a -  
mentally unfsir to prasucuta him fat thc ctiuclosurers hc 
was required to make and, therefore, ho is denied due 
p e w  of Iaw and tha statamohtv ha ma& to h a  officers 
on June 4th must be suppressed. 
Although Ridfiord states that he is unly requesting 
that the statcmtnrs be suppressed, his actual argument is 
much broader. By stating that it is Amdamentally unfair 
to cornpol him to give honest answers during trcatmcnt 
and be subjected to hrthcr prosecution [***7J based on 
hove answm, Radford appears to be arguing that Idrrha's 
due process provision should be interpreted  IS requiring 
, 
not jut tho suppression of my strrtotnrmtv compelled by 
the ttrms of his PWO~I, ths fluit ~ C I C O ~  but 
providing some Grid of blanket immunity fbr all crimes 
which arc disclosed during treatment. This conclusion is 
supported by Radfod's a r ~ u m n f  both in his brief and at 
oral nrgumcnt, thnt the State should h v e  to choose bc- 
ween requiring full disclosu~~ during court ordmd 
ltratmcnt, or the ability to prosecute pmbatiarrm for 
those crimes they dieclo~s Radfbrd argues the choice 
should k full &closure becaw there is a grrmer h e -  
fit to socisry in encouraging fill disclosure in order to 
incrcrwc Lhc chances for successful treatmen4 than in 
punishing an hdlvldual who is d m d y  seeking treatment 
h r  hiu behavior. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW In Coon v. State, 11 7 Idaho 38. 785 P.2J 163 
When reviewing a viol court's ruling on a defen- (1989). this Court hcld that h e  scopc of Idaho's duc 
dmt's motion to suppress, this Court dcfm lo the Vial process provision in Article I, Section 13 of the l&o 
- -  - - - - I  ' - - I  Y Y .  V Y  L O W  U I  I I C t ! b ,  C I I L U .  
. I . Hi, w 8 
134 Idaho 187, *; 998 P.2d 80, **; 
2000 I&. LUIS 23, *** 
Con.rti~tion is not "ncccnsauily bound by the inlcrprctn- 
tion given to due process by the United States Supre~ne 
Court." Id. or 40. 785 P.2d at 165. [+**8J Although thc 
due process c l aw  of the Idaho Constitution is inter- 
prcted independently. this Court "conside~s] the 
ale u d  by the United States Supreme Court in deciding 
Fourteenth Amendment due process ca..cs." Schcvcrs v. 
Statc,: 129 Idaho 573; 57?, 930 P.2d 603, 607 (1996). 
Additiondly, this Court has applied the United Swtes 
Suptcmc Court's standard for interpreting the due process 
clnuse of the United States Com'tution in other due 
process c m .  See. c . ~ .  Murcth v. Slate, Dept of Hca/th 
and WclJorre. 132 IJuhu 221.227.970 P.2d 14.20 (1 998) 
(d& process caie involving the detmmination of whether 
the plaintiff had a protectable' liberty or propcny inter- 
est); Schrrvers, 129 Idaho at 577.78, 930 P.2d at 607-CIR . 
.(due prows  cyye involving the deprivation of n liberty 
'Interest); Smirh v. Idaho Dept. of ~ori'cdion, 128 Idaho 
769.77~77,l 918 P.2d 1213, ,1216 (1996) (duc pmccss 
involving the depdvntion of a.  liberty in-). Finally, 
under the fa& of the present cosu thcrc is no compelling 
reason to expand the protection of the due process provl- 
sf on of the Idaho Constitution bayond th8t contcmplstcd 
[***9] in Lhc Fomctnth Amendment with rcgnrd to the 
smtunonts made by Radford to law e n f m e n t  officns. 
Bccauso this is not a situation where we believe h e  
Idaho Constirution provides greater protections than 
thosc y'vm in tho U.S. Constitution, the same analysis 
used for dettrmialng whether Rdford's sEItements were 
obtainod in violation of the right to due p1.6ccss under the 
U.S. Constirution will be used to determine whether 
those statements wm obtaincd in violdon of thc Idaho 
Constitution. 
Mford also arguea that his right against self- 
incrimination as gumanteed by ArticIe 1, Soctiow 13 of 
the Idaho Constitutfon ha6 been violated. Tn his brief, 
Radford wgucs only that his statements, which were rc- 
quirtd by the tern of his probation (the statements made 
during the pdygmph and the winen sexual history), 
were compelled ilnd therefore protected by liis right 
qpinst self-inaimination. Howcvn; lbc Stale is not hp 
pealing the suppression of those statements by the dis- 
trict judge. Ritther tho Statc is seeking only to havo thc 
June 4th smtemenm declared admissible. Radford has not 
; w e d  that these statmncnta were obkind in violation 
of Article I, Section 13 nn4 therefore, 1***101 we de- 
cline to consider R a d f d s  statc constitutional claim on 
this issue. B. The District Judge Erd In Suppressing 
Radford's June 141th Statcmentr. 
b d f d  argues thot the district' judge properly 
granted his motion to suppress because the ststrments 
wcrc both involuntary [*I911 [**84J and "hi t"  ofthe 
prior compelled sfiltemmts. We will address each ugu- 
mcnt m turn. 
I .  The Statements Were Voluntary. 
In dctcrmininy whcthm Radford's sMrmmtJ to law 
enforce~ncm ofXlcus on June 4th were voluntary, we first 
nolc it is undisputed that R a d M  was not in custody at 
the time the statements were ma&. ' Even if the inter- 
view were non-custodial, Radford's statements -. Gill 
inodmissiblc if thc slatmmls wcrc nbl vol~~tary. 'Scti 
Beckwith v. United Slates, 423 U.S. 341, 3 4 7 4  96 S. , 
Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L Ed. 2 d  1 (1976); Statc v. Kuz- 
nrichev, 132 Idaho 536, 544, 976 P.2d 462. 470 (1999);, 
Stutc v. Troy, 124 Jduho 211, 214. 858 P.2d 750, 753 
(1993). In order to detmine.the voluntarin& of a con-. . . 
fession, the Court must 160k to the "totality of the cir- . . 
cumsmncts" and detcrminc whchcr thc dcfcndant's will 
was o,verbone. See Arizona v: Fulminanre, 499 U.4.279, . 
287. I 1 I S. Ct. 1246, 12.52-53,"113.L Ed. 2d 302 (1991); . 
[**+11] Troy, 124 Idaho at 21 4, ,858, P.2d.at 753.. In 
Troy, we st oul lhc hctors to tjt cimside~d in clamin- 
ing whether a confrssion was given voluncnrily. ll~ese 
hctors include: 
( I ]  Whcthcr Mirartclh warnings wore 
givm; 
(2) The youth ofhu accused: 
(3) Thc accused's lcvcl of education or 
low in~llignce; 
(4) The length of detention; 
(5) The repented and prolonged nature of 
thc questioning; and 
(6) Deprivation of food or sleep. + 
Troy, 124 Iduhu ut 214, 858 P.2d at 753 (citing 
Schvcckloth v. Busturnom 412 US. 218, 226 93 S. Ct. 
2041. 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d854 (1973)). 
I Radford admits hc was not in formal custody 
at the time of the intentiew, although he points 
out that he was rcquit~d to mOOt with his pmb- 
tion officer on June 4th under the terms of his 
probation. In Minnesota v. Muvlry, 465 US 420, 
104 S Ct. 11 36, 79 L. Ed 2d 409 (1984), the U.S. 
Supreme Court specifically held that a proba- 
tioner's mgularly scheduled visit to his probation 
olIiccr did not constitute a custodial sitimtion 
which required Mirandu warnings, although 
thoat warnings were givm to Radford. 
- . . , a  - r  b " " * , I " L #  U V . U U  
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IC*+lZ1 Applying rhe above fircton to the f5ct.s of lhc coursc of the intmvicw. Thc rccord docs not support 
this ccuc, wc a p  wih thc disllicl judge that Radford's Radford's argument that DctcctIve Ayone disregnrdcd 
statements were voluntay. ' Flrsr, Wford was siven Rdford's initial request not to talk about the 199 1 inci- 
Miranda wruninp by Detective Ayotu prior to the inter- dent. 
view. Kadford a&uowledged that he M been notified of 
his rights and undmtocsd tho= righ:hts when he signed a 
"Notilication of Rights" form and Laitinled the line, 
which n;rd "1 understarid thcsc rights, yld'hxviny thcm 
in mind. 1 wish to talk to the omcer now." +itionally, 
Detective Ayotte testified that he repeatedly told Radford 
hc  was f - c  to lave and did not havc to talk.to the offi- 
cers. ?'he record meals thn'hdford was 29 years old' at 
the time o f  the intcrvicw. .had yeduated &om, high 
school, had anended one year of college; and: had. had 
prior contact with law cnforccrnent. Thmc is no indi&- 
. . . don hi Rodford was somehow incapable of underaim+ 
ing his rights or inwpahle.of making.a knowing +in- : 
tclliy~nt wiivcr of those rights. Fln~lly, the Interview 
lasted only for abu t  two hours, not on utcmive length 
of time. 
2 Tha dishict judge's original dccision included 
findings of fact supporthg his conclusion that 
Radfotd's Junc 4th ytatmncnts wmc voluntary. Al- 
though the district judge rcvcned his decision 
based on ow decision in Crew,  he did no1 
change his factunl Wings. Neither party has ap- 
pealed the factual findings and, thcrcforu, wc ac- 
cept lhcm. 
[***l31 Most of Radford's argument mtum on the 
fifth criteria. tho natm of the questioning. F h t ,  Radford 
egues that because part of the SANI? p r o m  obligated 
him to try rmd undcrstnnd the impact his actions had on 
his vict&ns, and his probation ofacor told him that by not 
disclosing tha names of his victims h8 made it appear he 
didnl care about hls victims, he was thmfors coerced 
into making his st;nrmentj about the 1991 &mu. How- 
cvcr, whilc Ihe oficcrs were catalnly uyhg to get him 
to mlk, tho nwrd mvealr no ~ s r s n c a  mado by the ofi- 
crms or thc probation ofllcer concerning the r e q t w  
of the SANE program, or any threats or promism made 
conccrniny Radfonl's continued treatment. 
[*I921 (**W Secondly, Radford argues that his 
statcmrmts wcrc caerted because, aha W o r d  stated 
&at he did not waat to talk about the 1991 incident, De- 
tective Aye* ( I )  placcd Ihc 1991 filc an h e  mblc be- 
twem Itadford and Ayotte, and (2) told Radford that he 
had mlked to the victim in the 1991 cssc and sht still 
livcd in fern However, ktcctivt Ayotte did not ask 
hdford any quustions about the 199 I crue allcr RadCord 
indicnted Ihnt he did not want to talk about it on the ad- 
vice of his attorney. 1g*'14] Inskcad, according la Ay- 
ottc's testimony, which the district judge found credible, 
Radford himself rcpcatcdly mfnnced tho case during 
Third, Radfird q u e s  his statements were coenxd 
.becaw his probation oficcr, in mponse to Raclford's 
question about wherhcr she would recommend he stay 
'lrcatmcnt if hc talked to the officer, told him if hc was 
totally truthfbl with the oficers she would recommend 
what was bus't; According to RsdTord. this statement 
meant he had .to talk because orhtrwise he would 'not 
have been m l l y  uuthful. J-lowevrr, it is undisputed the 
probntionoficcr did not promise she would rccomrnmd 
he stay in treatment even if he told the officus every- 
thing hc knew. Shc also clearly statcd shc was not order- 
ing him'ro talk to the ofnccrs. Rather than any attcmplt to. . . , 
iocrcc 'Radlbrd .into making a shitcmcnf it appears the .. 
probation offlcu was simply vying to give an honest . . 
answer to Radford's question. Even if the probation ofii- 
cacr remarks could be construtd as somc type of Lhrcat or 
promise Ig**1SI regarding Tcadford's probation sfatus, 
that alone would not require the suppmsion of the 
statements. We havc pmSously held that promises of 
leniency do not ncccv.dly rcn& a confession invalun- 
my. Sfore v. Algcr. 1 0  Idaho 675, 680. 603 P.2d 1009. 
1014 (1979). Rather, they arc only a factor to be consid- 
d under tln: totality of the chmstances. Id. 
Finally. Mford  amw his statsmontn m o t  be 
c o n s i d  voluntary because the officers had btcn given 
a copy of his writtun m a 1  history prior to their inter- 
view with him. In support of his argumcnh Fbdford rc- 
lies on the Idaho Cow of Appds case of State v. 
McLuan, I23 Idaho 108,844 P.2d 1358 (Ct. App. 1992). 
In M&m, the Coun of Appeals held that a second 
slatcmmt given by thc dcfmdanl to police, a h  they had 
b m  glven o copy of hls previous unwiunod smwnent to 
his ptobation officer, had to be supprcwcd, In so holding 
the Court of Appcrrls determined that  rally was no 
"secondn statumcnt Rathm, the first Ythkmcnt was sim- 
ply hand delivered to the oflicers and was used during 
thc questioning in order to gct morn information to add 
to that alnedy in the stnttment. 1***16l Therefore, the 
fim unwamcd, and thmfore hadmi&ible, statement 
simply grew into the second. 1d ul 113-1 4, 844 P.2d d 
1363-64. 
In this CBVC*, unlike McLscnq there is no cvidrmco 
that tho offlcsrs In any way used, or even r s f d  to, 
RadfbnSb writlcn s c x d  hidory during thc c o w  of tho 
inmmiaw. Pvfinps more importantly, Radford knew the 
omcm w m  aware of the conwrl of his slalcmnt fw at 
least six days, during which time Rdfbrd had consulted 
his anamcy a d  bccn dvivcd not LO talk about thc 1991 
incident. It is dimcult to see how knowing the oficers 
hnd a copy of thc writlrm shlcmcnl hiid any impact in 
causing Rndford to fcel compelled to give r second 
statanent to the officers. 
Wc agree with UIC district judgc that RadfordL dtci- 
sion to make statements about the 1991 incident was 
voluntaly- We do not condone invcstigatlons conducted 
in tho probation omce or with the probation officer pn- 
sent bct5use of tho clear rncssaya acnt to thc prohli~ncr 
that whntever is said will likely have some impact on his 
probidon s w s .  ~Iowevcr, based on the towlily of the 
circumslanclr, presented h u t ,  pnrricularly the fact tlmt 
Radford had consulted I***17J with an attorney. and 
clearly undcrshod his ri&& wc lind Rodford's eventual 
.decision to mnke statements to the officers was a product 
of his frce will. 
2. ~dibrd's Jme'4th Sutmnunh Wmc Not "Fruit" olbthc . 
Eai.litr Compelled Stntemcnt. 
The State argues the district judge improperly found 
the Junc 4th .statcmcnts to bc [*I931 [**86) inadmissi- 
ble "hitb1 of the inndmissible, compelled stiltelncnt Rid-. 
ford made during the May 28th polypph. In contrast, 
Rodford argues even If his smtcments were voluntary, the 
smtrments must be suppressed as a product of tho com- 
pelled statement becnusc the only rcnson tho officus 
interviewed Radford about tho 199 1 incident was be- 
cause thcy had k n  in~ormed of the stetemcnt made 
during Be polypph maminotion. 
As a preliminary mutter, in finding the June 4th 
statements mnde by Radford were inadmissible, the dis- 
trict judge relied on our dccision in Statc v. Crowc, 131 
Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998). In Crowu, we hold 
dfsclosuros required by the terms of tho SANE pro~pam 
were admissible in n probntion violation proceeding, but 
recognized the holding in Mimtc~orp v. M . h y ,  46.5 US. 
420, 104 9. CL 1136, 79 t Ed 2d 409 (19#), [***I81 
that my sntemems cornpsllcd during probation could not 
bc uscd in a subaqucnl criminal trial becnuso it would 
c o d m t t  a violation of tho defendant's right not to in- 
drninalc himsclC Thc parlies do not dispute tho state- 
mants made by Radford during the polypph examina- 
tion and a his written scxual history arc inndmissible in 
any crhInal proceeding, The swtcrnents at issue in this 
irppesl wtrs not mods during the of Ihc SANE 
maranent program, or otherwise compelled by the tenns 
of Radford's probution. Thcnrfstc, the question is 
whether the June 4th statements m forbidden fhah of the 
ford argues the June 4th statements ivc forbidden fruit of 
the compelled statements because the officers never 
would hnvc questioned Rndlbrd about he crime had thy 
not been infomad of the substance of his compelled 
statements. However, [***I91 the United States Su- 
preme Court has sated that the test of whether subs- 
qwnl cvidenct constitutes "f+it orthe poisonous trccw is 
more than just a "but .forn test. Woag Sun v. 'Clnild 
Bates, 371 US. 471, 83 S Cr. 407. 9 1, Ed 26 441 
(1 963). In Won$ Skur. the Court smted rhat: 
We need not hold that all tvidcncc is 
%it .of .the poisonous freen simply be- 
&luc it would nbthvc come to light but 
for the illc@al actions of the police. 
Ralhkr, the morc apt qucstion in. such ii 
'. case is "whether, panting cstablislun~nt 
of ,the primary illegality. tho cvidmce to 
which instnnt objection is made has been 
come, at by exploitation of that illegality 
or instcad by means suficiently distin- 
guishable to be purged of the primary 
taint." 
ld  or 487-88. 83 X Cr. tar 41 7. 'lb question in the pn- 
sent caae is not whclher the officn would not have ob- 
tained Radford's June 4th statements "bur for" their 
knowlcd~c of his compelled statement, but rather 
whether the June 4th statements were suflciently an act 
of h e  will to pwgc tho primary toint of tile compelled 
statement. As the United States Supreme Court h u  shtcd 
Aftor an acclrssd hiu once let the 
[**%I cat out of tho bng by cmi'iiing, 
no mattbr what tho inducement, he is 
never thatafter k c  of the paychologicol 
abd pmdcal disodvanmgca of bvhg 
confeswd, He cam ncvm got the cat back 
in the bag. The seerat is out for good. In 
such a sense, a later conhion qlways 
may be looked upon as b i t  of the liw. 
But this Corn hw nncw gone so fiu as to 
hold that making a confession undcr cir- 
cumstances which prccludo its uw, per- 
p d y  disables tbc c o n f i r  from mak- 
 in^ a usable ow after those conditions 
have been removed. 
inadmissible stitternnu fiom tho polygraph and wriltcn 
history. United Statcs v. Bqycr, 331 US. 532, 54041, 67 S. CI. 
' 
The Uniwd States Supreme Court has hold tho Fifth 1391,1398,91 L. Ed I654 (1947). 
Amendment pmlccu aplnst the use of a witnos's corn- In TMor v. Alabama, the United States Supreme 
plied m m  and "CVidmce d*d thercfiom" in any cow d k u  he kuu, lo cmridcm( in deding subnquenl aiminn1 wid. L q f l m i ~ t  v. Turly, 414 U.S. whnhw coaPrsion - rumclcDtly im la of he will 70, 78, 948. Ct. 316 322.381.. Ed 2d274 (1973). Rad- so, to pw of primw hint illeg.l allat, 
Tht important Bctors included: (I)  the lengrh in dmc 
between rhe confession and the arrest; (2) the pmctlcr of 
intervening circumstances; and (3) Lhc purpose w d  
[*I941 [**m flagmcy of the official misconduct. 
Tqylor, 457 U.S. 687, n 6911, 102 S. Ct. at 2671. The 
tfiIrd hctor would not be applicable, as this case lfff21) 
docs not involvc any official misconduct by law m- 
. . forcement; . . . 
stalcmcnl, wcrc not m;ldc to thc same peoplc in the same 
place as the earlier statement. Rother, the srntemcnts 
wcrc mndc to officers who wen not present at the earlier 
statement and the interview took place in the probation 
ollicc, not thc SANE treutrnent center. [**%I While 
the offlcus' knowledge of Radfonl's compellcd stattmcnt 
may have initially led them to interview him, the state- 
ments he made to Ihc oficas'during thc intmricw.at the 
probation office were the result of-rn intuvcning indc- 
Appiyin8 moining finon to he Of petdent act of ficc will. Wc hold that the June 4th s m p  &Is crw, we Gnd the statements arc suficienlly distin- menu were not "h i t "  of the earlier compelled stntement guishable so a to be purged of the primiuy mint. The given by R r J f . . .  June 4Lh statements wcrc madc a wcck aHcr thc Iirst 
cornpaved 'statement . during which time, Hadford had 
consulted his attorney and h d  been Jdvised not to talk 
nbout the. lq91 caw. Thus, thqc was on extended time 
py-od between the two st;rtmants. At' the time of the 
interview, Rddford wis reparedly told he was free to 
lave  and ,he did not have to talk to the officers about.the 
199 1 c w .  Wh'm R&dTotd statcd he had bccn adviscd not 
to calk nbout the incident, the officers respected this re- 
quest a d  asked Radford no questions about thc 1991 
incident uhU'Radford said he had decided to talk about 
it. Finally. the June 4th .stattmnnts am sufficiently at- 
tenuated because those statements, unlike the compellcd 
For the forog~bg re&&, we cvcrse. the 'order uf 
the district judge granting Radfofls motion to suppress 
his June 4th smtembts and r&and,hia m c  to thc dis- 
trict j u d ~ e  f& ftrther proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
JustiCes SILAK, S C K R O ~ E R ,  WALTERS and 
KIDWELL, CONCUR. 
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LEFKOWITG ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YO- ET AL. v. TCRLEY ET 
AL 
SUVRENE COURT OF TRE UNITED STATES 
oftobcr 10,1973, Arppcd . 
November 19,1973, Decided 
, . PRIOR RI!WORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED ' , 
STATES DlSTfUCT COURT FOR TI-lE W E S l ' m  
'DTSTRICT OF NEW YORK. . . 
DISPOSITION: 342 ESupp, 544. affirmed. 
Aitu two nrchiteas refused to testio before a Now 
York gnnd jury concerning thcir conh-ach with a county. 
and rcfuscd lo sign wnivcrs of hnunity Dom prosecu- 
tion, the District Attorney notified variou~ stah con-- 
ing authorities of thc mhitecb' conduct and called awn- 
tion to New York statutes providing that if a public can- 
tractor rchwcv lo waive immunity h m  criminal prosecu- 
tion or to answer questions wlien called before a p n d  
jury or g~vcmmcnt aEcncy lo lcslify concming his wn- 
trncts, his existing conmcts may be cancelled and he is 
disqualified fiPm further h a n d m s  with Lhc shtc f i  5 
years. Thereupon, the nrchitccts instituted an action in 
the United S m  Distzia Court for h e  Westm District 
of New York, alleging thnt their adsting comcts  and 
future conuitcting privileges wmc thrcatcncd, wd that 
the Ncw YoA statutes violated the constitutional privi- 
lege against self-incrimination. A 3-judge court was con- 
vened, and ic was held hat  ~ h t  s atutes were unconstitu- 
tional under the Fourteenth lvld F@ih Amcnd~nets (342 
FSupp 544). 
On direct nppenl, the United Stiatcs Supreme Coun 
affirmed. ln ;vl opinion by Whilc, J., il was hcld (I) ex- 
pressing the uhanimous view of the court, that the New 
York s~stutas wmc unconslitulionnl under the Fourteenth 
and Fi/ih A m d m e n t s  as violative of the privilege 
against salf- incrimination, sincc lhu sktc could no1 
compel testimony from publlc contmctors under thmt  of 
cancellation of current conmctu and disqulilication 
&om entering into public conmcts in the fume unless it 
first offered tha conmetor immunily from prosecution 
suflicienl to . 'supplan1 lhc. '&vilcgc against salf- 
hcrimbtion, without insisting tl~at he convncror waive 
such immunily,. and (2) cxpn%siny Lhc vicw of 6 mcm- 
bus of the court, that the immunity nccesscuy to compel 
such tcs6mony woir that neither the testimony nor its 
hits could be used In subsequent criminal proceedings. 
Brwnan, J., joined by Doughs and Marshall, JJ., 
concurred in the court's ophion cxccpl as lo holding (2) 
above, expressing the view that the privilege against self- 
incriminalion required that thc immunity nccasssry to 
permit compelled testimony was absolute immunity from 
prosecution for any transaction rcvciaIed in the testimony. 
[***LEdHNl] 
LAW (5502 
privilege agdnst self- incrhinntion - npplicability 
to State$ - 
The Fonrtemh Amendment makes the Fflh 
Amendment privilege against =If- incrimination applica- 
ble to the states. 
(+**LEdB[Nt] 
WITNESSES 479 
self-Incriminntion - public eonvnclon - irnrnunily - . 
State statutes whjch.(l) require thnt public contracts 
contain a clause providing that i r  a conbactor rcfusm to 
waive immunity h r n  criminal prosecution or to nnswer 
qucstims when called bcfm a grsnd jury or govemmrmt 
ngency to testifL concerning his conwcts with the state 
or any of ib subclivisiony his existing comncts may be 
a,,,, L W  L W U > \  I U L I  U U .  UU 
""" Y L ~ W  UTTIces, L n t a .  I t  HX)Z09a0 
Q 0 
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e~nccllcd md hc shall tic disqualilied from fwrhu w s -  
actions with the state for five yeius, and (2) require dis- 
qualification from contracting with public aulhorilics 
upon the failure of my person to waive immunity or to 
mswcr qdons concerning his Lntns3~lionu with Lhc 
state or its subdivisions, are unconstitutional under the 
Fowtemth and .F@h Amcndment~ violative of thc 
. . piivilcge.against scllsincriminatfon, since the'stnte can- 
not cqmpel tmimony that has not been iminunized born 
use in subscqucnt criminal proccedhgs. 
A wilness prolcclcd by tho privilcgc against =If- 
incrimination may rightfully rehse to 'ulswu unless and 
until he is prolcctcd at least aminst the usc of his com- 
pelied answas and evidence derived thereffom in any 
subsequent criminal case in which hc is a dcfmdwt; 
absent such protection, if he is nevertheless compelled to 
mrwm. his answers im inadmissible against him in a 
later criminal prosecution. , . 
privilege .against self-incrimination - prowedings . ,
involving public contractor - , . . 
self-incrimination - proceedings to which privilege 
privilege against self- 
indminalim not 'only protects the individual against 
b o b  invo1un~;yUy wlled ;u a witness against himself in 
a criminal pr~cul ion.  but also pnvilegcs him nut LO 
answer official questions put to him in any other pro- 
cacdink civil m criminal, formal or inlbrmal, what Lhc 
answers might Incriminate him in h u e  proceedings. 
. . 
Thc , F N ~  '. &e"dhcnt ' priyileg= . itpinst self- 
incrimination is not ~npplicable, simply becnw the is- 
suc a r i ~ s  in the kntext of.oBcid. inquiries into the job 
performance of n public conthlctot: he  orditwy rule is 
that the privilege is availnble to wimesses called before 
grand juries Lo tmtiFy concorning their public contracts. 
WMWESSES 572 WITNESSES 979 
sclf-incrimination -purpose of Fihh Amcntlmcnl- privilege against self-incrimination - public cm- 
ployccs wd conbgcton - 
Hcadnote: [8] The object of the FPh Amcndmmt pnvilcgc wins t  
self-incrimination is to tnsure that a pmon shall not be 
compelled, when acting as a witness in my investigation, 
to give t d m o n y  which might tcnd lo show that hc him- 
self bmdfted a crime. 
Although a sr;ue IISIS a strong, l eg ih te  interest in 
mru'nlaining the integrity of its civil service and of i b  
tmnsactions with independent canunctors W i n g  
goody and servicm, neverthel& such interest i s  not suf- 
flciently strong to override the privilege agniast self- 
incrimination so as to dlow the state to interrogate em- 
ployees and public contractors about their job perform- 
mcc without regard, to the Fi/rh Amcmdment, dischiuging 
those who refuse to answer or LO waive the pn'vilegc by 
waiving the immunity Born prosecution to which they 
would othuwlse be endtlcd, and wing any incriminating 
answsrs in subsequent crimind promcution. 
privilcgc against self-incrimination -- statutory in- 
4uj. - 
Headnolc:[S] 
The privilege against self-incrimination protects 
witnesses in a statutory inquiry, whcthn sblc or fcdcral. 
WITNESSES 579 
self-incrhination - iinmunity - 
seIf-incrimination - protection of witness - ~mdnotc:[9] 
Hciidnotc:l6] Notwithstanding fhc impatancc ofthe inmest of the 
states in the enforcement of their ordinary criminal laws, 
h e  price for compelling incriminating answers from 
4 14 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. CL 3 16, **; 
38 L. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. L W S  132 
third-patty witnesses is sufficient immunity &om prose- 
cution to satisfy the i m p d v e s  of tho F@h Amfndmcnt 
ptivilegr against compelled self-incrimination. 
privilege against self-incrimination -- waivm - 
Hcsdnotc:[lO] 
A waiver of tho privilege against self-inuimination 
and of immunity from subscqucnt pmscculion bascd on 
compelled testimony, secured under threat of subsmntial 
economic sanction, cannot be twned value; . 
self-incrimhtion. - public' tinployees and conmc- 
tors - immunity - , 
Although due regfwd for the F@h Amendment for- 
bids the smte &om compelling incriminating answm 
fiom it$ cmployces and contractors that may ba used 
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings, tho 
Constitution pennits such testimony to be compelled if 
neither it nor its h i t s  are aydlable for such use. 
l * * * l 1 2 ]  
CONTEMPT 812 
WITNESSES 879 
self-incrimi~tion - immunity - 
The accommodntion between the interest of the smte 
and the Fflh Amendment privile~e against selF 
incrimination requires thnt the stoltt hve means m its 
disposal to secure testimony if immunity is supplicd and 
~cslimotly is still refused; thus, the couttp have power to 
compel testimony, after a p n t  of immunity, by use of 
civil contcmpt and imprisonment. 
self-incrimin'ation - immunity - public cmployccs - - 
Givcn adequate immunity fiom criminal prosecution 
in return for waiver of the privilege awinst self- 
incrimination, thc sllllc may insist that iui cmployccs 
P. 0 I I /018---- 
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either answer questions under oath about the perform- 
yncc of thcir jobs or suffer the loss of employmmt. 
WITNESSES 979 
self-incrimination - waiver of privilege - public 
contractor - . , . . .  
Although a smte ]nay insist that public contractors 
cihw mpond lo rclcvmt inquiriw isbout the pdorm- 
q c e  of their contracts or suffer, cancellation of current 
contrims and disqualification h r n  conmcting with pub-: . 
lic agencies for an npproprke time in thc futllurc, ncva- 
theless the state may not insist that the c,ouuiictorg'~ive ' . , . 
heir , Fijih Amcndrncnr . .ptivilcgc against .' self- ' ' . . 
incrimination and consent to the use of the h i t s  of h e  . 
in l~mpl ion in subscquml .proceeding brought kbgnst ' . ' . . 
tliem; if answers are to be required, the smte must ofkr 
lo the witness immunity from prosecution sufficient to 
supplant the privilege, (md may not insist that the witness 
waive such immunity. 
SYLLABUS 
Ncw York statutes rcquirc public contmcb to prp 
vide that if a contractor refuses to waive immunity or to 
tcstify concmniny his stam contracts, his misting con- 
mcts may be canceled a d  he shall be disqualitied from 
tiuthcr transactions with thc State for fiw yams, and 
AYthcr require dsquallflcatlon &om contracting with 
public authoritia upon a pmon's failure to waive b u -  
nity or answer questions mpecting his stale nruwdctians. 
Appellees, New York-licensed architects, when sum- 
moned to testi@ before a grand jury investigating ver'ous 
charges, refused ro sign waivers of immunity, 
whereupon various contracting aurhorilies won notiiicd 
of appellees' conduct and had their attention called to the 
applicable disqualilication ~tzttutcs, Appellees thereafter 
brought this action challenging the statutes as violntivo 
of Lhuit conslilulional privilcgc against compcllcd self- 
incrimination. A hre-judge District Court declared the 
shtutrrcr unconstitutional undcr tho Fourteenth ;wd FPh 
Arnendmmts. lIuI3: 
I. The F@h Amertdmerrt privilege a p h t  self- 
incrimination is not inapplicable simply because the is- 
sue arises in the context of official inquiries into the job 
performance of a public contractor. The ordinary tulc is 
that the privilege is available to witnesses d l e d  before a 
grand juy as I ~ M C  apprllees were, and the State's Icgiti- 
rnme interest in maintaining the integrity of its civil ser- 
vice and of its transactions with indcpnrdcnl contractors, 
like other state concerns, cannot override the require- 
ments of the Fvh Amendment. Pp. 77-79. 
414 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct. 316, **; 
38 L. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. IEXIS 132 
2. '1%~ State could not compel testimony that had not 
been immunized and thc wiver sought by h c  Slate, un- 
dcr threat of loss of conmcrs, would have been no less 
compelled than u dircct nqucsl for the testimony witbout 
resort to the wdvw devicu, Gorriry v. New Jwsqy, 335 
US. 193; Gardner v. Rmdcrick 392 US 273; Sanitation 
Mcn v. Saniratiun Cuntmk 392 U.S. 280, and there is no 
constitutional distinction in tmris of compulsion b&ccn 
the thrcat of job loss in hose cases and h e  threat of con- 
mct loss to a conuanor. Pp. 79-84. 
3. Under o propor lrccommodstion bctwe~n the in- 
LWSL ofthe Slate and the I:[/lh Amendment, the State cirri 
require employees or conmctors to respond to  inquiries. 
but only if it o~TL* thcm immllnity sullicient to supplnnt 
their I;@ Amt!ndmt!nt privilege. Kastigar v. Unired 
' 8arcs. 406 U.S. 441. Pp. 84-85, , . . 
COUNSEC: Bmda Sololl: Assismnt Attomcy: G m d  . 
or NLV Y ork, nrgucd the muse for appelhts. 'with her 
on the brief for appellants LeRowitz ct sl. wore Louis J. 
l,cfkowitz, Attorney Gencrnl, pro st, and Smuel A. Hir- 
showitq First Assiswnt Attomcy General; A scpw& 
brief wuv fil~d for appellant Tutuska 
Richard 0. Robinson mgwd the cause and fled a brief 
for appelles. 
dUDCES: White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 
in which Burger, C. J.. and S t e m  Blackmun, Powell, 
and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, aad in which Brennan, J., 
joined by a sepame qualifying opinion. m which Doug- 
las and Mushall, JJ., joined, post, p. 85. 
OPINION BY. WHITE 
OPINION 
makes applicsblc to the Stittm tho Fph Amcmdmcnr 
privilege ngninst compelled self-incrimination. 
1 N. Y. Gen. Munic Luw §,6 103-u nnd 103-6 
(Supp. 1 973- 1 974) provide: 
Section 10341. Gmund Ibr cancellation of 
conmct by municipal corpontions and tlrc dis- 
tricts: 
"A. clause shall be inserted in all specifia- 
tions or contracts made or awruded by a munici- 
pal cotporetion or my public dcparlmcnt, agency 
or official tl~ereof on or after the h t  day of July, , 
'ninctccn hundred fifty-ninc or by a firc dimict or . 
any agency or oflicinl thereof on or after the fmt 
day of September, nineteen hundred sixty, for 
work or s e r v i c ~  perlbrmed or to be performed, . 
or 6oods sold or to be sold. to provide that upon 
the refusal of n pwion, when called before a . 
p n d  jury, liead of o state department, temporary 
stalc commission w ohcr sClc agency, . - . h a d  
of a city department, or other city agency, which 
is cmpowmcd to cornpcl thc atLndrincc of wit- 
nesses and examine thein under oath, to tcstifL in ' 
an invwtig8tion concerning my transaction or 
contract had with the state, any political subdivi- 
sion thereof, a public authority or with any public 
department, agency or oflicinl of the state or of 
any political subdivision thereof or of a public 
aulhority, to s i p  a wdvircr of immunity against 
subsequent criminal prosecution or to answer iuiy 
fclcvlvlt qucvtion concerning such transaction or 
conmct, 
"(a) such pcrson, and any h, partnorship or 
~rporation of which he is a member, pnrtnu, di- 
rector or officer shall be disclualified from t h e e  
["*2781 I++J191 MZL JUSTICE wTITE nf\a selling to or submining'bids to or receiving 
delivered the opinion of the Court. awivds fiom or entering into m y  con,ntncts with any mtlniciual cornomtion. or lie dislricL or mv 
[***LEdHRl) [l] New York General Municipal dep&tmemf rpn& or official ther'eof, f& 
Luw $,f 103-a and 103-b and N m  York Public Authori- goods, work or scrvice?~, Tor a period of five y m  
ticar L m  IJ$ 22601 and 2602 require public contracts to &r such refusal, and to provide also that 
provide that if o contnnor refirs& to waive immunity or 
to answer qucstions w h ~ n  d l e d  to mtify concerning his 
convects with the State or any of its subdivisions, his 
mistiny conhcts may be canceled and he s h d  be dis- 
qunlified from firrthcr nnsactions with the SMe for five 
years. ' In [**321] addidon to [*72j speciQing 
(***279] these contract terms, the statutes require dis- 
qualification fiom contracting with public authorities 
upon fallurc of any person to waive immunity [**-801 
or to [*73] answcr qucstions with rtypcct LO his tmnmc- 
lions with the Stnte or its subdivisions. The issue in this 
case is whether thcso scctions [**a11 arc consislent 
with the Fourruenrh [*741 Amendment insofiu its it 
"@) any and all contracts made with my mu- 
nicipal corporation or any public department, 
abmcy or official thmcof on or r r h r  tho first day 
of July, nineteen hundred fifty-nine or with any 
fire district or my agency or official thereof on or 
nftv the k t  day of September, nineteen hundred 
sixty, by such person, md by my firm, partner- 
stiip, or corpmdon of which he is a mcrnbw, 
p m q  director or oficer may lx cancelled or 
terminated by the municipal corporation or f r r  
district without incurring ,my penalty or darnages 
on account of such cancellation or taminadon, 
414 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct. 316, "; 
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but any monicj owing by Lhc municipal corpora- 
tion or f i e  district for goods delivered or work 
dons prior to thc mccllation or tcnnination shall 
be paid. 
"The provisions of this -on as in force 
and elTect prior lo the f i t  day of September, 
nineteen hundred sixty,. shall apply to specifica- 
tions or contmch m d c  or awanlcd by a munici- 
pal corpomtion on or after the flrst day of July, 
ninctccn hundrcd lilty-ninc, but prior to Lhc first 
day of September, nineteen hundred sixty." 
Secriow 1034. I>isqualification to connct 
wifi m&icipal corpomlioris Bnd lift disVicts: . 
"Any person, who, whcn ailed before a 
gmnd'jury, head of a m t e  department, temporary 
state'comm'ission or other state agency, . . . head 
of a city department or otha city a6mcy. which 
is cmpowctcd to compcl the nncndnnce of wit- 
nesses and examine them under oath, to tesa-fi in 
an invcstiwtion conccrniny any t ~ s a c l i o n  ot 
contrnct hnd with the state, any pollticnl subdlvi- 
sion tharwf. a public authorily, or wilh a public 
department, agency or ofYicia1 of the state or of 
any political subdivision thcrcof or of a public 
nuthoriry, refuses to sign a waiver of h u n i t y  
amst subsequent criminal prosecution or to an- 
swer my relevant question concvning such 
triansaction or contract, and m y  firm. partriership 
or corporation of which he is a member, partner, 
director or officer shall be disqualified from 
thmclrftcr selling to or submitting bids to or rc- 
ceiving awards fiom or entering into any con- 
tracts with any municipal corporation or fire dis- 
uiq or with any public depnronmt, agency or of- 
ficial thcreof. for good.. work or servi~rzi, for a 
period of flve years after such refusal or until a 
disqwlification shall be m o v e d  pucsuant to tho 
provisions of section one hundred three-c of this 
anicle. 
pmtncrship or corporation of which he is a mcm- 
ber, partner, director or officer, is known to have 
a contract Howevm, whcn such refusal occurs 
before a body otha thnn n g t ~ d  jyr ,  notice of 
refusal shall not be sent for a period of ten days 
nitu such refusal occurs. Prior to lhe cxpimlion 
of this ten day period, ;my person, firm, parma- 
. . .ship or corpomlion which has bccomc li&lc to 
the canahtion or termination of a contract or 
diqmlilicalion c o n k t  on account of such re- 
h l  may commence a special proccedhg at n 
special tcnn of the supreme court, held within the 
judicial district @ which the rcfusal occmd,  for 
iui order determining whetha'the questions in re- 
sponse to which 'the rc fwl  occurrcd wcrc rclc- 
. . : v a t  a d  material to the inquiry. . Upon the com- 
, , mmccmml of such proceeding, lhc ,.-ding of 
. . such notice of rcfusiil to answer shall be subject . . to order of the court .in which the proceeding was 
brought in a mnnner and on such terms as thc 
court may deem just. If a proceeding is not 
brought .within ten days, notice of rcfwl shall 
thereupon k sent as provided heroin." 
N. Y. Pub. Auth, Low $9' 2601 and 2602 
(Supp. 1973-1 974) provlde: 
Secn'orr 2601. Ground for c;mcellation of 
contrnct by public authority: 
"A clause shalI be insertod in a11 speciflca- 
tions or conmcta hcrcafkr made or awwdcd by 
nny public authority or by my official of nny 
public authority mated by thc state or any politi- 
d subdivision, for work or svvices performed 
or to bc pcrfmed or go& sold 61. to be sold, to 
provide that upon the refusal by a person, when 
called kfm a p d  jury, h d  of a state d a  
pnrunent, temporary state commission or ohm 
Sfilt4 agency, . . . hcad of a city depmnent, or 
other city agency, which is empowered lo compel 
the attmdimw of witntsscs and mmine them 
"11 shall bc thc dllty orthe ollica conducting under oath, to tcsti& in M investigation conccm- 
the investigation before the grand jury, the head ing any a;ms;iction or conmct had with the stnte, 
of a shlc dcprutmcnl, thc chairman of lhc lrmpo- any political subdivision thcrmf, a public author- 
rnry state commission or other swto apency, . . . ity or with any public department, agency or o n -  
tho hcad of a city dcpment  or olhcr city ngcncy cia1 of the state or of any polkical subdivision 
before whkh the refisal occurs to send notice of thereof or of a public authority, to sign a wniver 
such rcfuw~l, togcthcr with h e  namcs of my firm, oFimmwrily against subscqucnt criminal prosccu- 
pnrrnership, or corporation of which the person so tion or to answer ;my relevant question concern- ing such hanuittion or contract, rcfusing i s  known to bc a mcmbcr, p i n ;  offi- 
' c u  or director, to the commissioner of tmnsportci- "(a) such person, and b y  frm, partnership or 
tion of tho shtc of Ncw York and Lhc approprielc corporation of which hc is a m m b a ,  partner, di- 
dcpnrtments, agencies and o ~ c i a l s  of the state, rector or ol3ccr shall be disqunliiied from hcrc- 
politiwl subdivisions thcrcof or public authorilics after selling to or submitting bids to or receiving 
with whom the person so refusing and my f i ~ n ,  a w d s  from or entering into my conmcb with 
414 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct. 316, **; 
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m y  public authority or official thereof. for goods, sioner of genenl services as the cost may be, and 
work or suvices, for a period of live ycnrs ancr h e  nppmpriak dcpartmcnts, agencies ;uld oB- 
such refusal, and to provide also that cials of the state, political subdivisions lhcrcof or 
"(b) any nnd all conmcls made with any 
public authority or official thereof, since the ef- 
Ccctive date of this law, by such pcrjdn and by 
;my. fSrm, pmush ip  or ,corpomtion of which he 
' 
k a mumbm, partner, director or officer may be 
cancelled or ttrminnted by the public authority 
without incurring any penalty or dank~es  on ac- 
count of such cancellation or termination, but my 
monies owing by the public authority for goods 
.dclircnd or work done prior 10 the c;inccllation . . 
or tennibation shl l  be paid." 
Scctih. 2602. Disqualification to contract 
. . ' ; . with public authority: 
, . '"Any. person, who, when called before a 
h d  jury, h.cad ora  stale dcplotmcnl, tcmporwy 
stnte commission or other state ngency, . . . head 
.of a city dcpsrtmmt, or othor city agency, which 
is' empowerad to compel the nnendancc of wit- 
nesses and examino them under oath, to testify in 
M investigntion concerning any rrnnsnction or 
contnct had with the mte, any political subdivf- 
sion thcrtoL, a public aulhority or with a public 
department, agency or ofecial of the state or of 
any political subdvision thereof or of a public 
authority, rehses to s i p  a waiver of Immunity 
against ~ubseqmt  criminal prosccution or to w- 
swu my relcvnnt quastions concerning such 
transaction or contract, and m y  finn. partnership 
or wpomtion, of which he is n member, partner, 
director. or officcr shall bc diaqualificd from 
thaenftcr selling to or submitting bids to or re- 
ctivfng a w d s  from or entering into any con- 
m u  with any public authority or my oacial of 
any public authority created by the sute or llny 
political subdivision, f i  goods, work or serviccs, 
for a period of fin yews after such refusal or UII- 
ti1 a dsqualilication shnll bc nmovcd pursuant to 
the provisions of section twenty-six hundred 
thrcc of lhis title. 
"It shnll be rhc duty of the officer conducting 
tha invcsb'gntion bcfm the grand jury, tho hcad 
of a mtc department, the chnirmnn of the tempo- 
rary statc commission or other statc a~ency.  . . 
h e  head, of a city depnrtment or other city ngency 
kfom which the mfwa1 occurs to send notin of 
such rcfisal, together with the names of any lirm, 
partnmhip ar corporation of which the person so 
rchsing is known to be a member, pnrtner, ofi- 
ccr or director. to the commissioner of trianspom- 
tion of the state of New York, or h e  commis- 
public aulhorilics with whom the pmons [sic] so 
rc&sing i ~ ~ d  any fArm, partnership or corporation 
of which hc is a member, p;umer, dinctor or offi- 
cer, is known to have a contract. Howcvm, when 
such nfuil occurs before a body. other t h ~  n 
grand jury, nolice of rcfuvsl shall not be mt for a 
period of ten days after such refusal occurs. Prior 
to h e  expiration of this tcn day period, any per- 
son, fum, partnership or corporation which has 
bccomc lipble to the wncellation or terminntion 
of n contrnct or disqualificali6n. tb.contruct on ac- . ' 
count of such rrfusal may commence n' specid 
proceeding nt'o special t q ' o f  thc su-c court. 
held within tlle judicjd dhlrikt in which the re-. . . 
fusnl occuncd, fm an o r d ~  detemining whether 
the questions in response tb which the rcfwl  oc- 
cwrcd wcrc rclmnm and material to the inquiry. 
Upon tile conuhenctm&t of such ptocecdink the 
scndiny of such notice of'nfusjrl to answer shall 
be subject to order of h c  c o w  in which tho pro- 
ceeding was brought in a manner and on such 
terms as the court may decm jwt. T f  a proceedin& 
is not brought wirhio ten days, notice of refusal 
slrnll thereupon be sent es providcd herein." 
r975I 1 
[***L-] FA]Appollees are two architects 
licensed by the Stale of New York Tbay w m  sum- 
moncd to &fl before a grand jury invcstignting various 
charges of conspiracy, [YQ h i ,  and larceny. Thay 
wmo asked, but refused, to sign waivers of immunity, the 
effect of which would have been to waive their right not 
to lis compelled in a crimlaal case to be a witness againat 
themstlvcs. They wme thn cxcused 5nd the DMct 
[**322] Attorney, as dhcted by law, notified various 
contracting authoriticv of appellees' conduct and called 
attention to the applicable d i squ~ca t ion  statutes. A p  
pcllceri thereupon h u a t  this action alleging that their 
existing conacts nnd fi~tutr contracting privileges wcrc 
thmtmcd md assmtcd th;rt the pertinent statutory provi- 
sions were violetive of the constitutional privilene 
against cornpcllcd self-incrimination. A threc-ju-dge ~ 6 -  
uict C o w  wns convened nnd declared tho four statutory 
provisions at issue unconstitutional under the F'otu.lecnth 
and F ' h  Am~ndments, 342 FSupp. 544 (WDNY 1972). 
We noted probable jurisdiction, 410 .US. 924 (1973). 
'fhe Stale appealed p m m t  to 28 ti. $. C. # 1253. We 
afirm the judgment of the District Court. ' 
(***LWUUJ [3'J I***LEdRRQ] [4] [***I,- 
[5] [***LEdHR6] [6]The FiJlh Amendment providcs 
414 U.S. 70. *; 94 S. CL 3 16, *+; 
38 L. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 132 
that no person " h l l  be compelled in ;my criminal case 
to bc a wimcss against himself." The Amendment not 
only p ro tas  the lndlvldual agaiast being involuntlyily 
callcd as a wit~~css against himself in a criminal prosecu- 
tion but nlso prlvilegas him not to answer ofncEnl ques- 
tions put to him in any other proceeding. civil or crimi- 
nal, formal or informal whcrc the onewm might iu- 
criminate him in fiturn criminal procdmgs. McCa~hy 
v. Amdotein. 266 US 34, 40 (1924). a q w l y  held that 
"!he privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon tlre name 
' of the proceedkp in which the testimony is.sought or is 
to bc uscd. 11 applics alika to civil and criminnl .proceed- 
ings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to ei- 
nal mponsibility him .who ,give? it. The privilege pm- 
tects a~meri'witness as Allly as lt does one who is..also a . 
party ddendwLU ' , ' . . . .  . . . 
In this respect, McCrirthy v. ~ r n h t e i n  reflected the set- 
tlcd vicw in this Ccnnt. The object of the Amendment 
"was to insure that a person should not be comp~llod. 
w h n  acting as a wjltresa in any investigation, to give 
testimony whlch d @ t  tend to show that he himself had 
committed a crime!* Counrclmm v, Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 
547, 562 (1892). See nlso Brum v. United States, 168 
US. 532, 542-543 (1897); Brown v. Walker, 161 US. 
591 (1896); Boyd v. United S I C J ~ ,  116 US. 61 6, 634. 
637-638 (1 886); United States v. Saline BonA; 1 Pct 1 00 
(1828). This is the rule that Is now applicable to the 
Smtes. Malloy v. Hogan. 378 U.S. 1 [**-I (1964). 
"It m u t  be considcrcd irrclcvant that the pctltiom was a 
witness in o statutory inquiry and not a dchdarit in a 
criminal prowcution, fbr it has long been settled that tho 
privilege protects witnesses in similar fkdml inquiries." 
[*7a Id. at 11. In any of thew centcxts, therefore, a 
witness protected by the privilege may rightfblly rsfirse 
to answer unlesa md until he is protaetod at lcast against 
the use of his compelled answers aod avidence derived 
themfrom in any subsquont criminul chse in which he is 
EI dehdant, Kwiigru v. United Slates, 406 US. 441 
(1972). Absmt such protection. if hc is nmrcrthclcsu 
compelled to answer, his answers arc inadmissible 
against him in a later criminal prosecution, Brum v. 
United Slates, supra; Boyd v. United Stales, mpra 
P a p  7 
[**+LEdEUUl [8]It is true that the State has a strong, 
Icgitimntc intcrcst in mninbining the integrity of its civil 
service and of its transactions with independent conunc- 
~ O S  finishing a widc ~ g c  of goods 1*%23] and SCT- 
vices; and New York would have it that this interest is 
suficicntly strong to ovcrridc thc privilege. The sugges- 
tion is that the State should be able to interrogate em- 
ployees ;md contractors about their job performance . . . 
without rcgard 10 h c  Fwh Amcndmont, to dischaqgc 
those who refuse to answer or to waive the privilege by 
waiving thc immunity to which.th~y would olhcrwisc bc 
entitled, and to use any incriminating answers obtained 
in subscqucnt criminal prosecutions. But claims of over- 
riding intirests are not unusual in F v h  Amendment liti-. ' . . . . 
gation and they have not fired well. 
. . . . 
.[***~EdFm9] [9]ln McCarrhy v. Arnhtein, supra, the . . ' , . 
United SMcs insistcd hat bccnusc of thc sWny public ' , . 
interest in marshaling and distributing assets .of bank- . : . ' . . 
rupts, thc [*79] ~ # h  Anntcndmcnt sh6uld not protect a . 
bankrupt during the omciol examinations mairdatcd by 
the Bwknrplcy Ad. ' T ' M  position did not prevail. The ' 
bankrupt's testimony could be had, but only if hc were 
afkded sufficient immunity to supplant the 'privilege. 
And long bcforc McC'urtthy v. Arn&tein, Lhc Court me- 
ognized tliat wld~out he compelled tastimony of knowl- 
edgeable and perhaps implicated wimesses, chc enforce- 
ment of the tnnsportiifion laws "would become impossi- 
ble," but ncv&l~ss proceeded on a basis that witnesses 
must be granted adequate lmmuniry lf their evldcnca was 
to ba cornpcllcd. Brown v. WaIkcr, I61 US., at 610. 
Sirnilnrly, rile adorcement of the nntimst laws against 
privata m r p d o n s  was at stake in Hale v. Hcnkel, su- 
pra, but immunity was essential to command the ttsti- 
mony of individual Also, it would be dmcult 
to ovacstimate the imporrance of the interest of the 
Statss in the enforcement of their wdinrvy c r i m l ~ I  hws; 
but the price for incriminating amwm h m  third-paty 
witnesses is sufficient immunity to satis* the [**-I 
imperatives of the Ftflh Amandment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination. Finally, in almost &be very 
cont~xt ~LTC invulvcd, this Court hrrY only recently held 
that employees of the State do not forfeit their constitu- 
tional privilcg wd  hat h ~ y  may bc cornpcllcd to re- 
spond to questions about the performaace of their duties 
but only if thcir answers cannot bc uscd against them in 
subsequent criminal prosecutions. ~ u r r i 6  v. New Jcrc 
i71Aainrt backpoad9 thuc .vw, 335 US, 49.3 (1967); Garher v. BrodericA, 392 
for urdng Fflh Amenhent pivilege is U.S. 273 (1968); Suni~u~iun Man v. &nitcation C ~ n r ' r ,  inapplicabk simply bccaus~ the issue , it d m  39t US 280 b01964)- 
here, in the context of ofRcial inquiries into thc job per- 
formancc of n ~ublic ontrac~.  Swly, the ordinary rule 111 
is that the prkilep is available to 4hesses call& be- In Gawiry v. New Jersey, certain police officers 
fm grsndjlnip Urtc Hule w a e  wrnmoncd LO M inquiry bting conducted by tho 
v. Ifenkel, 2201 US. 43. 66 (1906). Attorney Genenl concerning the fixing of traffic tickets. 
J I I I V - L U - L U U J ~  IUL I  U O ;  I U  ~ a w  urrlces, ~ h t d .  
. I .  
. 
414 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct. 3 16, **: 
38 L Ed. 2d 274. ***; 1973 U.S. W I S  132 
[*SO] ThLy wcrc akcd qutstions following warnings 
thnt if they did not answer they would be removed &om 
office w d  that anything thcy .wid might bc uYcd against 
them in nny criminal proceedin& No Immunity of ;my 
kind was o h d  or available undm smk law. Thc qucs- 
lions were answered and the answers lntu used over their 
objections, in their prosecutions for conspimy. The 
Court hcld Ihal "he pleclion of the individual under 
the Fourreenfh Amendment against coerced statements 
prohibits usc in subscqucnt criminal proc,ccdings of 
statements obtained under threat of removal &om offlce, 
and that it cxtcnds to all. whcthcr Lhcy an: policcmcn or 
other mcmbcrs of our body politic." 385 US,.. at $00. 
The Coun also held'that in the context of ihrcats of r& . 
moval from oficc thc act of responding to interrogation 
wns not volunmry and was not an cffcctivc waiver of the 
privilcgc against self-incriminalion, .he Court conceding,' . . , 
however, that there might bc oihcr situations '"where one 
who is anxious to mllkc a clan brcusl of Lhe whol'c affair 
volunlms the information." Id. at 499. ' 
Tlie issue in Gardner v. hodwick supra, was 
whcthcr Lhu Shlc might discharge a police offlccr who, 
after he was I++326) summoned before a grand jury to 
testify about the palbrrnwce of his ollicid duties and 
wns advised of hls right against compulsory self- 
inaiministion, thcn rcfuwd lo waive hat right ;ry tc- 
quested by the Smu. Conceding that appellant could be 
discharged fot mfuing Lo answer qucations about the 
pcrfonnance of his ofUcial dudes, if not required to 
waive Immunity, the Court hcld that lhlr oniccr could not 
bt  knninalcd, as he was, for refbsing to walva his con- 
sthtlonal privilege. Atthou* undor G(RT~W my waiver 
executed may have been invalid and any nnswcrs elicited 
inadmissible in evidence, the State did not purport to 
rccognizc as much and instead [*811 attempted to co- 
erce n wdvu on the penalty of loss of employment. The 
"testimony was dcmkdcd. before h e  grand jury in par1 
so thnr it might be used to pmsecuto him, and not solely 
fm thc purposc of securing an accounting of b& perfom- 
ance of his public trust." 392 US. at 279. Hence, the 
State's sntutory provision requiting his dismissal for his 
refusal to waive immunity could not m d .  
The companion case, Sunitorion Men v. Sanitation 
Comm'r, supra, was to the same effect. Here spin, pub-- 
lic employees were officially intmgalcd and advised 
that rcfwl [***2&I) to answer md sign wnivvs of 
immunity would lead to dismissal. H m  win. the Court 
hcld that the Shlc prcscnltd the employees witb "a 
choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or' 
thcirjobs," 392 US.. af 284, nlfhough clearly they would 
"subject rhemselves to dismissal if they refuse to account 
for their performance of' heir public uust, after proper 
proceedings, which do not involve an attempt to coerce 
them to relinquish l h ~ i t  conslilulional rights." Id., at 2615. 
These cnses, and their predecessors, ultimately rest 
on a reconciliatian of the well-recognized policies behind 
thc pdvilegc of self-incrimination, Murphy v. Wutefionl 
Comm'n 378 US. 52, 55 (1964). md the need of thc 
SUc, as well as the Federal Governmcnl, lo obtaitl in- 
formation '"to assure rl~e effective finctioning of gov- 
ernment," id., at 93 (WHITE, J., concurring):). Immunity 
is required if thur is to be "mrional accommodation be- 
tween the impmtivos of tho privilege and tho lcgitimatc 
demands of government to compel citizens to testify." 
Kastfgar v. United State, 406 U.6, ar 446. It is in this 
scnsc lhat immunity [*82] s&tulcs have "become p m  of 
our con$itudonal fabric."UIImattn v. Unired States, 350 
US. 422,438 (1956). 
' . .2 In Orloflv. IYillnughhy,.33 US. 83 f1953). o 
, dbcror inducted into the Army was denied a . 
commission rts an officer'iifter refusing to divuigc 
' .  ' whether he was a Comrnunisl, ns required by o . 
loyaltyty certificate prescnied for commissioned 
o&cck. Insled hc ;isscrtcd his "FcdcraI consli- 
tudonill privilege" when tilled upon to answer 
lhc qucslion. In holding thal Lhc Gov~rnmcnt was 
justifled in refusing the comnlission because of 
thc tirilurc to answcr, the Court had no occasion 
to consider whether Orloff would have bcen ex- 
posed to criminal prosecution if hc had stated that 
he was a member of the Communist Parry. The 
case diffen significantly from the one before us 
since the Stnte bere asks the architects to affi io-  
tively axpose themselves to cn'mjnal prosecution 
by waiving heir privilrgc against self- 
incrimination, or fhm Garriry, wl~ere the threat 
of criminal prosecution *ria apparent bolh Gcim 
the n a m  of the proceeding, md the absence of 
applicable slate immunity rtatuh. 
Kimm v. R u e n b q ,  363 U.S 405 f1960), is 
dso inapposite. The Court there held that an 
&en whose deportntion had bcen ordered was in- 
eligiilc for s discretionary order pennitring his 
volunmry d e p m ,  because he had failed to es- 
tablish th;t he was not affiliated with the Com- 
munist Party. Pelilionet's imminenl dcpiulm 
from the country, whether it wiu voluntary or 
campelled, obviously made h e  ~hnat  of criminal 
prosecution on the h i s  of his answer remote. 
[ * * * m B ]  [2B] [***LEdRRlOI [ I  O]Wc 
agree with the District Court that Grrrriry. Gurdner, and 
Sanitation Men control the issue now More us. The 
Smte sought to intmogtte appellees about their triumc- 
tions with the [**- .St& and to require Lhmn to fur- 
nish possibly incriminating testimony by demanding t h t  
they waive thck immunity and by disquslifyin~ thcm as 
publlc conuactors when they refirsed. 11 seems to us that 
411 U.S. 70, *; 94 S. Ct. 316, **; 
38 1. Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXlS 132 
the State intended to accomplish what Cmriry ripccifi- 
ciilly prohibited - to compel testimony that h d  not been 
immunizsd. The waiver sought by the State, under thrcst 
of loss of contracts, would have been no less compelled 
than i~ direct request for die testimony without resort to 
tho wivm dcvicc. A wrrivcr sccurcd unda threat of sub- 
stantial economic sqnction cannot be [*83] termed vol- 
untary. As already noted. Garrity [***28!iI sgccilicully 
rcjecltd the claim of an effective waiver when the po- 
licemen . in that case, , in the facc of possiblc discharge, 
proceeded to answer Ihc questions put to them. 38s U.S., 
w 498. The same holding is implicit in both Gardncr and 
Sanitafion Men. . . 
. . 
The ~ k t c .  nevertheless asserts that whitever niny be 
Pus of state vployeeq a diffemt mlc is applicable lo 
public contractors such as architects. Ueuuse independ- 
'ent conmctors miry not depend entirely on ~ s i i c l i o n ~  
with thc State for Lhcir livelihood, it is suggested that 
'&qudiflchrion from conacting with official aguncics 
for. a period of five y c w  is ncith~r compulsion within 
h e  meaning of the F$h Ame~drnettt nor a forbidden 
penalty for refusing to answcr questions put to them 
about their job perform~cc. But we agree with the Dis- 
uin Court tliat "the plaintiffs' disqu;ilifialion from pub- 
lic contracting for live years as a penalty for nsswzing a 
constitutionid privilege is violdve of their Fflh AmcnC 
mont rights." 342 F.Supp.., at 549. We fail to see a dificr- 
enco of ~ ~ t u d o n a l  magnitude bctwca thc Ulrctll of 
job lass to an cmploytt of the Slate, and a threat of loss 
of CO~MCTS to P conui~ctor. '
3 As Gatrig succinctly put it: "The option to 
lose their moans of livelihood or lo pay the pen- 
a l ~  of self-incrimination is the antithesis af fiee 
choice to speak out or to m a i n  dlent." 385 U.S 
493, 497 (1967). 
If the argument is that the cost to a contraclOT is 
small in comparison Lo lhe cost to nn cmploycc of 10- 
his job, the premise must be that it is hsrdn I'm a shlc 
cmploycc to find cmploymen~ in the private sector, thm 
it is for aa nrckitect. An architect lives off his ccmhacting 
fees as surely ay a sbtc cmploycc lives o r  his salnry, und 
fees a d  salaries may be equally had to come by iv the 
private scctor a& sanctions have been tllktn by 1*84] 
the Smte. In some sense the plight of the architect may 
be worse, for undm tho Ncw York shlulcs il may be that 
also lo "my finn, p m a s h i p  or corporation of 
which he is a member, partner, direnor or officer 
I1 --.. 
[***LEdER2CJ [2C] [***LEdHRll] [l l]  
[***LEdHR12] [I 21 . . , [***LRdHR13] [ I  31 
[***UUHRlIJ' [l'4'JWe should mnkc 'clear, however, 
what we have said before. Although due regard for the 
F@h Amcndmmt forbids Lhc Stale LO compel incriminnt- 
ing answers from its employees md contractors that may 
bc uscd against them in criminal pmcccdinlp, the Consti- 
tuGon. permits that very, testimony to be. compelled if 
neither it nor its hits ars 'available for such usc. Kusti- 
gar v. Unitcd $tatcv, supra- Furthermore, the accomrno- 
dation between the .interest of the Sbtc and thc F&?h ' ' 
Amcndmcnt q u i r e s  that lhc Slate have mean4 at its dis- 
posal tq securc~restimony~if .immunity is  supplied and 
testimony is. still rcfwod. Thiu' is rccognid by Lhc 
power of the courts to compel testimony, after a grant of 
immunity, by use of civil contempt and comccd impris- 
ondncnt. ShiIIitarti v. United Sloftrr. 384 US. 364 (1966). 
Also, given adequate immunity, [**32q thc Statc may 
plainly insist that employees either answer questions 
I e * r s 6 ]  under o;dh about the pcrfbrmmce of their job 
or suffix the loss of cmploymcnt By like token, the 
State may insist that the architects involved m this wsc 
either rcspand 10 rclcvanl inquiries about the puform- 
ance of their conmcts or suffer wncellation of current 
relationships and disquxlili~~~iion &om contracting wilh 
publlc agencies for on appropriate time in the future. But 
the State may not insist that appollocs [*%S] wru'va thdr 
Fflh Arnefidin8ru prjvilege against self-inaimination and 
consmt to tho usa of thc h i t s  of tho intermgetion in any 
later procmdings brought against them. Rather, the Smte 
must recognize what our c a , ~  hold: that answers elicited 
upon the thrcat of tbc loss of employment are compelled 
and inadmissible h evidence. Hence, if answers arc to 
be required in such cirmrnstanccs States must offer to 
the wimess whatever immunity is required to supplant 
the privilcgc and may not insist that the employer: or 
contractor waive sucb immunity. 
MR. NSl'lCE BRENNAN, with whom MlL JUS- 
TICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTTCE MARSHALL join. 
any lim that employs him thereafter will also be subject I join h e  Comb opinion in d l  respects but one. It 
to contnct cancellation and di,qualiticalion. ' A signifi- is my view that immunity which permits tesn'mony to be 
can1 inliingcment of constirutiod rights cannot be justi- compellcci "if neirhkr it nor iis hits  are available Tor. . . 
fled by the speculative ability of those iilliiled to cover use" in criminal proceedings docs not satisfy the privi- 
the damage. Icge against self-incrimination. "1 believe that the F@ 
Amendmentb privilege winst self-incrimination re= 
4 The contract disqunlitications apply not only quircs that any jurisdiction that compels a man to in- 
to the person who refuses ta waive immunily but criminate himself p t  him absolute immunity under its 
414 U.S. 70. *; 94 S. Ct. 3 16, **; 
38 L Ed. 2d 274, ***; 1973 U.S. LEXlS 132 
r .  U I U / U I U  
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laws &om prosecution for any transaction revealed in 
that tcslimmy." Piccirillo v. Now Yo& 400 US. 548, 
562 (1971) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) 
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PRIOR HISTORY: [**I] Appeal fiom the United cide whether the government's actions violated his Fifth 
States District Court for the District of Montana. D.C. A m u f h t  right against compelled self-incrimination. 
No. CR-00-00039-DWM. Donald W. Molloy, District Because the Canstitution does not countenance the son 
Judge, Presiding. of government coercion imposed on Antelope, and 
United States v. Antelope, 65 Fed. Appx. 112, 2003 U.S. [*I1311 because his claim is ripe for adjudication, we 
App. L W S  7618 (2003) reverse the judgment of the district court. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, We decide also Antelope's challenge to the release 
vacated in part, and remanded. term prohibiting him fiom possessing "any pornographic, 
sexually oriented or sexually stimulating materials," 
which we vacate and remand, & well as his challenge to 
the term prohibiting him fiom access to "any 'on-line COUNSEL: Anthony R. Gallagher, Federal Defender, 
compuDr sewice;,, which we arm. John Rhodes, Assistant Federal Defender, and David 
Avery, ~ede*l Defenders of Montana,  iss sou la, Mon- 
tana, for the defendant-appellant. BACKGROUND 
The course of events leading to this appeal began 
William W. Mercer, United States Attorney, Marcia when Lawrence Antelope joined an Internet site advenis- 
Hurd, Assistant United States Attorney, Billings, Mon- ing "Preteen Nude Sex Pics" and started corresponding 
tank for the plaintiff-appellee. with someone who, unbeknownst to Antelope, was an 
undercover law enforcement agent. The sting operation 
JUDGES: Before: Melvin Brunetti, M. Margaret McKe- proved-firuitll when Antelope ordered a child pornop-  
own, and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges. phy video over [**3] the Internet. Federal agents ar- 
ranged a controlled delivery, delivered the video, and 
OPINION BY: M. Margaret McKeown then promptly arrested Antelope. 
OPINION 
[*1130] McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 
Lawrence Antelope is a convicted sex offender who 
shows promise of rehabilitation. The terms of his super- 
vised release offer him treatment -- but at a price he is 
not willing to pay. Antelope has repeatedly refused to 
incriminate himself as part of his sex offender treatment. 
He declines to detail his sexual history in the absence of 
any assurance of immunity because [**2] of the risk that 
he may reveal past crimes and that his admissions could 
then be used to prosecute him. In response, the govern- 
ment has twice revoked his conditional liberty and sent 
him to prison. The case he now brings requires us to de- 
Caught red-handed, Antelope pleaded guilty to pos- 
sessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. $ 
2252A(a)(S)(B) and was initially sentenced to five years 
probation. One of the probation terms required Antelope 
to participate in the Sexual Abuse Behavior Evaluation 
and Recovery program ("SABER), which would subject 
him to mandatory "periodic and random polygraph ex- 
aminations." At sentencing, Antelope raised a Fi@h 
Amen- challenge to this requirement, but was told 
by the district judge that the "use of that information . . . 
is, I think, subject to the privilege between the counselor 
and the patient." Antelope was also prohibited from 
"possessing any pornographic, sexually oriented or sexu- 
ally stimulating materials" and from "possessing or using 
a computer with access to any 'on-line computer service' 
395 F.3d 1128, *; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1327, ** 
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at any location . . . without the prior written approval of tion" for additional crimes. Antelope appealed once 
the probation department." Both Antelope and the gov- more. This fourth appeal is one of the two directly before 
emrnent promptly appealed the sentence. US now. 
While the appeal was pending, the district court re- 
voked Antelope's probation for [**4] failure to comply 
with several probation conditions, including the require- 
ment that he submit to polygraph examinations as part of 
the treatment program. The district judge re-imposed 
probation with an additional six months of electronic 
monitoring and warned that Antelope's continued refusal 
to submit to the polygraph would result in his incarcera- 
tion. Antelope appealed this ruling as well. 
Immediately following this ruling, Antelope filed a 
motion in the district court seeking to clarify whether the 
order included immunity from the use of Antelope's 
statements made in compliance with SABER to prose- 
cute him. The district court never ruled on this motion, 
later dismissing it as moot. 
While these appeals were pending, the district court 
again found Anttlope in violation of probation, At the 
probation revocation hearing, Roger Dowty, Antelope's 
counselor at the sex treatment program, testified that 
Antelope had failed to complete SABER'S sexual history 
autobiography assignment and "full disclosure poly- 
graph" verifying his "full sexual Mstory." Dowty ex- 
plained that Antelope had been told that any past crimi- 
nal offenses he revealed in the course of the program 
could be released to the [**5] authorities. Dowty also 
testified that he was under a legal obligation to turn over 
information regarding offenses involving victims under 
eighteen. Antelope argued that the autobiography and 
full disclosure polygraph requirements violated his F@h 
Amendhunt right, expressed his desire to continue 
treatment, and sought immunity for statements made in 
compliance with the program. The district court rejected 
his argument, ruling that the fact of probation [*I1321 
nullifies any F#% Amendment right Antelope might 
otherwise have to decline to "reveal[] information that 
may incriminate him," and sentenced him to 30 months 
in prison. Antelope appealed a third time. 
All three appeals were consolidated for appellate re- 
view, and this court issued a decision reversing in part 
and remanding for resentencing. The court declined to 
reach Antelope's First and Fi@h Amrndinmt claims. 
See United States v. Anlclope, 65 Fed Appx. 112 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (mem.). 
Following remand, Antelope was resentenced to 
twenty months incarceration, followed by three years of 
supervised reltase. The district court again imposed the 
contested conditions as terms of his supervised release. 
Antelope [**6] once again objected, but the court ruled 
that the objection was not ripe, and would not be ripe 
until Antelope was "prosecuted or subject to prosecu- 
Shortly after he was resentenced, Antelope finished 
serving his prison term and was released under supervi- 
sion. Antelope reasserted his desire for treatment but 
continued to refuse to reveal his full sexual history ab- 
sent an assurance of immunity. When Antelope appeared 
at a release revocation hearing, he yet again argued the 
merits of his F@lh Amen& claim. The district judge 
reiterated his belief that Antelope's admissions would be 
protected by an "absolute privilege under Montana law 
between a counselor, psychologist and the patient"; as- 
serted that "given the fact that [Antelope has] not said 
anything yet, . . . everything is premature[a]nd until this 
judicial proceeding, where he's compelled to testitjl, it 
seems to me, . . . you don't have any legal arguments to 
be making that are meritorious in my view today"; and 
declined to rule on whether Antelope's admissions 
would be protected by use immunity, apparently [**7] 
on ripeness grounds. The district judge suggested that 
Antelope's proper course would be to "assert[] his privi- 
lege when he goes to see Mr. [Dowty, the counselor,] 
and say[], I am doing this because I'm ordered to do it. I 
am nor doing it voluntarily, it's a court order, and I do it 
only because VI don't do it I'm going to end up in jail." 
The district court sentenced Antelope to an addi- 
tional ten months in prison and twenty-six months of 
supervised release with the same conditions. Antelope 
appealed a final time, and we consider the issues pre- 
sented by his consolidated fourth and fifth appeals. 
DISCUSSION 
L RIPENESS 
We turn first to the government's argument that An- 
telope's F@h Amen& claim is not yet ripe for re- 
view. The constitutional component of ripeness is a ju- 
risdictional prerequisite. Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. 
Getman, 328 E3d 1088, 1093-94 & n 2  (9th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that the question of ripeness often "coincides 
squarely with standing's injury in fact prong"). Whether 
Antelope's claim is sufficiently mature to justify appel- 
late review is a question of law we consider de novo. 
[**a) Laub v. United States Dep't ofthe Inferior, 342 
F. 3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003). 
To determine whether Antelope suffered an injury 
in fact, we must identify "an invasion of a legally pro- 
tected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; 
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypotheti- 
cal." Id at 1085. Here, Antelope's appeal centers 
around his claimed right to be fiee of unconstitutional 
compulsion: Under his theory, the government violated 
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his FijW Amcndincnl [*I1331 right when it conditioned 
his probation and supervised release on the submission 
of a sexual autobiography that we may assume would 
have revealed prosecutable offenses. From Antelope's 
perspective, in whose shoes we stand when deciding this 
threshold issue of justiciability, he has already suffered 
the very serious and non-hypothetical injury of impris- 
onment after he invoked his FijW Amendmart right. In 
other words, "if his legal argument is correct, he has al- 
ready suffered constitutional injury." United States v. 
Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 
ripe the defendant's challenge to his supervised release 
condition, which he had been reincarcerated [**9] for 
violating). Antelope's case history reads like a never- 
ending Ioop tape: he asserts his constitutional rights, the 
district court advises him that surely his statements will 
be confidential but that he must comply with what he 
views as a violation of his constitutional rights, he re- 
fuses to comply, his release is revoked, and Antelope 
ends up incarcerated. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a 
more paradigmatic "injury in fact" than actual incarcera- 
tion. We therefore conclude that Antelope's F@h 
Amendment claim is ripe for review. 
IL THE FIFlH AMEh'DMENT RIGHT 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
Having determined the question justiciable, we ad- 
dress next Antelope'r claim to the - Amrndinal 
privilege against compelled self-incrimination, an issue 
that has dominated the five appeals Antelope has filed 
throughout the c o m e  of these proceedings. Antelope 
contends that the Fm Amen- restrains the gov- 
ernment from forcing him to admit prior wrongdoing 
unless his statements are protected by use and derivative 
use immunity in accordance with [**lo] Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 US. 441, 32 L. Ed 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 
1653 (1972). Whether there i9 merit to Antelope's argu- 
ment is a legal matter, which we decide without defer- 
ence to the judgment of the district court. See United 
States v. Rubio-Topete, 999 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
We ground our analysis in well-settled principles, 
starting with the Constitution. The Fm Amendment 
guarantees that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." US. 
Const. amend V. This right remains available to Ante- 
lope despite his conviction. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 US. 420, 426, 79 L. Ed 2d 409, 104 S. Ct. I136 
(1984) ("A defendant does not lose this protection by 
reason of his conviction of a crime . . . ."); c$ McKune v. 
Lile, 536 US. 24, 48-54, 153 L. Ed 2d 47, 122 S. Ct. 
2017 (2002) (O'Comor, J . ,  concurring in 4-1 -4 decision) 
(applying the full-blown F@h Amendhat analysis to a 
prisoner's claim that the prison's requirement that he par- 
ticipate in a sex offender treatment program violated his 
constitutional right). ' 
1 Abiding by the rule that when "no single ra- 
tionale explaining the result enjoys the assent of 
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds," Mark v. United States, 430 US.  188, 
193, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260, 97 S. Ct. 990 (1977) (in- 
ternal quotation marks omitted), we treat Justice 
O'Connor's opinion in McKune as controlling. 
Two of our sister circuits considering this ques- 
tion have anived at the same conclusion. Ains- 
worth v. Stanley, 31 7 F.3d I ,  4 (1st Cir. 2002) 
("Justice O'Connor's concurrence [in McKune] is 
arguably more narrow than the plurality's and 
therefore constitutes the holding of the Court.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted); Searcy v. 
Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002) 
("Because Justice O'Connor based her conclusion 
on the narrower ground that the [Kansas] policy 
was not compulsion under the Fifrh Amendment, 
we view her concurrence as the holding of the 
Cowt in McKune."). 
h 
[**Ill [*I1341 To establish his rn Amendment 
claim, Antelope must prove two things: (1) that the tes- 
timony desired by the government carried the risk of 
incrimination, see Murphy, 465 US. at 435 n. 7 (explain- 
ing that the state may compel answers "as long as it . . . 
eliminates the threat of incrimination"); Minor v. United 
States, 396 US. 87, 98, 24 L. Ed 2d 283, 90 S. Ct. 284 
(1969) (rejecting a F@& Amm&nent challenge because 
the risk of incrimination was "only imaginary and insub- 
stantial . . . rather than . . . real and appreciable" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)), and (2) that the penalty he 
suffered amounted to compulsion, see L e m i t z  v. Cun- 
ningham, 431 US. 801, 806, 53 L. Ed 2d 1, 97 S. Ct. 
2132 (1977) ("The touchstone of the Jlj2h Amrndinal 
is compulsion . . . ." ); cf Lile v. McKune, 224 F.3d 
1 1  75, 1 1  79 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The privilege has two 
components: incrimination and compulsion."), rev'd, 
536 US. 24, 153 L. Ed 2d 47, 122 S. Ct. 2017 (2002) 
(holding the state-imposed repercussions insufficiently 
coercive to amount to compulsion). 
A. Incrimination 
[**I21 The Fifrh Amendment privilege is only 
properly invoked in the face of "a real and appr&iable 
danger of self-incrimination." McCoy v. Comm'r, 696 
F.2d 1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). "lf the threat is remote, unlikely, or 
speculative, the privilege does not apply . . . ." Id Thus, 
the Constitution offers no protection to an individual 
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who, for example, asserts a general intent to refuse to 
answer any questions at a court hearing. See United 
States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(holding that the probationer's Fijih Amendment claim 
could not be evaluated because he had tendered an un- 
specific "blanket refusal" to answer any questions at a 
district court hearing designed to probe his financial 
condition). Nor does its umbrella shelte~ statements 
whose ability to incriminate is "highly unlikely." Seattle 
Times Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 845 F.2d 1513, 
1520 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J . ,  concurring); see also 
Minor, 396 U.S. at 98 ("Imaginary and insubstantial haz- 
ards of incrimination . . . [do not] support a Fijih 
Amendment claim." (internal quotation [**I31 marks 
omitted)). 
Instead, because the Fifrh Amendment's self- 
incrimination clause was designed "to effect [the] practi- 
cal and beneficent purpose" of preventing inquisitorial 
interrogation, Brown v. Walker, 161 US. 591, 596-97, 
40 L. Ed. 819, 16 S. Ct. 644 (1896), it may only be in- 
voked when the threat of future criminal prosecution is 
reasonably particular and apparent. Cf: id at 598 ("If a 
prosecution for a crime . . . is barred by the statute of 
limitations, [a witness] is compellable to answer."); Neal 
v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 833 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that a prison treatment program requiring inmates to ad- 
mit guilt of the crime for which they were imprisoned 
did not violate the F@h Amendment because double 
jeopardy and the terms of their plea agreement insured 
that "no admission . . . could be used against them"). 
This is not to say, however, that the prosecutorial 
sword must actually strike or be poised to strike. To the 
contrary, an individual "need not incriminate himself in 
order to invoke the privilege," [**I41 McCoy, 696E2d 
at 1236, but may simply refuse to make any statements 
that place him at risk. Accord Seattle Times, 845 F.2d at 
1520 (Reinhardt, J . ,  concurring) ("It is appropriate for a 
defendant to raise aJiPh amendment objection at the time 
he is required to [make the potentially incriminating 
statements.]"). And as a general rule, countervailing gov- 
ernment interests, such as criminal rehabilitation, do not 
trump this right. Thus, when [*1135) "questions put to 
[a] probationer, however relevant to his probationary 
status, call for answers that would incriminate him in a 
pending or later criminal prosecution," he may properly 
invoke his right to remain silent. Murphy, 465 US. at 
435. 
telope of having committed prior sex offenses. The 
treatment condition placed Antelope at a crossroads - 
comply and incriminate himself or invoke his right 
against self-incrimination and be sent to prison. We 
therefore conclude that Antelope's successfbl participa- 
tion in SABER triggered a real danger of self- 
incrimination, not simply a remote or speculative threat. 
We have no doubt that any admissions of past 
crimes would likely make their way into the hands of 
prosecutors. Dowty made clear that he would turn over 
evidence of past sex crimes to the authorities. As he ex- 
plained at Antelope's probation revocation hearing, 
Dowty has reported his clients' crimes in the past and his 
reports have led to additional convictions. The SABER 
release form, which Antelope signed, specifically author- 
izes Dowty to make such reports. ' And, were Antelope 
to reveal any crimes involving minors, Montana law 
would require Dowty to report to law enforcement. See 
[**I61 Mont. Code Ann. JJ 4 1-3-201 to -202 (2003) 
(requiring counselors who suspect child abuse to report 
to the authorities). 
2 The SABER release form provides: "I hereby 
allow SABER to report to the appropriate au- 
thorities . . . any and all information concerning 
my behavior which is related to sexual offend- 
ing." 
In sum, the evidence shows that, setting the privilege 
aside, Antelope would have to reveal past sex crimes to 
the SABER counselor; the counselor would likely report 
the incidents to the authorities, who could then use Ante- 
lope's admissions to prosecute and convict him of the 
additional crimes. Viewed in this light, very little stands 
between Antelope's participation in SABER and future 
prosecution. When he invoked his F&h Amenhunt 
right, Antelope's situation presented a "real and appre- 
ciable danger," not a "remote, unlikely, or speculative" 
risk. See [**17) McCoy, 696 F.2d at 1236. We con- 
clude that Antelope has shown a sufficiently real possi- 
bility of incrimination. 
B, Compulsion 
In this case, Antelope's risk of incrimination was The second prong of the self-incrimination inquiry 
"real and appreciable." The SABER program required asks whether the government has sought to "impose sub- 
Antelope to reveal his fill sexual history, including all stantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his 
past sexual criminal offenses. Any attempt to withhold Fim Amen&tent right not to give incriminating testi- 
information about past offenses would be stymied by the mony against himself." Cunningham, 43 1 U.S. at 805. 
required complete autobiography and "full disclosure" We are mindful that an individual choosing silence does 
polygraph examination. Based on the nature of this re- not get a fiee pass against all possible repercussions. See, 
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e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 
286, 140 L. Ed 2d 387, 118 S. Ct. 1244 (1998) (a stat 
clemency board may draw "adverse inferences" from an 
inmate's failure to testify on his own behalf at a clem- *i 
ency hearing). Only "some penalties are so great as to 
'compel' such testimony, while [*I1361 others do not 
rise to that level." McKune, 536 U.S. at 49 (O'Connor, 
J . ,  concurring). The Supreme Court's decision in McKune 
requires us to conclude that this level has been breached 
in Antelope's case. 
In McKune, a plurality of four justices concluded 
that the penalties faced by the inmate [**I81 in that 
case, Robert Lile, for rehsing to make disclosures re- 
quired under Kansas's Sexual Abuse Treatment Program 
("SATP) did not amount to compulsion under the Fifrh 
Amendment. Id at 29. Lile brought a § 1983 action 
against prison officials, alleging that they had violated 
his Fifih Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor explained that 
penalties severe enough to offend the Fifrh Amendment 
privilege include: "termination of employment, [ Uni- 
formed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
392 US. 280, 20 L. Ed 2d 1089, 88 S. Ct. 191 7 (1968)], 
the loss of a professional license, [ Spevack v. Klein, 385 
US. 511, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967)], ineli- 
gibility to receive government contracts, [ LejRowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 38 L. Ed 2d 274, 94 S. Ct. 316 
(1973)], and the loss of the right to participate in political 
associations and to hold public office, [ LejRowitz v. 
Cunningham, 431 US. 801, 53 L. Ed. 2d 1, 97 S. Ct. 
2132 (1977)J." McKune, 536 US.  at 49-50. In contrast, 
an inmate's "reduction in incentive level, and a corre- 
sponding transfer fiom a medium-security to a maxi- 
mum-security part of the prison" were not "serious 
enough to compel him to be a witness against himself." 
[**21] Id at 50. 
by reducing his privildges and transferring him from me- Significantly, Justice O'Comor did not attempt to 
dium-security housing to maximum-security housing as a establish the governing standard for all cases, noting that 
result of his refusal to disclose his sexual history as re- she did not "need [to] resolve this dilemma [of setting 
quired by SATP. forth a comprehensive theory of the self-incrimination 
The plurality rejected Lile's argument that his case 
was controlled by "the so-called penalty cases" like 
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 US. 493, 497-98, 17 L. Ed 
2d 562, 87 S. Ct. 616 (1967) (striking down state statute 
forcing public employees "either to forfeit their jobs or to 
incriminate themselves"), and Spevack v. Klein, 385 
U s .  511, 516, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574, 87 S. Ct. 625 (1967) 
("The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional 
standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are 
powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relin- 
quish the privilege."), where lesser penalties involving 
the potential loss [**I91 of economic livelihood were 
held unconstitutional. The plurality distinguished those 
cases because they "involved free citizens" and were "not 
easily extended to the prison context." McKune, 536 
US.  at 40-41. Relying instead on prisoner-specific cases 
like Murphy, 465 US. at 434-39 (concluding that there 
was no FNh Amendment violation where petitioner 
claimed he felt compelled to incriminate himself because 
he feared absent truthful statements his probation would 
be revoked), and Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286-88 (con- 
cluding that there was no compulsion where a death row 
.inmate had to choose between incriminating himself at a 
clemency interview and having adverse inferences drawn 
from his silence), where the Court found no FiJh 
Amendment violations despite the use of far harsher pen- 
alties such as longer incarceration or execution, the plu- 
rality wrote that "lawful conviction and incarceration 
necessarily place limitations on the exercise of a defen- 
dant's privilege against self-incrimination." [**20] 
McKune, 536 U.S. at 38. 
privilege] to make [her] [*I1371 judgment in" 
McKune. Id at 54. Nevertheless, though Justice O'Con- 
nor's concurrence does not delineate the limits of the self- 
incrimination clause's protections, it makes clear that the 
Court likely would conclude that the penalty Antelope 
faced for not participating in SABER was constitution- 
ally impermissible. 
Although Justice O'Comor agreed with the plurality 
that Lile's "reduction in incentive level, and . . . corre- 
sponding transfer fiom a medium-security to a maxi- 
mum-security part of the prison" were not penalties "suf- 
ficiently serious to compel his testimony," Justice 
O'Connor said that she "did not agree with the suggestion 
in the plurality 6pinion that these penalties could permis- 
sibly rise to the level o f .  . . penalties [like] longer incar- 
ceration and execution [which] are far greater than those 
we have already held to constitute unconstitutional com- 
pulsion." [**22] Id at 50, 52. Justice O'Connor did not 
accept the plurality's reasoning that the different out- 
comes in the "penalty cases" and the Court's decisions in 
cases like Murphy and Woodard could be explained on 
the basis of the citizen-prisoner distinction and that the 
key factor in assessing a prisoner's self-incrimination 
claim was whether the disputed penalty, in the plurality's 
language, amounted to an "atypical and significant hard- 
ship" within the prison context. Justice O'Comor ex- 
plained: 
I believe the proper theory should rec- 
ognize that it is generally acceptable to 
impose the risk of punishment, however 
great, so long as the actual imposition of 
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such punishment is accomplished through 
a fair criminal process. . . . Forcing defen- 
dants to accept such consequences seems 
to me very different fiom imposing penal- 
ties for the refusal to incriminate oneself 
that go beyond the criminal process and 
appear, starkly, as government attempts to 
compel testimony . . . . 
Id. at 53 (internal citation omitted). 
Thus, under Justice O'Connor's opinion in [**23] 
McKune, the compulsion inquiry does not dispositively 
nun on the status of the person claiming the F$h 
Amendment privilege or on the severity of the penalty 
factors may bear on the walv- 
olling issue is the state's purpose in 
Although it may be acceptable for 
penalties on defendants when it 
has legitimate reasons for doing so consistent with their 
conviction for their crimes of incarceration, it is a differ- 
ent thing to impose 'penalties for the refisal to incrimi- 
nate oneself that go beyond the criminal process and 
appear, starkly, as government attempts to compel testi-, 
Applying these principles here, we reject that the 
state could sanction Antelope for his self-protective si- 
lence about conduct that might constitute other crimes. 
We do not doubt that SABER'S policy of requiring con- 
victed sex offenders to give a sexual history, admitting 
responsibility for past misconduct to participating coun- 
selors, serves an important rehabilitative purpose. See, 
e.g.. [**24] id. at 33 (plurality opinion) ("An important 
component of [sex offender] rehabilitation programs 
participants to confiont their past and accept 
responsibility' for their misconduct. . . . Research indi- 
cates that offenders who deny all allegations of sexual 
abuse are three times more likely to fail in treatment than 
those who admit even partial complicity.") (citing U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Inst. of Con., A Practitioner's 
Guide to Treating the Incarcerated Male Sex Offender 73 
(1988) and B. Maletzky & K. McGovern, Treating the 
Sexual Offender 253-55 (1 99 1 )). Often sex offenders 
repeat their past offenses, and informed counseling can r only help protect [*I1381 them, their potential victims, 
and society. The imconcilable constitutional problem, 
however, is that even though the disclosures sought here 
may serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, they also may 
be starkly incriminating, and there is no disputing that 
the gove-ent may seek to use such disclosures for 
prosecutorial purposes. In fact, Antelope's SABER 
counselor testified that he routinely transmits to authori- 
ties any admissions his clients make about past sex 
crimes, and that such reports have led to [**2$ more 
prosecutions and convictions. Cj: McKune, 536 U.S. at 
40-41 (plurality opinion) (arguing that a "critical distinc- 
tion" between McKune and the penalty cases where the 
Court found F@h Amcndkrrnt violations is that "there is 
no indication that the SATP is an elaborate attempt to 
avoid the protections offered by the privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination"). 
Justice O'Comor made clear in her McKune concur- 
rence that she would not have found a penalty of "longer 
incarceration" such as that here to be constitutionally 
permissible. Id. at 52. The strength of Justice O'Connor's 
opinion as precedent is reinforced because it seems cer- 
tain that the four dissenters in McKune, who argued that 
a loss of discretionary privileges and a transfer to less 
desirable living quarters under similar circumstances 
1 
were sufficiently compulsive to violate Lile's privilege 
against self-incrimination, would find a Fim Amend- 
ment violation where the district court revoked Ante- 
lope's conditional liberty and sentenced him to an addi- 
tional ten months in prison. ' On the basis of McKune, 
we hold that Antelope's privilege against self- 
incrimination [**%] was violated because Antelope 
was sentenced to a longer prison term for refising to 
comply with SABER'S disclosure requirements. ' 
3 Indeed, the McKune plurality, even with its 
more stringent standard, might here hold that the 
Fifrh Amendment's self-incrimination clause was 
violated, given that the McKune plurality de- 
clared that Kansas had not used the information 
gathered in SATP for prosecutorial purposes, id. 
at 34, and that Lile's refbsal to participate in Kan- 
sas's SATP did not result in an "extenrsion ofj his 
term of incarceration." Id at 38. 
4 The Court's pre-McKune decision in Murphy 
is consistent. In Murphy the defendant challenged 
a condition of his probation requiring him to "be 
b-uthful with [his] probation officer 'in all mat- 
ters"' or "return to the sentencing court for a pro- 
bation revocation hearing," arguing that this con- 
dition unconstitutionally forced him to choose be- 
tween making self-incriminating disclosures or 
returning to prison. 465 US. at 422. The Court 
held that there was no FYI1) AmmhaU viola- 
tion because the defendant "could not reasonably 
have feared that the assertion of the privilege 
would have led to revocation," given that the 
state would have provided a hearing before revo- 
cation, and defendant could have raised the privi- 
lege as a reason for noncompiiance, and that the 
defendant could point to no case in which Minne- 
sota revoked probation when a probationer "re- 
hsed to make non-immunized disclosures con- 
cerning his own criminal conduct." Id at 439. 
The Court said that the outcome would have dif- 
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fered if the state "expressly or by implication, as- 
serted that invocation of the privilege would lead 
to revocation of probation," because this would 
have resulted in "the classic penalty situation." 
Id at 435. Here we have the "classic penalty 
situation" contemplated in Murphy; Antelope's 
supervised release ended because he would not 
make potentially self-incriminating statements as 
required by SABER. 
[**27] Our holding comports with the case author- 
ity in our sister circuits which suggests that the condi- 
tions must not only be sufficiently coercive, but also 
more than merely hypothetical. When probation and su- 
ervised release terms are at issue, a court must deter- 
mine whether the alleged Fifih Amendment problem truly 
implicates the defendant's conditional liberty. In [*1 W9] 
United States v. Lee, 315 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied, 540 US. 858,157 L. Ed 2d 106, 124 S. Ct. 
160 (2003), for example, the Third Circuit rejected a 
defendant's challenge to his supervised released condi- 
tion because Lee offered "no evidence that [his] ability to 
remain on probation is conditional on his waiving the 
Fifrh Amendment privilege with respect to future crimi- 
nal prosecution." In Lee, the prosecutor had stipulated 
that Lee's failure "to pass a polygraph examination, in 
and of itself, likely would not result in a fmding of a su- 
pervised release violation." Id. Without the real risk of 
revocation, the polygraph's effect on Lee could not 
amount to constitutional compulsion. 
The First Circuit likewise faced a Fifth Amendment 
challenge to a supervised release [**28] condition im- 
posing a polygraph exam requirement in United States v. 
York, 357 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2004). The twist in York was 
an ambiguous provision in the release condition: "When 
submitting to a polygraph exam, the defendant does not 
give up his Fifh Amendment rights." Id at 18. The First 
Circuit grappled with York's Fifh Amendment challenge, 
acknowledging that "the polygraph requirement may 
implicate York's Fifrh Amendment rights, depending on 
how the district court's order is understood." Id. at 24. 
The York court carefully avoided interpreting the release 
condition to mean "that it flatly requires York to submit 
to polygraph testing as a condition of his supervised re- 
lease, so that York's reftlsal to answer any question -- 
even on valid Fifh Amendment grounds -- could consti- 
tute a basis for revocation." Id Rather than impute this 
"constitutionally problematic" meaning to the release 
condition, the First Circuit simply construed it to mean 
that "York's supervised release shall not be revoked 
path of constitutional avoidance taken in York and Lee 
is unavailable here. Whether Antelope's supervised 
lease is actually conditioned on his participation in SA- 
BER is a question whose answer is certain. Antelope has 
already suffered repeated revocation of his conditional 
liberty as a result of invoking his F@h Amcndmcnl 
right. And, we have no doubt that Antelope's loss of 
liberty was as "substantial" a penalty as, if not more seri- 
ous than, the ones imposed upon the litigants in the line 
of cases fiom Spevack to Cunningham -- and totally 
unlike the mere transfer fiom one part of a prison to 
other, as in McKune. 
Here, the district court tried to walk a fine line be- 
tween the government's absolutist view -- that full dis- 
closure without immunity was a condition of release -- 
and Antelope's view -- that fill disclosure without F&& 
Amenrlinenl protection was a no-win proposition. Al- 
though this effort was laudable and the district court was 
sensitive in recognizing Antelope's Catch-22 predica- 
ment, its ruling left Antelope [**30] in legal limbo. U1- 
timately, the district court revoked Antelope's super- 
vised release as a result of his refisal to disclose his sex- 
ual history without receiving immunity fiom prosecution. 
Because the government and district court have consis- 
tently refused to "recognize[] that the required answers 
may not be used in a criminal proceeding" against Ante 
lope, Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, we hold that the 
revocation of his probation and supervised release vio- 
lated his F@h Amendhat right against self- 
incrimination. 
C. Antelope's Entitlement to Kastlgar Immunity - 
The nature of Antelope's entitlement to immunity 
for incriminating statements [*I1401 is subject to some 
dispute between the parties. We find it appropriate to 
resolve their disagreement because the issue is intimately 
bound up with the resolution of the merits of Antelope's 
F@h Amendhat claim. The govenment argues that 
Antelope has no entitlement to an assurance of immunity 
before he makes incriminating statements. See Kastigar, 
406 U.S. at 453 (holding use and derivative use irnmu- 
nity under 18 U.S.C. jj 6002-6003 coextensive with the 
F@h Amendwmt [**31] privilege). It contends, in ef- 
fect, that the government has the right to compel Ante 
lope to incriminate himself, prosecute him, and force 
him to litigate the admissibility of each piece of evidence 
in future criminal proceedings. Only then, according to 
its view, can Antelope properly assert his F@l Amen& 
mew privilege. We disagree. 
based on his vaiid assertion of Fifh Amendment privi- As the Supreme Court has explained, adoption of the 
lege during a polygraph examination." [**29] Id at 24- government's position would all but eviscerate the pro- 
25. tections the self-incrimination clause was designed to 
Although the First and Third Circuits found an in- provide. See, e.g., Turley, 414 U.S. at 78 ("[A] witness 
terpretative way around the F@h Amcnrlinrnl issue, the protected by the privilege may rightfilly refuse to an- 
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swer unless and until he is protected at least against the 
use of his compelled answers and evidence derived 
therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is 
a defendant." (emphasis added)). More recently, Justice 
Thomas, speaking for four members of the Court, reaf- 
firmed this principle: "By allowing a witness to insist on 
an immunity agreement before being compelled to give 
incriminating testimony in a noncriminal case, the privi- 
lege preserves the core FiJh Amendment right fiom inva- 
sion . . . ." [**32] Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 
771, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003) (Thomas, 
J., in a plurality opinion joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.) (emphasis in original). 
That this protection should be the law is only logi- 
cal; "the failure to assert the privilege will often forfeit 
the right to exclude the evidence in a subsequent 'crimi- 
nal case."' Id. (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 440). Without 
a pre-testimonial assurance of immunity, the witness 
would scarcely be better protected than if there were no 
privilege at all. See id. ("If the privilege could not be 
asserted [before making the incriminating disclosure], 
testimony given in those judicial proceedings would be 
deemed 'voluntary' . . . ." ). Our conclusion in this case 
gives effect to Justice Thomas's admonition that "it is 
necessary to allow assertion of the privilege prior to the 
commencement of a 'criminal case' to safeguard the core 
Fifrh Amendment trial right." Id. 
In the face of the vast weight of precedent to the 
contrary, see, e.g., [**33] Murphy, 465 U.S. at 429-40 
(discussing circumstances where the Flfh Anrenciinrnt 
privilege is triggered the moment a defendant is com- 
pelled to give statements which might incriminate him in 
criminal proceedings, even if such proceedings have yet 
to be initiated), the government contends that Chavez 
stands for the proposition that Antelope may not assert 
the FiBh Amenllhrent right until the moment a com- 
pelled statement is used in a criminal proceeding against 
him. But Chavez did not, as the government suggests, 
unseat decades of Supreme Court law. Instead, the gov- 
ernment's argument reveals a f'hdamental misunder- 
standing of Chavez. 
Chavez was a civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. $ 
1983 by a plaintiff alleging that a police officer who ag- 
gressively questioned him violated his F@h Amendment 
right. Six justices agreed with the defendant police of%- 
cer that the cause of action premised on a Fifh Amend- 
ment violation could not survive summary judgment. See 
Chavez, 538 US. at 766-67 [*1141] (Thomas, J., joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J., O'comor, J. ,  and Scalia, J.); [**34] 
id. at 777-79 (Souter, J., concuning, joined by Breyer, 
J.). But Chavez left unaltered the Court's commitment to 
safeguarding the FiJh Amendment's core guarantee under 
the circumstances presented here -- a point the govern- 
ment chooses to ignore. Critical to the reasoning of all 
six justices was the simple principle that the scope of the 
F@h Amendment's efficacy is narrower when used as a 
sword in a civil suit than when used as a shield against 
criminal prosecution. See id. at 772-73 (Thomas, J., 
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J.) 
("Rules designed to safeguard a constitutional right [such 
as that protected by the selflincrimination clause] do not 
extend the scope of the constitutional right itself. . . . 
Accordingly, Chavez's failure to read Miranda warnings 
to Martinez . . . cannot be grounds for a $ 1983 action. 
And the absence of a 'criminal case' in which Martinez 
was compelled to be a 'witness' against himself defeats 
his core Fifh Amendment claim." (internal citations 
omitted)); [**35) id at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring, 
joined by Breyer, J.) (explaining that while case law "re- 
quiring a grant of immunity in advance of any testimo- 
nial proffer . . . . is outside the Fifh Amendment's core," 
the privilege's protections will only be expanded where 
"the core guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it, 
would be placed at some risk in the absence of such 
complementary protection," and concluding that it was 
not "necessary to expand protection of the privilege . . . 
to . . . civil liability"). Simply stated, the holding of 
Chavez is tightly bound to its J 1983 context. 
Were Antelope to turn the tables and sue the gov- 
ernment, Chavez would direct our inquiry to the "core 
constitutional right" -- and, in such a posture, the gov- 
ernment's argument might well prevail. But here, where 
Antelope is on the defensive, F m  Amcndknt case 
law offers him protection beyond what the Chavez plu- 
rality called the "core" right. Thus, whether we describe 
our decision as arising out of a "prophylactic" or "consti- 
tutional" rule, the same result obtains: Antelope fol- 
lowed the appropriate course of action by refusing to 
answer the sexual history question [**36] until he was 
assured that his answers would be protected by immu- 
nity. 
5 The scope of the immunity should be consis- 
tent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Kasti- 
gar, 406 U.S. at 453 (holding that "immunity 
fiom use and derivative use [provided by 18 
U.S.C. $$ 6002-60031 is coextensive with the 
scope of the privilege against self- 
incrimination"). Kastigar, of course, does not in- 
sulate Antelope fiom prosecution altogether, just 
fiom the "use and derivative use" of compelled 
admissions in trial against him. Id. 
IIL THE PROHIBITION ON "ANY PORNO- 
GRAPHIC MATERIALS" 
Antelope also challenges as unconstitutionally vague 
the provision of his supervised release prohibiting him 
from possessing "any pornographic, sexually oriented or 
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sexually stimulating materials." In United States v. 
Guagliardo, 278 E 3 d  868 (9th Cir. 2002), we held 
impermissibly vague a similar supervised release term. 
Guagliardo was prohibited from possessing "'any [**37] 
pornography,' including legal adult pornography." Id at 
872. Because "a probationer cannot reasonably under- 
stand what is encompassed by a blanket prohibition on 
'pornography,"' we remanded for clarification. Id. We do 
the same here. The condition imposed on Antelope is 
indistinguishable from the one imposed on Guagliardo. 
Here, instead of "any pornography," we have "any por- 
nographic . . . materials." 
The government contends that "sexually oriented or 
sexually stimulating" should be [*I1421 read to define 
"pornographic." We decline to adopt this grammatically 
unnatural reading. The release term explicitly lists three 
types of materials that Antelope may not possess: "any 
pornographic, sexually oriented or sexually stimulating 
materials." Because the condition imposed on Antelope 
suffers from the same defect as the one struck down in 
Guagliardo, we vacate and remand for clarification. 
Upon reconsideration, the district court may take note of 
the condition imposed in United States v. Rearden, 349 
F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2003), which passed constitutional 
muster. 
IV. THE PROHIBITION ON "ACCESS TO ANY 
ON-LINE COMPUTER SERVICE" 
fiom "possessing or using a computer with access to any 
'on-line computer service' at any location (including em- 
ployment) without the prior written approval of the pro- 
bation department." 
As Antelope acknowledges, we recently rejected 
precisely such a challenge in Rearden. See id at 620-21. 
He argues, however, that his case should be treated dif- 
ferently because his crime involved less use of the Inter- 
net and was less severe than Rearden's. Although there is 
some appeal to this nuance, the Internet was nevertheless 
essential to the commission of Antelope's crime: He fmt 
contacted the federal agents through joining a child por- 
nography-oriented online group. Added to the evidence 
suggesting that Antelope's crime was one step on a path 
towards more serious transgressions, there is enough to 
justifL the imposition of the term "to protect the public 
from Auther crimes of the defendant" and "to afford ade- 
quate deterrence to criminal conduct." 18 U.S.C. $3553 
(a)(2)(B) & (C). We a f f i  the imposition of this provi- 
sion of Antelope's supervised release. 
CONCLUSION 
[**39] Accordingly, the decision of the district 
court revoking Antelope's supervised release because he 
invoked his F@% Ammdwaenl rights in connection with 
the SABER program is REVERSED, the imposition of 
the release term prohibiting access to "any pornographic 
materials" is VACATED and REMANDED. and the 
Antelope's final [**38] argument challenges as release term prohibiting "access to any 'on-line computer 
overbroad the supervised release term prohibiting him service'" is AFFIRMED. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 Case No. CR-2008-00000932 & 
Plaintiff, CR-2007-0001156 
vs . 1 RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
1 SUBMISSION OF CASE LAW FOR 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 RETAINED JURISDICTION REVIEW 
1 HEARING 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, The State of Idaho, by and through Lee Fisher, Elmore County Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby responds to the Defendant's submission of case law as follows. 
BACKGROUND AND FACTS 
Defendant pled guilty to one count of aggravated battery reduced fiom rape in case number CR- 
2007- 1 1 56 and was sent on a rider. During the rider, he was interviewed by law enforcement regarding 
two other potential victims. Based on that interview, this matter was filed with two counts ofrape. The 
Defendant returned &om his lint rider with arecommendation to relinquish jurisdiction. The Defendant was 
placed on probation in case number CR-2007- 1 156 pending the resolution of this matter. The Defendant 
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entered a guilty plea to one count of rape in this matter and was sent on arider in both cases with the Court 
reserving the issue of sex offender registration in this case and restitution in both cases. During his second 
rider, the Defendant completed a sexual history as part ofhis treatment. He submitted to a polygraph to 
determine the truthhlness ofhis sexual history. The polygraph indicated that he had not been truthfbl and 
he subsequently admitted that he had left another victim out ofhis history. The Defendant did not invoke 
his Fifth Amendment rights at any time during this process. 
LAW 
The case of State v. Crowg governs this matter. In Crowe, the Defendant was placed on probation 
and required him, as conditions ofhis probation, to complete a specialized sex offendertherapyprograrn 
through SANE and have no unsupervised contact with minors following a conviction for sexual abuse of 
a minor. State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 1 09,110- 1 1 (1 998). The Defendant failed a polygraph examination 
as part of his SANE treatment. "When contionted about this," the Defendant admitted that he had 
mpervised contact with his ten-year-old niece and had inappropriately touched her buttocks. Id. at 1 1 1. 
The Defendant, at the SANE counselor's request, "made verbal and written admissions to his probation 
officer about the incidents."u. The statements to the counselor and probation officer, including the written 
statement, were admitted at the probation violation hearing. The Defendant was found to have violated his 
probation, and his sentence was imposed. See id. 
On appeal, Crowe argued that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated by the admission of the 
statement to his counselor at the probation violation hearing. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected that 
argument. The Court .first noted that "lilt is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by 
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the person claiming the privilege or the privilege is deemed lost." u. at 1 12 (citations omitted). Crowe did 
not assert his Fifth Amendment right. u. The Court then reviewed the United States Supreme Court 
decision in Minnesota v. Mmhy. The Cmwe court noted that held the "Fifth Amendment applies, 
even if not invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat 
to impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked."u. The court in Mumhy then limited its own holding, " 'a 
State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its 
probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal 
proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination.' "u. (quoting Minnesota v. Mmhy, 465 US. 
420,436 n. 7, 104 S. Ct. 1 136, 1 146 n. 7 (1984) (citation omitted)). 
The Crowe court held that a probation violation proceeding is not a subsequent criminal 
proceeding. See id. Therefore, the admission of the statements to the counselor did not violate Crowe's 
Fifth Amendment rights. See id. A copy of the Crowe decision is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
The case of Madison v. Craven is a civil rights violation case involving Mr. Madison, "a prison 
inmate," who sued the Executive Director of the Commission of Pardons and Parole and two therapists 
at the Idaho Department of Correction. Madison v. Craven, 144 Idaho 696,698,169 P.3d 284,286 (Ct, 
App. 2007). Madison's claims included that his Fifth Amendment rights wereviolated when he was forced 
to tell a counselor that he was "sexually attracted to his daughter who was the victim ofhis crime." 144 
Idaho at 699, 700, 169 P.3d at 288. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that there was no Fifth 
Amendment violation for two reasons, the admissions did not incriminate Madison and were never used 
against him in a criminal pr0ceeding.u. at 700,169 P.3d at 288. The Madison court went on to quote 
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State v. Crows in support of this holding, noting that there was no violation in Crowe because the 
statements had not been used in a criminal trial. & d., 144 Idaho at 701, 169 P.3d at 289. 
Madison also notes that if a Defendant does not claim the F i f i  Amendment privilege and answers 
voluntarily, the privilege is lost, i.e. the answers are not considered to be compelled within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. seeid. at 700,169 P.3d at 288 (citing Minnesota v. M u n , h ~  465 U.S. 420,427- 
28 (1984)). A copy of Madison is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
The case of State v. Radford, submitted by the Defendant, also supports the State's position. In 
Radford, the Defendant was required to participate in counseling through SANE. As part of the counseling, 
he completed a sexual history and was given a polygraph on that history. State v. Radfmd, 134 Idaho 187, 
189 (2000). "During the polygraph, Radford revealed" that he had committed a separate offense in 199 1. 
Ig. Radford had signed an agreement with SANE that SANE would disclose "information regarding his 
treatment to law personnel" and the contract specifically stated that "pnmously committed crimes must also 
be reported, and may be prosecuted. . . ."U. at 188. After the disclosure to the counselor, Radford met 
with his probation officer and made the same statement to the probation officer. At a later date, Radford 
met with his probation officer and two detectives. At that meeting, Radford was Mirandizd, told he was 
not in custody, and signed a "Miranda waiver."u. at 1 89. Radford then made admissions regarding the 
same prior crime. See id. 
Radford was charged with new crimes based onhis statements and filed amotion to suppress the 
statements as being obtained in violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. At first the district court judge 
denied the motion to suppress. See id. After the Crows case discussed above was decided, Radford filed 
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amotion to reconsider, which the district court granted and suppressed all ofthe statements. See id. The 
State then appealed only the suppression of the statement made to the detectives. See id. at 189,190 
(noting that the State did not appeal the suppression of the statements in the new case that were required 
by the polygraph as part ofhis probation). The Radford court then held that the statements to the detectives 
should not have been suppressed because they were voluntary and were not the f i t s  of the polygraph 
statements. &g d. at 191-93. 
ARGUMENT 
Based on the foregoing cases and the fads in this matter, the Defendant's Fifth Amendment rights 
have not been violated. First, the Defendant did not invoke his Fifth Amendment right. He omitted a victim 
fiom his sexual history and failed the polygraph examination because ofhis omission As the cases above 
note, the failure of the Defendant to invoke his Fifth Amendment right waives the right. 
Second, even if the Court were to find no waiver, there was no Fifth Amendment violation because 
the law inIdaho is clearly settled that statements made to a SANE counselor as part ofprobation cannot 
be the basis for a new criminal prosecution. Crowq specifically held that such statements can be used for 
a probation violation hearing but not in anew trial. State v. Crowq, 13 1 Idaho 109,112 (1 998); see also 
State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,193 (2000) (noting the Crowe decision stands for the premise that 
disclosures required by probation were admissible in a probation violation proceeding but not in a 
"subsequent criminal trial"). This is a retained jurisdiction hearing. The Defendant has even fewer 
constitutional rights on a rider than he would have on probation. This proceeding is not a new or subsequent 
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criminal trial but is more akin to a probation violation hearing. Since the Defendant's omission is not being 
used in a new prosecution, there is no violation of the Defendant's Fifth Amendment right. 
Third, as noted above, the law is clearly settled in Idaho that the State cannot use the incriminating 
statements of a person in a new case when such statements are made pursuant to a requirement of 
probation. Here, the Defendant made the false statements pursuant to the requirements ofhis treatment on 
the retained jurisdiction program, which should be considered to be akin to the probation situation. The 
State has long recognized that it cannot use these statements for a new prosecution. The State cannot use 
the Defendant's admission that he has another victim as evidence in anew case. The most the Defendant 
faces from his admissions or failures to admit are the imposition of sentence in this matter, which clearly 
does not implicate the Fifth Amendment under the binding Idaho authority discussed above. Therefore, the 
State's use of the Defendant's lies on his sexual history in this matter does not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Since the Defendant was not at risk for a new criminal proceeding ifhe had revealed his other 
victim, the persuasive case ofcrnited States v. Antelope does not indicate a different result. The Antelo~q 
court's holding provides that if there was immunity from prosecution for the answers to the sex offender 
treatment counselor's questions, there would be no Fifth Amendment violation. See. es.. Antelopq, 395 
F.3d 1 128,1141 (9th Cir. 2005). The Antelo~e court also aflirmed that for the Fifth Amendment to be 
implicated "the government has [to seek] to 'impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give in- . . g testimony against himself' " Antelow at 1 135 
(quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunninehm, 43 1 U.S. 80 1,805 (1 977)). The Defendant's other case is similarly 
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unavailing of any additional relevant standard in light of the binding, directlyrelevant decisions of the Idaho 
courts in Crowe, Madison, and Radford. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant cannot prove a violation ofhis Fifth Amendment rights. The State is fiee to argue 
his failure to disclose another victim on his sexual history and the subsequent fded polygraph together with 
any other arguments arising therefiom as reasons to impose his sentence. 
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131 Idaho 109; State v. Crowe; 952 P.2d 1245 
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. John David CROWE, Defendant-Appellant. 
[Cite as State v. Crowe, 13 1 Idaho 1091 
No. 23325. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, December 1997 Term. 
February 27, 1998. 
Following conviction on defendant's plea of guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Ada County, Joel D. Horton, J. revoked defendant's probation, and defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Silak, J., held that admission of defendant's statements to sex offender counselor 
that he had fondled his niece's buttocks, in violation of probation agreement, did not 
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violate his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
Affirmed. 
Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, David J. Smethers, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for 
appellant. David J. Smethers argued. 
Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Kenneth M. Robins, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
Kenneth M. Robins argued. 
SILAK, Justice. 
This is an appeal fiom an order revoking probation. At the probation revocation hearing, 
incriminating statements made by the probationer to his counselor and probation officer were admitted. 
The appellant claims that admission of the statements at the hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination. We affirm the decision of the district court. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Appellant John David Crowe (Crowe) was indicted on charges of lewd and lascivious conduct on 
September 25,1990. He subsequently pled guilty to an amended charge of sexual abuse of a minor on 
October 2, 1990. Crowe was placed on probation. 
The relevant terms of the probation included Crowe's completing a specialized sex offender therapy 
program through the Sexual Abuse Now Ended (SANE) program, Crowe's abiding by all laws of the 
State and Crowe's not "associat[ing] with any juveniles unless accompanied by [a] responsible adult as 
212 
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approved by the probation officer and 
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therapist." The terms of the probation also included Crowe submitting to polygraph examinations upon 
request of a probation officer. As a condition of the treatment at SANE, therefore a condition of the 
probation, Crowe was required to report any contact with minor children and to submit to polygraph 
examinations upon request. 
At the SANE facility, Crowe signed a treatment contract which allowed counselors during treatment 
to disseminate information to Crowe's probation officer. During a SANE treatment session around May 
15, 1996, Crowe underwent a polygraph examination as part of his SANE treatment. Crowe failed the 
examination. When confronted about this, Crowe related to D.F., his SANE counselor, that he had failed 
the examination because he had been alone with his ten-year old niece, and had improperly touched her 
by placing his hand on her buttocks. At the counselor's request, Crowe made verbal and written 
admissions to his probation officer about the incidents. Crowe was arrested for violating his probation. 
On May 28, 1996, a motion and order for a Bench Warrant for Probation Violation was filed. After a 
violation hearing, at which the statement to D.F., the statement to the probation officer and Crowe's 
written statement were admitted, the district court found that Crowe violated his probation by having 
unsupervised contact with a minor and committing the crime of sexual abuse of a minor. The district 
court ordered Crowe's probation revoked and ordered the execution of the previously suspended 
sentence, a unified sentence of ten years imprisonment, with three years fixed. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Whether Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated at his probation 
revocation hearing by the admission of statements Crowe made to a counselor during a sex offender 
counseling session required by his probation agreement. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard Of Review. 
[I, 21 This Court exercises fkee review in determining whether "constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied in light of the facts" found by the trial court. State v. Weber, 1 16 Idaho 449,452, 776 P.2d 
458,461 (1989) (quoting State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656,658,759 P.2d 947,949 (Ct.App.1988)). 
Deference will be given to the findings of the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
B. Additional Issues Raised For The First Time On Appeal At Oral Argument Are Not 
Properly Before This Court. 
[3,4] Preliminarily, we note that counsel for Crowe tried to raise at oral argument the issues of 
whether an extra-judicial confession was sufficient to convict Crowe absent more corroborating 
evidence and whether Crowe's right to confront witnesses at the probation violation hearing had been 
violated. These issues were not presented by Crowe's counsel in the statement of issues or argued in the 
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briefs. Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(4) requires that a list of issues be presented on appeal. This Court has 
acknowledged that this rule will be relaxed when the issues are supported by argument in the briefs. 
State v. Prestwich, 1 16 Idaho 959,961, 783 P.2d 298,300 (1989), overruled on other groundr, State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,842 P.2d 660 (1992). Counsel for Crowe did not argue these additional issues 
in his brief. Therefore, these additional issues are not properly before this Court and will not be 
addressed on appeal. 
151 Additionally, Crowe's counsel argued at oral argument that the Idaho Constitution provides 
greater protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The appellant's brief did 
not argue for a different interpretation of the Idaho Constitution nor was there any authority cited for a 
different interpretation. Therefore, this issue also was not properly raised on appeal. The only issue 
properly before this 
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Court is the application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the present facts. 
C. The District Court Was Correct In Holding That The Admission Of Statements Made By 
Crowe To His Court Ordered Counselor Did Not Violate The Appellant's Fifth Amendment Right 
Against Self-incrimination. 
[6] It is well-established that the Fifth Amendment must be invoked by the person claiming the 
privilege or the privilege is deemed lost. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427-28, 1 04 S.Ct 1 136, 
1 142,79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984); Garner v. US., 424 U.S. 648,654,96 S.Ct 1 178, 1 182,47 L.Ed.2d 370 
(1976). It is undisputed that Crowe did not assert his Fifth Amendment right. 
[7] Crowe relies on Minnesota v. Murphy in arguing that his statements to his counselor should be 
suppressed because the questions posed to him forced him to answer or to be punished as a probation 
violation for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination; thus, he argues he was forced into the 
"classic penalty" situation. The Court in Murphy held that the Fifth Amendment applies, even if not 
invoked, if the State compels an individual to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat to 
impose a penalty if the privilege is invoked. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434,104 S.Ct. at 1146. The Court in 
Murphy limited this exception to situations in which the statement obtained was to be used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding. The Court in Murphy stated: 
[A] State may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence 
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers 
may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. 
Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled 
testimony would not be at stake," and nothing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a 
State fiom revoking probation for a rehsal to answer that violated an express condition of 
probation. 
Id. at 436 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7 (quoting Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 
280,284, 88 S.Ct. 191 7, 1920,20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1 968)). In this case, the statements were used against 
Crowe in a probation revocation hearing, not a subsequent criminal trial. A probation revocation 
proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. Id. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1146 n. 7. See also, United 
States v. Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1992) ("a person may not claim the self-incrimination 
privilege merely because his answer to a question might result in revocation of his probationary status. 
His answer, however, cannot be used against him in a criminal prosecution."); United States v. 
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Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985) ("in general, a probationer is not entitled to invoke 
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about his probation status."). 
This case does not present a "classic penalty" situation. The statements were not used in a 
subsequent criminal proceeding. We hold that the admission of the statements to the counselor at the 
probation revocation proceeding did not violate Crowe's Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the district court revoking Crowe's probation and placing his previously suspended 
sentence into execution is affirmed. 
TROUT, C. J., and JOHNSON, SCHROEDER and WALTERS, JJ., concur. 
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MADISON v. CRAVEN 
169 P.3d 284 (ID 2007) 
Carl Lewis MADISON, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
Olivia CRAVEN, Ed Chenney and David Trial, Respondents. 
No. 33710. 
Court of Appeals of Idaho. 
August 6,2007. 
Review Denied October 15,2007 
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This Page Contains Headnotes. 
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Daniel C. Hurlbutt, J. 
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Carl Lewis Madison, Boise, pro se appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; William M. Loornis, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for 
respondent. 
LANSING, Judge. 
Carl Lewis Madison, a prison inmate, filed an action against the Executive Director of the 
Commission of Pardons and Parole ("Commission") and two therapists at the Idaho Department of 
Correction, requesting that certain information be removed fiom his prison record and not considered in 
any future parole proceedings because the information was allegedly obtained through violations of his 
privilege against self-incrimination. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the action, 
and Madison appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1997, Madison was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen, Idaho Code § 1 8- 1 506, 
for which he received a sentence of fifteen years with three years determinate. During the course of his 
incarceration, Madison participated in a sexual offender therapy program. He contends that during that 
program, he was forced to falsely(fh1) admit a sexual attraction to the victim, his daughter, and was later 
terminated from the group when he accused the therapists and Department of Correction personnel of 
colluding to make him appear to be a serial pedophile. In May of 1999, he was denied parole. The 
minutes of that parole hearing contain a notation that Madison had molested fifteen victims. Madison 
216 
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later asserted that this statement in the minutes was false and that he had only one victim. 
On November 14,2003, Madison filed a prisoner civil rights complaint asserting that the therapists' 
acts and the allegedly false information in the parole hearing minutes violated his civil rights. The 
district court treated Madison's complaint as a habeas corpus petition and dismissed it when Madison did 
not pay the filing fee. He appealed, and in Madison v. Craven, 141 Idaho 45, 105 P.3d 705 
(Ct.App.2005), we reversed and remanded. After remand, Madison amended his complaint. 
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The nature of the claims that Madison intends to be presenting in his pro se complaint and 
subsequent filings is difficult to discern or characterize. His general claim seems to be that various post- 
trial admissions he made, including those contained in the presentence investigation report (PSI), and 
statements made at the parole hearing and during sexual offender treatment, were obtained in violation 
of his F i f i  Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged from his record 
and not considered in any future therapy or parole proceedings. He also contends that he has been 
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and raises several other related claims. 
The district court initially characterized the amended complaint as a habeas corpus petition before 
deciding to handle it as an action for violation of civil rights. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the 
action on the respondents' summary judgment motion. Madison appeals, asserting that the district court 
misinterpreted one of his claims, did not address several others, and misapplied the law. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment may be entered only if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). See 
also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 Idaho 745,747,890 P.2d 33 1,333 (1995); Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass% v. 
City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740,742, 890 9.2d 32 ,328  (1995). On review, this Court liberally 
construes the evidence in favor of the party opposing the motion and draws all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,272,869 
P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994). If the evidence reveals no material disputed factual issues, however, only a 
question of law remains over which this Court exercises fiee review. Roell v. Boise City, 130 Idaho 199, 
200-01,938 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (1997). 
In this case, there are no disputed issues of fact; the respondents' summary judgment motion did not 
challenge Madison's allegations that the minutes of the parole hearing erroneously state that he had 
fifteen victims or that Madison's therapist required him to make statements regarding his sexual 
attraction toward the victim. Therefore, the issue presented is whether these alleged events violated 
certain of Madison's constitutional rights. Because we exercise de novo review over this legal issue, 
Madison's assertions that the district court misinterpreted his arguments or erred in its legal analysis 
need not be specifically addressed. 
B. Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-incrimination 
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Madison's primary argument on appeal is that information elicited after his conviction-including the 
statement in his parole hearing that he had fifteen victims, statements made during therapy regarding his 
sexual attraction to his daughter, and information in the PSI report-was obtained in violation of his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination and must therefore be purged fiom his record. The thrust of 
his argument is that these statements were elicited to make him appear to be a serial pedophile, which he 
contends has undermined his ability to trust his therapists and participate in therapy. He notes that this 
will make it difficult for him to be paroled, and speculates that if this characterization of his criminal 
nature remains in his record, it could be used against him in future matters. 
The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself." It has long been held that this prohibition not only permits a person to refuse to 
testify against himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also "privileges him not to 
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where 
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." LeBwitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70,77, 
94 S.Ct. 316,322,38 L.Ed.2d 274,281 (1973). 
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See also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,426, 104 S.Ct 1 136, 1 141,79 L.Ed.2d 409,418 (1 984). 
The availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "does not turn upon the 
type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission 
and the exposure which it invites." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,49,87 S.Ct 1428, 1455, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 
558 (1967). A witness protected by the privilege may rightfully refuse to answer unless and until the 
witness is granted immunity from the use of the compelled answers in any subsequent criminal case in 
which the witness is a defendant. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct at 1141,79 L.Ed.2d at 418. If he 
or she is nevertheless compelled to answer without immunity, the answers are inadmissible against the 
witness in a later criminal prosecution. Id. An individual does not lose this protection by reason of 
conviction of a crime; notwithstanding that a person is imprisoned at the time he or she makes 
incriminating statements, if those statements are compelled they are inadmissible in a subsequent 
criminal trial of that person. Id.; State v. Curless, 137 Idaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1 193, 1 198 
(Ct.App.2002). 
1. Statement that Madison had fifteen victims 
To the extent that Madison contends that the inclusion of the statement at the parole hearing that he 
had fifteen victims violated his right against self-incrimination, this argument is undermined by 
Madison's own assertions. He does not suggest that he was unlawfully compelled by the parole board to 
admit this fact, but claims that he did not say it. Accordingly, the Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination is not implicated here. 
2. Statements contained in the PSI 
Madison also argues that any statements he made to the presentence investigator should be purged 
fiom his record. A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies both at the 
sentencing hearing and in presentence evaluations. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558,563, 149 P.3d833, 
838 (2006); State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-19,868 P.2d 1231, 1233-35 (1994); State v. Lanvord, 
1 16 Idaho 860,871,781 P.2d 197,208 (1989). However, if a defendant desires the protection of the 
Fifth Amendment, he generally must claim it or it will be lost. That is, if one who is being questioned 
does not assert the privilege and instead voluntarily responds without protest, the responses are not 
considered to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fiflh Amendment. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
Page 4 of 7 
427-28, 104 S.Ct. at 1142-43,79 L.Ed.2d at 419-20; Curless, 137 Idaho at 143,44 P.3d at 1198 (holding 
that the defendant's failure to assert the Fifth Amendment during a psychosexual evaluation precluded 
him fkom asserting the privilege on appeal). In this case, Madison has presented no evidence suggesting 
that during the preparation of the PSI, he claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege and was nevertheless 
compelled to answer, nor that compulsion prevented him from asserting the privilege. Because Madison 
never asserted the privilege, he is not entitled to its protections, and his claim that the presentence 
investigation interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege therefore fails. 
3. Statements made during therapy 
We next examine whether Madison's Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by the allegedly 
compelled admission, during treatment by a Department of Correction therapist, that he was sexually 
attracted to his daughter who was the victim of his crime. We hold that this claim is without merit for at 
least two reasons. First, there has been no Fifth Amendment violation because Madison's statements 
were not used against him in a criminal proceeding and, second, the statements were not incriminating. 
In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,123 S.Ct 1994, 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had no cause of action for damages for violation of the Fifth 
Amendment where his allegedly compelled statements were never used against him in a criminal 
prosecution. In that case, Martinez brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 on the theory that his right 
against self-incrimination was violated 
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by an officer who interrogated him while he was in an emergency room receiving treatment for several 
gunshot wounds. Martinez was not charged with a crime, and his answers were never used against him 
in any criminal case. A four-justice plurality of the Supreme Court was of the view that when statements 
have been compelled by police interrogations, "it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs." Id. at 767, 123 S.Ct. at 2001, 155 L.Ed.2d at 993. The mere 
use of compulsory questioning, without more, the plurality said, does not violate the Constitution. Id. 
Two additional justices who did not join in the plurality opinion nevertheless also rejected Martinez's 
argwnent that the questioning alone was a completed violation of the Fifth Amendment subject to 
redress by an action for damages under 5 1983. Id. at 777-79, 123 S.Ct. at 2006-08, 155 L.Ed.2d at 
1000-0 1 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
The Idaho Supreme Court earlier reached the same conclusion in State v. Crowe, 1 3 1 Idaho 109,952 
P.2d 1245 (1 998), where the defendant had been required to participate in sex offender therapy as a 
condition of his probation. During therapy, he admitted that he had fondled a minor while on probation, 
and this statement was used against him in a subsequent probation revocation hearing. The defendant 
argued that his right against self-incrimination had been violated. The Idaho Supreme Court held that no 
violation had occurred because the statements were used in a probation revocation hearing, not in a 
criminal trial. Thus, we conclude that because Madison does not assert that any of his allegedly 
compelled statements were used against him in a criminal prosecution, he has not alleged a cognizable 
civil claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment. 
Madison's claims also fail for the additional reason that he has not shown that the allegedly 
compelled admissions were incriminating. The Fifth Amendment provides a privilege against answering 
official questions "where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Murphy, 
465 U.S. at 426, 104 S.Ct. at 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d at 418 (quoting Lefkowitz, 414 U.S. at 77,94 S.Ct. at 
322, 38 L.Ed.2d at 281). That is, the privilege applies only if there is some rational basis for believing 
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that the answer to a question will incriminate the individual and no assurance has been given that neither 
the statement nor its fruits will be used against him in a subsequent prosecution. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 
429, 104 S.Ct. at 1143, 79 L.Ed.2d at 420; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591,599-600,16 S.Ct 644,647- 
48,40 L.Ed. 819,821-22 (1896). In dicta, the Murphy Court observed that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not available when a defendant is being questioned about violations of conditions of 
probation that do not constitute new criminal acts because the answers could not be used to incriminate 
the probationer in another crime. While the answer to the questions might result in termination of 
probation, the Court said, a probation revocation proceeding is not a separate criminal proceeding. 
Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n. 7, 104 S.Ct at 1 146 n. 7,79 L.Ed.2d at 425 n. 7. Thus, information is not 
incriminating if disclosure poses no realistic threat of criminal prosecution. 
In this case, Madison's admission that he had been sexually attracted to his daughter could not be 
used against him in a criminal prosecution, for he had already been convicted and sentenced for 
molestation of his daughter before he made the statement. Double jeopardy protections insure that he 
cannot be reprosecuted for this offense.(W) Madison speculates that his statement could negatively 
impact potential future parole eligibility proceedings, sex offender classification proceedings, eligibility 
for prison therapy programs, or civil cases. None of these, however, are criminal proceedings. See Folk 
v. Pennsylvania, 425 F.Supp.2d 663,667-68 (W.D.Pa.2006) (no violation of defendant's 
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right against self-incrimination when parole board declined to grant parole after defendant refused to 
admit guilt to sexual crimes during therapy, for parole eligibility proceedings do not constitute a 
criminal cases); In re Mark; 292 Wis.2d 1,7 1 8 N.W.2d 90, 100 (2006) (statements regarding the crime 
of which defendant was convicted, or confession to activities that are not criminal but violate conditions 
of parole, are not incriminating for Fifth Amendment purposes); Bankes v. Simmons, 265 Kan. 341,963 
P2.2d..4.1.2, 419 (1998) (statements compelled during prison sexual abuse treatment program may be used 
against inmate in a civil commitment proceeding as a sexually violent predator). Because the 
proceedings in which Madison alleges that his statements could be used against him aie not criminal 
proceedings and the statement does not implicate him in a separate crime, he has no Fifth Amendment 
claim.(fh3) 
C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Madison also alleges that forcing him to falsely admit a sexual attraction to his daughter, in 
combination with the allegedly incorrect statement that he had fifteen victims, constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment. He contends that he is being stigmatized by family, friends, inmates, and prison 
officials as a serial pedophile, that he is no longer able to trust his therapists and prison officials, and that 
he experiences mental anguish at being forced to say that he perceived his daughter in a sexual light. 
The Eighth Amendment, which restrains the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishments" on those convicted of crimes. 
The Supreme Court has explained its application as follows: 
[Tlhe Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, 
use excessive physical force against prisoners. The Amendment also imposes duties on 
these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must 
ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 
"take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." 
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[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. 
First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, "sufficiently serious"; a prison official's 
act or omission must result in the denial of "the minimal civilized measure of life's 
necessities." 
The second requirement follows from the principle that "only the unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment." To violate the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a "sufficiently culpable state of mind." In 
prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of "deliberate indifference" to inmate 
health or safety. 
Fanner v. Brennan, 5 1 1 U.S. 825,832,834,114 S.Ct 1970,1976,1977,128 L.Ed.2d 8 1 1,822,823 
(1 994) (internal citations omitted). When considered against this articulation of what constitutes "cruel 
and unusual punishment," it is readily apparent the unpleasant emotional and social conditions of which 
Madison complains are not sufficiently serious to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. 
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D. Other Issues 
Madison's pro se appeal brief also mentions several other claims that he contends were alleged in his 
civil rights complaint, but were not addressed by the district court. As to these additional claims, we 
have either considered them and find them to be without merit or have been presented with no coherent 
legal argument that we are able to identie and address. 
CONCLUSION 
Madison's factual allegations and evidence, even when accepted as true and liberally construed in his 
favor, show no right to relief in this civil rights action on any of the theories he has advanced. Therefore, 
the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing the action. Summary judgment for the 
respondents is affirmed. 
Chief Judge PERRY and Judge GUTIERREZ concur. 
Footnotes: 
FN1. He advances the theory that he should not be branded as a pedophile because he imagined his 
victim as an adult when he molested her. 
FN2. The time for appeal of Madison's conviction has long since passed, as has the statute of 
limitation for any post-conviction action challenging the conviction. Madison does not contend that 
there exist any pending post-conviction actions challenging the validity of his conviction or any other 
proceeding that could lead to a new trial on the charge for which he was convicted, such that the 
admission of sexual attraction to his daughter could be used against him in a new trial. 
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FN3. A fbrther word concerning the scope of Fifth Amendment protections is appropriate to ensure 
that our holding in this case will not be misunderstood nor applied too expansively. We have addressed 
today only whether an individual who did not invoke the self-incrimination privilege and who made 
statements allegedly under compulsion may obtain the remedy of removal of the statements fiom his 
prison records. We do not address the quite different issue of whether the government may penalize a 
person who, not having been offered immunity, legitimately invokes the privilege and refuses to provide 
potentially incriminating information. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Chavez did not 
overturn decades of precedent allowing the self-incrimination privilege to be asserted in contexts other 
than criminal cases and granting relief where the government has penalized persons for their refusal to 
waive the privilege. To the contrary, the Chavez plurality expressly recognized the continuing authority 
of those decisions and characterized them as establishing "prophylactic rules" that are necessary to 
protect the "core constitutional right." Chavez, 538 U.S. at 768 n. 2,770-72, 123 S.Ct. at 2001 n. 2, 
2002-04, 155 L.Ed.2d at 994 n. 2,995-97. 
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. .THE SUl"ATE OF IDAHO, . . 
1 coae~o; 0.48-0932 ' 
Plaintiff, 1 
1 
-VS- 1 MEMORANDUM 
1 
JUSTIN WODGION, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW The Defendant, JUSTIN 000DGION, by and through his attorney of 
record, TERRY S. RATLIFF of Ratliff l a w  Ollias, Chtd., and hcrcby submits this Mernonndum 
in support OF his desire to bc pfaccd on supervised probation. I 
Essentially, the issue b e b e  thc Court is whether Justin should be pIaced on probation, 
the & that the 'Ride? personnel rclcascd him f2om the progam fy failing to 
disclose ,the facts and chmmtmces surrounding a yr?xual encounter that is allcgcd to have ocamed 
andrd& rcq&rcd to,b cliscloPcd to co'mplnc the SANE program. I I 
'Chc Defendant concedes ittat he m y  bc compefld to give up his Fifth Amendment rights . 1 
against sclf-incrimination in order to get lreatment, so long as such disclosurt docs not subject him I 
MEMORANDUM - Page 1 I 
to new and additional criminal sanctions. State v. Crowc, 131 Idaho 109 (1998). However, in this 
case, Justin did not have the knowledge to assert thc Fifth hmcndrnent, and in fact did not asat the 
m e ,  he just simply kept his mouth shut, basuse nobody told htn what his rights were, or gavc 
him'accds to his ap&ntr:d' counscl, xithat he could make knowing and in~elligent decision! : '. ' . , . .  . 
. htcad, thc "~idd have simply c~ncluded that Justin should k kicked out of the 
program, since he won't disclose. Them is nothing in the record, provided by thc Statc, to support . . . . .  : .  
. . 
thc ~ondvsion that Justin shpihould be 'flopped' basal on his nondisclosure.  SANE agreement , 
' . .  
' hdditibdy, the caselaw proscntcd by thc State deals with piobatib* vioiiiion 
Jlegotians, which Crowe has depicted as not being "a s q m t c  criminal proceeding." Id at 112. 
'kis ,being the 'law of the cast,' it seems to me that it is  totally within thc Court's discretion 
whdm to, at this time, place Justin on probation or send llim to the penitentiary, Of note, 
however, is the statcmcnt in the report from Mr. Vogel stating that "1 see no reason why he 
would not be a successful candidate for supervision in the community." 
Given the rule bf lenity, and thc way thc Court is to interpret the sentencing statuteg, it' 
would be appropriate to give Justin a chance at probation As has been previously set forth in the 
w e  law, '5t is a well-settlcd rule of statutory construction in Idaho that words of a statute arc 
gvcn their plain, usual and ordinary mcaning, in the absence of any ambiguity." Miller v. Miller, 
1 1 3 Idaho 4 15,745 Y .2d 294 (1 987); Walker v. Hemley TrucRing, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1 1 87 
(1 984); SILI I~V.  Moore,; . , 1 1 1 Idaho 854,727 P3d 1 282 (CkApp. 1986). "As a general rule, "![i]t is' , , . , 
well d s d  thra pmal statutcs am subject to a strict construction. More accmtcly, it may bc said ' ' 
that such laws arc to bk in~erpretcd strictly against the state and libenlly in favor of the accused." 
73 AMJUR2d Starutes, 5 293 (1974). "Idaho courts havc followed the general rule in holding 
MEMORANDUM - Page 2 
. . 
, 22.4 
that criminal statutes arc strictly construed in their substantive cfcmcnts and in their ,wctions." 
. . 
State v. Thumpson, 101 Idaho 430, 614 P.2d 970 (1980); State v. McKuughen, 108 Idaho 471, 
700 P.2d 93 (CtApp. 1 985). 
7 
' .DATED This 3@ day of January, 2009. .. . 
RATLIFF LAW OPFICIES, CHTD.. 
CERTIFlCA'I'E OF SERVICE 
. . 
' f f f  I HEREBY CERTIFY That T have on this* &y of January, 2009, served a copy of thc 
within and foregoing MEMORANDUM to: 
Lee .Fi shm BY: Hand Delivery 
Elmorc County Prosecutor's Office - Fdml Express 
190 South 4' East - Certified Mail 
P.0, Box 607 
Mountain 1-Iorne, lD 83647 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE MICHAEL E. WETHERELL FEBRUARY 2 ,  2009 
COURT MINUTES 


















Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Terry Ratliff 
Public Defender 
Counsel for State 
Counsel for Defendant 
11:35 a.m. Call of case. 
Time and date set for SENTENCING, defendant present, in custody. 
The Court reviews the file. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff regarding CR-2007-1156. 
Response by the Court. 
The Court continues to review the file. 
All parties have received and have had adequate time to review the 
materials. 
Mr. Fisher had no corrections. 
Mr. Ratliff had no corrections. 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
Page - 1 
The defendant had no corrections. 
No testimony or statements. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher. 
Mr. Fisher's recommendations: 
That the Court relinquish jurisdiction and asks that the Court 
reserve the restitution. And if it is needed the State will 
notice it for a hearing. That the defendant register as a sex 
of fender. 
Statement made by Mr. Ratliff. 
Mr. Ratliff's recommendations: 
That the defendant be placed on probation. 
No statement made by the defendant. 
No legal cause shown. 
The Court imposes the underlying sentences in both cases. The 
defendant will receive sex offender treatment. In case CR-2007- 
1156 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 
15 years with 5 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate with credit 
for 688 days against the fixed portion of the sentence. This 
sentence is to run concurrent with CR-2008-932. In case CR-2008- 
932 the defendant is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 25 
years with 10 years fixed and 15 years indeterminate with credit 
for 340 days against the fixed portion to run concurrent with CR- 
2007-1156. The Court using its discretion under Rule 35 reduces 
the sentence in CR-2008-932 to 29 years with 6 years fixed and 19 
years indeterminate. While the defendant is incarcerated the 
Court recommends that he receive cognitive based programs, sex 
offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such other 
programs deemed appropriate by prison personnel. 
The Court advises the defendant of his right to appeal. 
The defendant understands his right to appeal. 
Copies of the materials returned. 
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the sheriff. 
Statement made by Mr. Fisher regarding custody. 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
Page - 2 
The Court advises that the defendant will be required to register 
as a sex offender for the remainder of his life in case CR-2008- 
932. The Court will reserved restitution for a period of 90 days. 
The Court set this matter for RESTITUTION HEARING on May 4, 2009 
at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
12:11 p.m. End. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
COURT MINUTES - FEBRUARY 2, 2009 
Page - 3 
Reporter: N. Omsberg 
Clerk: K. Johnson 
Reporter's Est. 36 pages 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DImcq? 01 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs . ) Case No. CR-2008-932 
JUSTI ON, 
DOB:  ) ORDER RELINQUISHING 
SSN:  I JURISDICTION 
Defendant. 
TO: STATE OF IDAHO BOARD OF CORRECTIONS: 
On the 2nd day of February, 2009, before the Honorable 
Michael E. Wetherell, District Judge, personally appeared Lee 
Fisher, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Elmore, 
State of Idaho, and the defendant with his attorney Terry 
Ratliff, this being the time for jurisdictional review in this 
matter. 
At which time the Court relinquished jurisdiction and the 
defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Idaho State 
Board of Correction for execution of the original sentence 
for a period of twenty-five (25) years with ten (10) years 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 1 
2 2 9  
fixed and fifteen (15) years indeterminate to run concurrent 
with Elmore County Case CR-2007-1156. The Court however 
chooses to exercise its power pursuant to Rule 35 and reduces 
the sentence of the defendant in this case CR-2008-932 to a 
period of six (6) years fixed and nineteen (19) years 
indeterminate for a total of twenty-five (25) years based upon 
the finding contained on the rider review report that the 
defendant may be considered as appropriate for sex offender 
treatment. The Court recommends that the defendant receive 
cognitive based programs, relationship and parenting programs, 
sex offender treatment, anger management treatment, and such 
other programs as are deemed appropriate by prison personnel; 
That pursuant to Idaho code Section 18-309, the defendant 
shall be given credit for the time served in the Elmore County 
Jail in this case of 340 days, including the retained 
jurisdiction time. 
The defendant shall submit a DNA sample and right 
thumbprint impression to authorities pursuant to I.C. § 19- 
5506. 
The defendant will register as a sex offender for the 
remainder of his life. 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 2 
230 
All of the defendant's fines, fees, and costs are forgiven 
due to his incarceration and the resulting indigency. 
The defendant is to have no contact with his victims while 
incarcerated or while on parole should he be granted parole. 
The Clerk shall deliver a certified copy of this Order to 
the said Sheriff, which shall serve as the commitment of the 
defendant . 
2- Dated this 2.1 -day of February, 2009. 
EL WETHERELL 
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING * 
I hereby certify that on this 5 day of February, 
2009, I mailed (served) a true and correct copy of the 
within instrument to: 
Lee Fisher 
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Terry Ratliff 
Elmore County Public Defender 
Interdepartmental Mail 
Central Records 
Idaho Department of Correction 
1299 North Orchard, Suite 110 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Elmore County Jail 
Interdepartmental Mail 
MARSA GRIMMETT! / 
Clerk of the ~Didtrict Court 
' I  
ORDER RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION - 4 
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TERRY S. RATLIFF 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CIFII). 
290 South Second East Street 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
I.S. B. No. 3598 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 Case No. CR-2008-0932 
Respondent, 1 
1 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 
1 
Appellant. 1 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS ATTORNEYS, 
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE; LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
STATEHOUSE, BOISE, IDAHO 83720; AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the February 4, 2009, Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction, by the Honorable Michael E. 
Wetherell, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Decision I 
described in paragraph 1 above is applicable for an Appeal order under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(c)(l) I 
and or (9), I.A.R. and Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 l(a)(2). I 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
3. Issues on Appeal: 
(a) Whether the District Court abused its discretion, when it relinquished jurisdiction 
of Justin, due to the allegation that "on 12/05/08 he was DECEPTIVE" during a polygraph 
examination conducted while he was on a second rider. 
. . .  
(b) Whether the District Court denied Justin due process of law pursuant to the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, by revoking probation of him, when he was 
required to participate in a polygraph examination, as set forth above, without allowing him 
access to his court appointed attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, nor advising him of 
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, prior to and during the polygraph 
examination. 
4. The Pre-Sentence Investigation Report is routinely sealed by the Court, and is 
requested herein. 
5. (a) Is reporter's standard transcript requested? Yes. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript as defined in Rule 25(b), I.A.R.: 
(1) Hearing held on 9/17/07 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
(2) Hearing held on 4/07/08 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
(3) Hearing held on 7/07/08 Case No. CR-2007-1156 
(4) Sentencing hearing held on 2/02/09 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R. 
a. All memorandums or briefs filed herein. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
b. Addendum to the Pre-Sentence Investigation and Cover Letter dated 
12/08/08, by Darh Maqueda. 
7. I certifl: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on the reporter. 
(b) ( 1 ) T h a t  either the reporter of the clerk of the district court or 
administrative agency has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the transcript. 
- (2)XThat  the appellant is exempt fiom paying the estimated transcript fee 
.' . because this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent. 
(c) (1) - That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record 
has been paid. 
(2)-That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because this is a criminal appeal. The Defendant is also indigent. 
(d) (1)-That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
( 2 ) x T h a t  appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because 
this is a criminal appeal. The Appellant is also indigent. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20. (And the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code.) 
7 DATED this / 7 day of March 2009. 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
Attorney for ~ppeliant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
24 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That I have on this / 7 hay of March 2009, served a copy of the 
within and foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to: 
Kristina Schindele BY: P Hand Delivery 
Elmore County Prosecutor Federal Express 
P.O. Box 607 Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Lawrence Wasden BY: Hand Delivery 
Attorney General Federal Express 
Attention: C-al Division Certified Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 Er U.S. Mail 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 Facsimile Transmission 
Molly J. Huskey BY: - Hand Delivery 
State Appellate Public Defender Federal Express 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane Certified Mail 
Boise, ID 83703 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Nicole Omsberg BY: - Hand Delivery 
Court Reporter Federal Express 
Elmore County Courthouse Certified Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Steve Kenyon 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 State St. 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-01 01 





Terry ~ P t l i f f  ,/ 1 
Attorney for Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
' I -  
/ TERRY S. RATLIFF 2009 flAR 18 Pfl 3: 6 1 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South 2nd East Street ; i t , t % . ~ . ;  d i r f i i  IC i I 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 C L E R K O F T H E C O U R T  
Telephone: (208) 587-0900 DEPUTY C.7-,LL- 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
Idaho State Bar No.: 3598 
Attorney for DefendantIAppellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No.: CR-2008-0932 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS. ) MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT 
) OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, ) DEFENDER 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, JUSTIN W. GOODGION, by and through his attorney, 
Terry S. Ratliff of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and hereby moves this Court for its Order pursuant 
'to Idaho Code $19-867, et seq, and Rule 13 (b), (12) and (19) appointing the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office to represent the above-named Defendant-Appellant in all M e r  
appellate proceedings and allowing trial counsel for Defendant to withdraw as counsel of record. 
This motion is brought on the ground and for the reason that the Defendant-Appellant is 
currently being represented by this Counsel and Office, as Public Defender in and for the County 
of Elmore, and the State Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the 
Defendant-Appellant in all felony appellate proceedings. 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENJ) 
arnr 
Further, it is in the interest of justice for that Office to represent the Defendant-Appellant 
in this case since the Defendant-Appellant is indigent, and any further proceedings in this case 
will be at the appellate level. 
DATED this (8 day of March, 2009. 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this /g day of March, 2009, served a copy of the 
within and foregoing MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER to: 
Molly J. Huskey By: Hand Delivery 
State Appellate Public Defender Federal Express 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane Certified Mail 
Boise, ID 83703 7 U.S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Kristina Schindele BY: - Hand Delivery 
Elmore County Proiecutor Federal Express 
P.O. Box 607 7 U.S. Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 Facsimile Transmission 
Legal Assistant 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - Page 2 
amr 
238  
TERRY S. RATLIFF 2009 APR -6 Pn 3: 40 
RATLIFF LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
290 South 2nd East Street 
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647 
Telephone: (208) 5 87-0900 
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940 
Bar Number: 3598 
Attorney for DefendantfAppellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 
Defendant. 
1 Case No.: CR-2008-0932 
1 
1 
1 ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 




The Court having reviewed the Defendant's Motion for Appointment of State Appellate 
Public Defender and Defendant-Appellant being indigent, and good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That Molly J. Huskey of the State's Appellate Public 
Defender's Office is hereby appointed as Counsel for the Defendant and Teny S. Ratlie of Ratliff 
Law Offices, Chtd. is hereby withdrawn as counsel of record. 
A DATED this& day of ,2009. 
--7 
ORDER FOR APPOMTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 1 
amr 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 1 have on this ?&day of , 2009, 
served a copy of the within and foregoing ORDER to: 
. . Kristina Schindele By: _'Ha Delivery 
Elrnore County Prosecuting Attorney - Federal Express 
190 South Fourth East - Certified Mail 
P.O. Box 607 - U.S. Mail 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 - Facsimile Transmission 
Terry S. Ratliff 
Ratliff Law Office, Chtd. 
290 South Second East 
Mountain Home, ID 83647 
Molly J. Huskey 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3627 Lake Harbor Ln. 
Boise, ID 83703 
-and Delivery 
- Federal Express 
- Certified Mail 
- U.S. Mail 
- Facsimile Transmission 
- Hand Delivery 
- Federal Express 
- Certified Mail 
A . S .  Mail - 
- Facsimile Transmission 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER - 2 
arnr 
' 4 0  
8 
r- 
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In the Supreme Court of the Statfi,q&J&#poo 9 
- 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 u 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS 
v. 
) 
) Supreme Court Docket No. 36364-2009 
) (36365-2009) 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, ) Elmore County Docket No. 2007-1 156 
) (2008-932) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
It appearing that these appeals should be consolidated for all purposes for reasons of 
judicial economy; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that appeal No. 36364 and 36365 shall be 
CONSOLIDATED FOR ALL PURPOSES under No. 36364, but all documents filed shall bear 
both docket numbers. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare a CLERK'S 
RECORD, which shall include the documents requested in the Notices of Appeal, together with 
a copy of this Order. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Reporter shall prepare a 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT, which shall include the transcripts requested in the Notices of 
Appeal. 
DATED this 1 0 ~  day of April 2009. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Court Reporter 
24 1 
ORDER CONSOLIDATING APPEALS - Docket No. 36364-2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs . ) Supreme Court 
) Case No. 36364-2009 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, (Case No. 36365-2009) 




I, MARSA GRIMMETT, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby 
certify: 
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered or 
admitted into evidence during the trial in this case: 
There were no trial exhibits in these cases. 
AND I FURTHER CERTIFY that the following will be submitted as 
exhibits to this Record: 
Pre-sentence Report dated Sept 11, 2007(Confidential Exhibit) 
APSI Report dated February 19, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit) 
Mental Health Report dated July 1, 08 (Confidential Exhibit) 
APSI Report dated Dec 8, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit) 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 1 
I N  WITNESS WHEREOF, I have  h e r e u n t o  set my hand  a n d  a f f i x e d  t h e  - 
seal o f  t h e  s a i d  C o u r t  t h i s  z!d d a y  o f  JULU , 2009 .  
MARSA G R I M M ~ T T  
C l e r k  o f  t h e  District  C o u r t  
BY bl wlCC) 
C Deputy C l e r k  
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS - Page 2  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE 





vs. ) Supreme Court 
) Case No. 36364-2009 
) (Case No. 36365-2009) 
JUSTIN W. GOODGION, 1 CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
I, MARSA GRIMMETT, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Elmore, do hereby 
certify that the foregoing Record in this cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction and is a true, correct and complete record of the 
pleadings and documents requested by Appellate Rule 28. 
I further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above 
entitled cause, see Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, will be duly lodged 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's 
Transcript and Clerk's Record. 
I further certify that the following will be submitted as 
exhibits to the Record on Appeal: 
Pre-Sentence Report dated Sept. 11, 2007 (Confidential Exhibit 
APSI Report dated February 19, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit) 
Mental Health Report dated July 1, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit) 
APSI Report dated December 8, 2008 (Confidential Exhibit) 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal - 
of the said Court this &I$+ day of ,) tC\Y , 2009. 
MARSA GRIMMETT 
Clerk of the District Court 
BY ~ I W !  
l Dkputy Clerk 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I N  THE D I S T R I C T  COURT O F  THE FOURTH J U D I C I A L  D I S T R I C T  O F  THE 
STATE O F  IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY O F  ELMORE 
STATE O F  IDAHO, 
v s .  
J U S T I N  W .  GOODGION, 
1 
1 S u p r e m e  C o u r t  
) C a s e  No .  3 6 3 6 4 - 2 0 0 9  
) ( C a s e  No .  3 6 3 6 5 - 2 0 0 9 )  
) CERTIFICATE O F  SERVICE 
1 
I, MARSA GRIMMETT, C l e r k  of t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  of t h e  F o u r t h  
J u d i c i a l  D i s t r i c t  of t h e  S t a t e  of Idaho, i n  and f o r  t h e  C o u n t y  of 
E l m o r e ,  do hereby c e r t i f y  t h a t  I have personal ly  served o r  m a i l e d ,  
by  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  M a i l ,  one copy of t h e  REPORTER'S  TRANSCRIPT and 
C L E R K ' S  RECORD t o  each of t h e  a t t o r n e y s  of record i n  t h i s  cause a s  
f o l l o w s :  
L a w r e n c e  G. Wasden M o l l y  Huskey 
ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
S ta tehouse  M a i l  3 6 4 7  L a k e  Harbor L a n e  
P . O .  B o x  83720 B o i s e ,  I D  8 3 7 0 3  
B o i s e ,  I D  8 3 7 2 0 - 0 0 1 0  
I N  WITNESS WHEREOF, I have h e r e u n t o  s e t  my hand and a f f i x e d  
the s e a l  of t h e  s a i d  Court t h i s  213% day of x&f , 
2 0 0 9 .  
MARSA GRIMMETT 
C l e r k  of t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  
C E R T I F I C A T E  O F  SERVICE 
